COMMUNICATION AND CULTURE
Argumentative, Cognitive and Linguistic Perspectives

László Komlósi
Peter Houtlosser
Michiel Leezenberg
(Eds.)

Amsterdam
Sic Sat 2003
# Table Of Contents

Converging Aspects of Culture in Communication: Introduction 7  
Michiel Lezenberg, László I. Komlósi and Peter Houtlosser

## Section I Pragmatics

Culture-Internal Variation in Metaphors 19  
Zoltán Kövecses

The problem of meaning variance of mental terms in cognitive development 31  
Szabolcs Kiss

Similarities and Differences Between Monolingual Communication and Translation 43  
Pál Heltai

Translation: Intercultural communication or interlinguistic transfer? 53  
Albert Péter Vermes

The Narrative Perspective in Subjective Literary Experience: A Cross-Cultural Study 61  
János László and Tibor Pólya

Communication as Social Practice: The Interface between the Cognitive and the Social Sciences 69  
Michiel Lezenberg

## Section II Cognition and Conceptualization

Social Cognition and Language as a Cultural Model of Reality 81  
Gábor Győri

Recognizing Specificity and Social Cognition 91  
László Tarnay and Tamás Pólya

The Relationship of Conceptual Structure and Grammatical Structure in Modals 101  
Péter Pelyvás

On the Social–Cognitive and Linguistic Status of Various Types of Knowledge and Knowledge Structures 115  
József Andor

On the Conceptualization of Animal Taxonomies across Cultures 131  
Sándor Martsa
Numerical Systems Analysis for the Conceptual and Semantic Structures of the Lexicon in Contemporary Hungarian  143
László Marácz and Attila Montvai

SECTION III  DISCOURSE ANALYSIS AND ARGUMENTATION THEORY

In Quest of Cultural and Conceptual Universals for Situated Discursive Practice  159
László I. Komlói
Strategic Manoeuvring: William the Silent’s Apologie. A Case in Point  177
Frans H. van Eemeren & Peter Houtlosser
Exploring communicational ethos. A compulsory phase in the study of discourse and intercultural communication  187
Danièle Torck
The Transition from Misunderstanding to Understanding in Intercultural Communication  197
Jan D. ten Thije
The Role of Political Communication in Shaping Culture in CEECs  215
István Tarróy
Argumentative and juxtapositive strategies in political discourse  227
J. Lachlan Mackenzie
Converging Aspects of Culture in Communication: Introduction
Michiel Leezenberg, László I. Komlósi and Peter Houtlosser

The language we speak is such an obvious and apparently natural feature of our environment that, in situations of practical communication, we only become aware of some of its complexities when confronted with speakers of a different language. Differences in vocabulary and grammar appear at once when confronting, say, Dutch and Hungarian; but effective communication in either, or between the two, also requires knowledge of, among others, the different conceptualizations and styles of communicating that both languages involve. This point applies quite generally: what is considered polite in one speech community (say, not looking one’s conversation partner directly in the eyes, or using elaborate forms of honorific address) may be considered rude or tedious in others. Successful cross-linguistic or intercultural communication thus requires much more than mere knowledge of the grammar of a foreign language.

Yet, communication across linguistic, cultural and national boundaries is increasingly becoming a staple feature of living in a globalized world. Moreover, the drastic political and economic restructuring that Eastern European countries have undergone since 1989 and the meteoric (and, at first blush, irreversible) rise of the internet society are indicative of the very rapid processes of social change which the world is undergoing at present and which are bound to have far-reaching consequences for our means and styles of communication. Such developments suggest that at present, we may be living through a period of cultural change of an unprecedented scope, scale and speed. They also suggest that linguistic and conceptual skills are not merely acquired as a matter of adaptation to a quasi-natural environment, but also, and crucially, involve institutional settings, such as schools and the media. Such institutional settings do influence both our styles of communicating and our ways of conceptualizing.

How these quick and radical forms of social and institutional change may affect the ways of communication within and across cultural and national boundaries, and how individuals and groups try to cope with specific communicative strategies are, at present, widely open questions. It is to such questions that the present collection of papers is devoted. The contributions can be grouped under three broad headings. The first is that of pragmatics: it focuses on language use and its cultural, cross-cultural and sub-cultural variations. The second is that of cognition and conceptualization: it focuses on the linguistic expression of the results of social cognition, of our social experiences and of the conceptual models of social reality. The third is that of discourse analysis and argumentation theory: it focuses on the discursive and argumentative strategies with which language users (primarily, but by no means exclusively, politicians) may communicate their cultural norms and ideals, or what used to be called ‘ideologies’.
It just so happens that each of these sections contains six papers. Needless to say, some of the contributions display an overlap between the sections; and equally needless to say, the approaches gathered here do not exhaust the ways in which one can study communication and culture. They form a preliminary offering of approaches, with a distinct Dutch–Hungarian flavor. They offer, so to speak, an experimental fusion of Hungarian and Dutch cuisines in the study of communication. We sincerely hope that this mixture of textures and tastes will wet the reader’s appetite.

I. Pragmatics

The contributions collected in the first section broadly fall under the topic of pragmatics. They all deal with language use and its variability, and, more importantly, with the social and cultural factors that may influence such variation. They also address the relation between linguistic (or, more precisely, semantic and conceptual) structure and language usage, and the interrelationships between cultural and cognitive variation. In other words, the contributions of this section stand at both the interface between semantics and pragmatics and the interface between cognitive and social sciences. Consequently, the two notions that take pride of place in this section are categorization (or conceptualization) and culture.

Zoltán Kövecses addresses the question of how cognitive linguistics can account for variation in systems of conceptual metaphor. He suggests that such an extension must be able to account for the (social, cultural, and other) dimensions, the forms, and the causes of such metaphor variation. He discusses some of the (sub-) cultural, ethnic, and other differences that may be involved, and provides vivid examples from speakers as diverse as Japanese married couples and American pilgrims.

Szabolcs Kiss addresses the question of socio-cultural variation in conceptualization from a perspective of developmental psychology. His erudite paper focuses on children’s cognitive development, especially their development of a ‘naive theory of mind’, that is, a way of understanding people’s behavior in terms of mental-state concepts like belief, intention, anger, etc. Opposing both rationalist (or nativist) and empiricist approaches to cognitive development, he defends a constructivist approach. He argues that mental terms undergo important changes of meaning in the course of the child’s conceptual development. These differences may be so serious as to make the child’s theories at different stages incommensurable.

Translation can be regarded as interpretive language use and as such it shares properties with other kinds of interpretive language use. Therefore, translation can be treated within the framework of Relevance Theory, a general theory of communication. Two contributions address the question of whether, and in how far, translation is, on the one hand, a phenomenon sufficiently distinct from monolingual communication to justify a separate theoretical account, and on the other, a monolithic or unitary phenomenon. Pál Heltai discusses, and rejects, Gutt’s Relevance-theoretical argument that there is no need for a separate account of translation. Inter-lingual communication, he argues, involves essentially more complex processes of coding and decoding and the like than monolingual communication; structural linguistic differences may further complicate this process.
Translation, Albert Vermes argues, is a form of communication that may occur in vastly different institutional contexts (e.g., conversational, diplomatic, or literary) and with quite different aims; these differences, however, are not so radical as to defeat the very attempt to subsume them under the same theory. Rather, translation may involve different degrees of cultural transfer (or intercultural translation) and of closeness in interpretation. Like Heltai, Vermes also briefly discusses Gutt’s views.

János László and Tibor Pólya present a cross-cultural study of narrative comprehension by Hungarian and Danish readers. They experimentally investigate whether the variable of cultural proximity affects readers’ understanding of narrative perspective, and the richness of remembrance of events. Their findings suggest, among others, that the reader’s experienced vividness of an internal or narrator’s perspective appears to depend on cultural closeness.

Michiel Leezenberg presents a theoretical and methodological discussion of some of the main notions involved in the study of social cognition. Criticizing on the one hand the individualist and mentalist view of cognition predominant in cognitive linguistics, and on the other hand the naïve view of culture in terms of shared rules, norms or values assumed in many discussions of (inter-cultural) communication, he takes the recent development of so-called practice approaches in the social sciences as his main source of inspiration. These, he argues, allow for a more sophisticated account of both the public and performative character of social action; with a more systematic attention to the role of power and conflict, they also promise a different perspective on intra-cultural and inter-cultural variation, and on linguistic and conceptual change. A further spin-off of such a more principled attention to language usage as practice may be a renewed thrust towards the integration of the cognitive and discourse dimensions of communication, which also are the main focus of attention of the other two sections of this volume.

II. Cognition and Conceptualization

Among the approaches that deal with the question of communicability of cultural phenomena one can see an increasing number of frameworks acknowledging a strong background in cognitive science and cognitive linguistics. As a matter of fact, in the past 20 years Cognitive Linguistics has markedly established itself as an alternative paradigm in the fields of theoretical linguistics and language studies to the Generative Linguistics paradigm.

The cognitive approach to language and language use acknowledges the (direct or symbolic) relationship between perception, conceptualization and language structure. In particular, this concerns the ways in which we conceptualize our bodily, spatial and temporal experiences on the individual and social levels alike. This feature of the cognitive approach is often referred to as experientialism and/or social constructivism concerning meanings. Another important tenet of the cognitive approach concerns the way we think: on the basis of domain-specific sets of knowledge we constantly expand our knowledge innovatively with the help of mental processes that can metaphorically and metonymically extend meanings or blend and integrate contents of mental spaces. On such premises, cognitively oriented inquiries show focused interest in culture-specific conceptualizations and cultural models mapping the social environment in the different speech communities in
order to obtain a better understanding of the nature and the processes of social cognition. The cognitive approach is also open to evolutionary explanations of human capacities (such as perception, categorization, conceptualization) that exhibit direct relevance to language structure and language use.

The set of papers dealing with the role of cognition and the contribution of cognitive linguistics to the study of cultural models reflect two types of inquiry: some of them concern theoretical research into the nature of perception and cognition, the evolutionary aspects of cognition and language, the correlation between individual and social cognition, including cultural models mapping the social environment. Others turn their attention to application: they inquire how cultural models are realized in conceptual and linguistic structure, how verbal interaction facilitates the social cognitive processes of social adaptation, integration, and negotiation. There are still other papers which offer detailed analyses of strictly linguistic phenomena, concentrating on the mental lexicon, the working of which is witnessed in the language use and the linguistic choice of the members of the speech communities.

Gábor Győri looks at the evolution of cognition from a broad perspective and claims that cognition is an indispensable condition of life. He sees cognition in animals as primarily a biological function for constructing an internal model of their environment with the operation of which they can adaptively interact with the environment. He claims, however, that while most organisms can only acquire knowledge through sensory experiences gathered individually, human cognition is enriched by human linguistic capacities with the help of which knowledge is acquired without direct physical experience. Symbols in language carry information about reality and symbolic communication capable of substituting direct experience. Many symbolic structures have a representational content of non-physical experiences. Győri’s major claim is that human language has a crucial evolutionary advantage that makes the unique human capacity for symbolic cognition manifest. Symbolic cognition substitutes to a great extent direct experience. Győri argues that the human brain models the social environment in a way that allows for cultural models as outcomes of the processes of social cognition.

László Tarnay and Tamás Pólya critically analyze traditional views of the recognition of co-specifics in social communities, especially the recognition of specificity in individuals. They reject the view that recognizing an individual is an instance of categorial perception and argue that the recognition of specificity is an entirely different capacity from categorial perception: it cannot be reduced to any of the possible modes of categorization. The main thrust of their argument is that evolution afforded a cognitively less costly solution to the specificity recognition problem: the recognition of individuals is based on the detection of indexical, non-categorizable information about their specificity. They conclude that individual recognition is direct, not mediated by categorial structure. Therefore, specificity recognition logically and empirically precedes categorial perception. Their final, somewhat striking conclusion is that not only the two recognition capacities, but perception and language per se are orthogonal.

The paper by Péter Pelyvás discusses the relationship between conceptual structure and grammatical structure in the paradigm of Cognitive Grammar. Pelyvás focuses on English modals. He claims that the conceptual structures of modals are obtained through meta-
phorical extension of root meaning into the epistemic domain. In his analysis, he relies on his own force-dynamics framework describing the interacting forces responsible for conceptual change. The analysis permits a clear distinction between root (mainly deontic) and epistemic modals in terms of conceptual structure. Although the analysis focuses on the deontic and epistemic meanings of MAY and MUST, it also offers a natural extension to other entrenched grammatical constructions. He concludes that in the cases of modals, the symbolic relationships that link conceptual and grammatical structure should not be considered trivial.

In his paper József Andor offers an interesting combination of a theoretical investigation and an empirical analysis of certain culture-specific newspaper texts. In the first part of his paper we witness an attempt at an integrated and systematic description of types of knowledge and knowledge structures (lexical/dictionary knowledge, encyclopedic knowledge, generic knowledge, individual/private knowledge, social knowledge, etc.) related to texts. The second part of the paper investigates the role of the types of knowledge and knowledge structures in textual production and comprehension, based on the analysis of five sample texts of Hungarian newspaper articles reporting Princess Margaret’s death. Andor concludes that the news articles do not present maximally co-operative types of texts, as they manifest violations of the Gricean maxims.

The paper by Sándor Martsa offers a cross-linguistic and cross-cultural investigation, using evidence from English and Hungarian, into figurative meanings of animal terms as a reflection of the conceptualization of human character traits which is motivated and licensed by correlations with animal taxonomies. Martsa argues that among ethnobiological categories it is the so-called generic taxa that display the highest salience. Thus, ethnobiological categories for animals are not definable in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, but rather in terms of psychologically and culturally salient features. The anthropomorphization of the corresponding real-world animals appears to be an important condition for the metaphorical application of generic taxa for animals. Martsa also shows how the communicative principle of the Gricean Maxim of Quantity imposes restrictions on the mapping of animal features onto human features. In order to encourage further investigation, Martsa argues for a dynamic two-way mapping, in which humans and animals become the alternating source and target domains.

László Marácz and Attila Montvai set out to analyze and quantify a substantial collection of lexical material in the Hungarian language using their own experimental numerical systems analyser. The authors tease out the cognitive implications of the original insight of the root dictionary of Czuczor and Fögarasi, especially relevant for word recognition and associative meaning integration. Marácz and Montvai advance two claims: (i) the most dominant root structure in Hungarian is tryadic CVC and (ii) the basic meaning of the root is expressed by the consonants. Marácz and Montvai reconstruct the so-called organic word groups across the lexicon of Hungarian. They claim that the generative and permutational capacities of the Hungarian lexicon are greatly enhanced by these organic word groups. They further introduce the highly productive operational procedures of linking and looping for root transformations. Hence, their study of the Hungarian lexicon contributes to the study of the innovative capacities of the human mind.
III. Discourse Analysis and Argumentation Theory

The research presented in the last section of this volume specifically aims at illuminating cultural phenomena (inter-cultural, intra-cultural, cross-cultural and multi-cultural) as they manifest themselves in discourse. This discourse research is closely related to the socio-pragmatic and cognitive-linguistic research presented in the earlier chapters of the book. The phenomena that are studied can at least in part be seen as realizations of the potential constituted by the underlying socio-pragmatic and cognitive-linguistic system. Yet, the cultural phenomena that are the object of investigation in this section also have an independent quality, which calls for modes of investigation altogether different from those used in social pragmatics and cognitive linguistics. Unlike the general cultural phenomena that are characteristic of linguistic communication, discursive cultural phenomena require a detailed study of the communication in specific types or genres of discourse, and even in particular specimens of communication that are typical of a specific type or genre.

As was to be expected, the types and genres of discourse subjected to cultural scrutiny in this section are quite diverse: they include narrative discourse, political discourse, argumentative discourse, historical discourse, and even literary discourse. The methods of discourse analysis and text analysis that are used to analyze the cultural aspects of these various types and genres of discourse consist in applications of theoretical analytic frameworks designed to highlight particular features of a specific discursive activity. The kinds of frameworks that are applied in the analyses vary in orientation, depending on the interests of the analysts and the discourse features they are interested in analyzing, from structural to functional, from monological to dialogical and interactional, and from rhetorical to dialectical. The insights gained by using these diverse frameworks do not always automatically combine. They may even be incompatible. In their own right, however, all analyses contribute to enhancing our understanding of the cultural ins and outs of the various discursive practices in human communication. Moreover, however disparate the types of discourse and frameworks of analysis, all authors contributing to this section share an interest in (i) identifying the ways in which cultural phenomena shape a frame of reference for, or even determine, the proceeding of the discourse, and (ii) identifying the ways in which the participants in the discourse create such cultural phenomena. This two-fold interest is a reminder of discourse analysts’ interest in the role that context is supposed to play in discursive practices in framing the discourse and being framed by the discourse. In this light, ‘investigation of culture’ can be seen as a special form of ‘investigation of context’.

What kinds of results do these ‘contextual investigations’ produce? And how can they be used? A general theoretical result the papers presented in this section is that more insight is gained in the various ways in which ‘culture’ pervades discursive activities in all types and genres of discourse. Such an insight could, as Michiel Leezenberg argues in his contribution to the first section of this volume, be instrumental in analyzing and explaining pragmatic issues concerning language meaning and understanding. A second, more practical result consists in a more profound knowledge of the various mechanisms and strategies that participants in a discourse employ in trying to get their points across. Knowledge of such mechanisms and strategies could, for instance, be of help in improving the quality of negotiations between people from different cultural backgrounds. A third, practical and
even more concrete result is that it becomes clear how actual specimens of discourse that are generally regarded as culturally – or interculturally – important ‘work’, so that they can be more adequately dealt with. Contemporary examples are to be found in the cultural analyses given of President Bush’s oratory on terrorist activity.

A closer look at the papers included in this section makes it clear what kinds of results each of the authors is aiming for, and how their work can be utilized.

László Komósi’s paper clearly intends to lead to results of the first type we just discussed. He attempts to give a comprehensive analysis of the complex relationship between linguistic behaviour, social interaction and the (re)production of culture. By adopting a social constructivist starting point and a discursive approach to culture, he attributes a constitutive role to situated discursive practice in cultural production. He defines ‘culture’ in terms of the fixed patterns that are observable in language use and in narrative constructions. Starting from a distinction between the cognitive linguistic system (based on the conceptual organisation of language) and the cognitive cultural system (based on cultural narrative construction), Komlósi analyses three examples of cultural universals that play a part in securing cultural identity: (i) interactant identities secured by face keeping, (ii) cultural identities secured by cultural narratives, and (iii) the dichotomy of human inquiry secured by the “prismatic complexity” of reasoning. Komlósi also analyses three examples of conceptual universals: (i) metaphorical and metonymical thinking, (ii) mental space blending, and (iii) fundamental organizing principles of concept-structuring systems. In his analyses of situated discursive practice, he applies a pragma-dialectical framework of argumentative discourse as well as the theory of dialogical action games in social interaction.

The contribution of Frans van Eemeren and Peter Houtlosser has a general theoretical component as well as a practical component. Their theoretical aim is to transcend the old disciplinary division between dialectical and rhetorical approaches to argumentation, which has led to an almost ideological separation in Western academic culture. Van Eemeren and Houtlosser propose an integrated pragma-dialectical perspective for the analysis and evaluation of argumentative discourse in which a central position is assigned to the concept of ‘strategic manoeuvring’. The authors envision strategic manoeuvring as an attempt to reconcile the dialectical obligation to conduct an argumentative interaction in accordance with the critical rules of dialectic and the rhetorical ambition to have one’s own position accepted. To illustrate their view, they analyse some fragments of William of Orange’s famous Apologie (1581), a pamphlet that was written to defend William’s actions, as leader of the Dutch Revolt against the accusations of the Spanish ruler of the Low Countries, King Philip II. In their analysis, van Eemeren and Houtlosser make clear how both cultural and religious differences caused the polemic between William and Philip to derail from the moment it started.

Gaining insight in the various mechanisms and strategies by which discourse participants try to get their attitudes conveyed in intercultural communication is the central concern of Danièle Torck’s contribution. More specifically, her aim is to illuminate the cultural notion of ‘communicational ethos’. Unlike the classical concept of ethos, the notion of communicational ethos refers to the dominant communicative norms, principles and behaviour of a culturally-determined group of speakers. In Torck’s view, an interest in communicational ethos calls for an examination of the ways in which its various dimensions are
represented in people’s discourse, and the way in which they are perceived and evaluated by the recipients of the discourse. In Torck’s paper, specimens of political discourse are subjected to an examination. In this endeavour, she is particularly interested in how speech communities value an orientation towards confrontation, as opposed to the orientation towards cooperation that is generally supposed to be basic to human communication.

Jan ten Thije has similar aspirations as Torck, albeit that he realises them in an entirely different manner. In recent years, ten Thije says, people’s lives have become interculturally determined. Social transitions have created completely new cultural constellations. In order for people to participate in these constellations, a complex communicative intercultural competency is required. Ten Thije focuses on a particular aspect of this competency, i.e., the use of a three-step linguistic strategy for bringing about a common ground between interlocutors in intercultural communication. He reconstructs the use of this strategy in a particular sort of intercultural communication, i.e., a series of talks between West and East Germans and Dutchmen about the Germans’ past experiences with their Trabant automobile. Ten Thije’s analysis neatly shows how the three-step strategy is executed.

The aim of István Tarrosy’s contribution is of a more local and practical nature. Tarrosy is concerned with the development of the political culture in post-Soviet countries. After a brief discussion of the social transitions in these countries, he investigates the methods and results of political communication between individuals and the society they are part of. He observes that political communication plays an all-important role in constituting a political culture and strongly influences the socialisation process. It may therefore be thought to be helpful to the leading elite to take this into account for maintaining political power. On the other hand, as Tarrosy shows, in times of social transition political communication can also facilitate criticism of the policies of the elite.

Clarifying how a cultural frame of reference is exploited in a particular specimen of argumentative discourse is the aim of Lachlan Mackenzie’s paper. Focusing on the argumentative strategies brought to bear in a political text printed in the Budapest Sun, Mackenzie applies the framework of Rhetorical Structure Theory. Rhetorical functions are attributed to particular units in a text on the basis of their structural relation with other text units. Mackenzie shows that the mechanisms Rhetorical Structure Theory refers to can be manipulated to realise persuasive aims. He demonstrates that specific structural relations in the Budapest Sun text invite the reader to assign argumentative functions to the text that it does in fact not have. Assigning such functions is thus unwarranted. Mackenzie focuses in particular on one case, in which the overall structure of the text suggests that a causal relation between two text units exists, whereas, structurally speaking, these units are merely juxtaposed. This suggestion, Mackenzie argues, is clearly rhetorically advantageous for the author: not only does the reader become actively engaged in making the causal link, but also he assumes a responsibility for its authenticity.

In concluding it may be interesting to point at an important issue that is not explicitly addressed in most of the papers in this section: the potential of cultural critique. Van Eemeren and Houtlosser are in this respect most outspoken. Their requirement of conventional validity implies that in intercultural discussions, such as that between William of Orange and Philip of Spain, there is a necessity to agree on some common ground. If any common ground is lacking, the discussion will go astray. Torck and Tarrosy, too, touch
upon the critical aspects of their endeavours. Torck points at two possible explanations of the current trend of ‘cultural fundamentalism’ – pointing out how it can be remedied. Tarrósy emphasises the critical potential of political communication for those who prefer pluralism to authoritarian rules. Mackenzie does not address the critical potential of his analytic framework, but he carefully casts doubt on the persuasive qualities of the text to which this framework is applied. Komlósi and ten Thije do not explicitly manifest any critical ambitions. Their aim is to show us that people engaged in intercultural communication are to a large extent competent and rational in doing the things they do – a reassuring observation.

The articles collected in this volume constitute a generous selection from the papers presented at the Dutch-Hungarian Conference on Cross-cultural Linguistics and Intercultural Communication, organized by the University of Pécs and held in the Center of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in Pécs, Hungary in February 2002. Numerous Dutch and Hungarian scholars from various universities, not all of them located in Holland or Hungary, participated. The original title of the conference, “Social Cognition and Verbal Communication: Cultural Narratives, Linguistic Identities and Applied Argumentation in a Period of Social Transition: Dutch-Hungarian Conference on Cross-cultural Linguistics and Intercultural Communication” reflects the broad range of approaches and perspectives that a topic of such complexity deserves. The conference was held under the auspices of the intergovernmental agreement “Joint Work Plan for Dutch-Hungarian Cooperation in Education 2000-2002”. The financial and institutional support gained due to the agreement is gratefully acknowledged, just as the contributions of CROSS and Sic Sat in financing and publishing this volume.
SECTION I
Pragmatics
1. Introduction

In the past twenty years cognitive linguists have discovered a huge system of conceptual metaphors (see Lakoff & Johnson, 1980 and Kövecses, 2002). In addition, they have found that a large part of this system appears to be universal. In light of these findings, some important new questions arise: Is this metaphor system monolithic and universal? If not (as we might expect it to be the case on the basis of available evidence), what would a cognitive linguistic theory of metaphor variation look like? I would suggest that such a theory should be capable of explaining three crucial aspects of variation in the use metaphor: the dimensions, the forms, and the causes of variation.

By dimensions of metaphor variation I mean those cultural, social, etc. divisions among the users of metaphorical language along which metaphors vary. The form of metaphor variation means the particular manifestations of variation. The causes of metaphor variation involve the factors that are responsible for the differential use of metaphors. The relationship among the three aspects of metaphor variation can be summarized as follows: certain factors (causes) produce differential uses of metaphor (forms) along certain divisions of speakers and contexts of use (dimensions).

In the present paper I will only be concerned with the question of what the dimensions of metaphor variation might be. What are the main dimensions along which metaphors (both conceptual and linguistic) vary? I think of this as an empirical issue and will look at various kinds of evidence that suggest such dimensions of variation. One obvious dimension of variation is the cross-cultural one, that is, the division that separates various language groups. Cross-cultural and cross-linguistic variation has been noticed by a number of researchers both within cognitive linguistics and outside it. In this paper I will examine the major dimensions of metaphor variation within the same culture on the basis of evidence that has become available to me in recent years. The dimensions that emerge from this preliminary survey include the various social, ethnic, subcultural, regional, stylistic, and individual divisions of larger language groups (see also Boers, 1999). We can observe several kinds (forms) of differences in the use of metaphorical language along these dimensions.

2. The Social Dimension

Social dimensions include the differentiation of society into men and women, young and old, middle-class and working class, and so forth. Do men, the young, or the middle-class
use different metaphors than women, the old, or the working-class? At present we do not have the relevant studies from a cognitive linguistic perspective. But we do have some indication that metaphor usage varies according to such divisions of society.

One example of this is the men–woman distinction. This division seems to be operative in several distinct cases: the way men talk about women, the way women talk about men, the way men and women talk about women, the way men and women about the world in general (i.e., not only about the other). In English-speaking countries (but also in others), it is common for men to use expressions such as bunny, kitten, bird, chick, cookie, dish, sweetie pie, and many others, of women. These metaphorical expressions assume certain conceptual metaphors: women are (small) furry animals (bunny, kitten), women are birds (bird, chick, hen party), and women are (sweet) food (cookie, dish, sweetie pie). However, when women talk about men they do not appear to use these metaphors of men, or use them in a more limited way. Men are not called bunnies or kittens by women. Neither are men characterized as birds or chicks, but they can be thought of as large furry animals instead, such as bears. And women are more commonly viewed by men as sweet food than men are by women, although women can also sometimes describe men as food, especially for sexual purposes (a hunk).

In Japanese culture, women seem to be metaphorically conceptualized in ways in which men are not (Hiraga, 1991). In Japanese it is customary to describe women as commodities, but the same conceptualization does not apply to Japanese men. Hiraga (1991: 39-40) provides such examples as the following for the women are a commodity metaphor:

(1) Ano onna-wa ore-no mono da.
That woman-TOP I(M)-GEN thing be –PRST
(That woman is mine.)

but not
(2) ?? Ano otoka-wa watasi-no mono yo.
That man-TOP I(F)-GEN thing be-PRST
(That man is mine.)

According to another example:
(3) Ore-no onna-ni te-o dasu-na.
I(M)-GEN woman-DAT hand-ACC hold-out-NEG-IMP
(Don’t make an advance to my woman.)

but not:
(4) ?? Watasi-no otoko-ni te-o dasa-nai-de.
I(F) GEN man-DAT hand-ACC hold-out-NEG-IMP[F]
(Don’t make on advance to my man.)

In addition to women being conceptualized as a commodity in Japanese, they can also be more specifically viewed as sales products (Hiraga, 1991: 40):
(5) Tanoo-wa ano onna-o kizu mono-ni si-ta.
Tanoo-TOP that woman-ACC flaw thing-DAT do-PAST
(Tanoo made that woman a flawed article.)
(Note: Tanoo is a common Japanese name for men.) The same thing, however, cannot be said of men:
In the last pair of examples, the flaw in the product corresponds to the lack of virginity in a person. It is this aspect of people that is treated unequally in the Japanese language and in traditional Japanese society in general.

But the general point is this: A language community may employ differential metaphorical conceptualizations along a social division that is relevant in that society. As we saw above, the particular division of members of a society into men and women may be reflected in various ways of differentially treating men and women in metaphorical language and thought. We can perhaps hypothesize that the more varied these ways are, the more important or entrenched the particular division is. Furthermore, it makes sense to believe that when a particular metaphorical conceptualization is linguistically obligatory for all the participants of the division (e.g. for both men and women alike), the more deeply seated it is likely to be.

3. The ethnic dimension

Metaphorical conceptualization appears to vary from ethnic group to ethnic group (and this factor can also possibly combine with various social factors, such as men-women, working class-middle class). One would expect that variation along the ethnic dimension should especially be noticeable in societies with highly segregated ethnic groups. Another interesting aspect of the ethnic factor is to see whether and how the metaphors that have been created by a particular ethnic group become integrated into another, and why. The answers to these questions could be used as the first steps to a sociology of metaphor in the cognitive linguistic paradigm. It can also be the case that ethnic groups base their metaphors of a particular target domain on different but congruent source domains. One example of this is the Black English expression *nitty-gritty* (meaning important) versus the mainstream white expression *bottom line* for the target domain of importance. In both, we have the conceptual metaphor *important is central*, but the specific-level source domains are obviously different.

The ethnic factor may also play an important role in creating speaking styles that are highly metaphorical. One such speaking style is “playing the dozens” in the Black English Vernacular. The following is a sample from a more extended conversation (from Kochman, 1981: 55):

Pretty Black: “What’chu laughing ‘bout Nap, with your funky mouth smelling like dog shit.”
Nap: “Your mama motherfucker.”
Pretty Black: “Your funky mama too.”
Nap (strongly): “It takes twelve barrels of water to make a steamboat run; it takes an elephant’s dick to make your Grandmammy com; she beeen elephant fucked, camel fucked and hit side the head with your Grandpappy’s nuts.”
Playing the dozens is a competitive conversational situation in which the participants attempt to outdo each other. The success of the participants depends on verbal and conceptual skills in producing metaphorical imagery at the expense of the other. In other words, in this particular speaking style characteristic of Black youth culture metaphorical creativity is emphasized as being a precondition for success.

4. The regional dimension

An obvious division of societies is according to distinct regions. Metaphor usage may vary according to region. Regional varieties can be national or local dialects. As an example, we can observe differences in metaphorical conceptualization in national dialects. This has several aspects: the choice of expressions reflecting the same conceptual metaphor might differ; conceptual metaphors might differ for the same target; one national dialect may influence metaphorical conceptualization in another, and so on. For example, Americans use a metaphorical expression for anger that is a variant of the general anger is a hot fluid in a container (or even more generally, of the angry person is a pressurized container): have a cow, while the British use have kittens. Both expressions are motivated by the same conceptual metaphor but the actual linguistic expressions differ. Furthermore, in the past 300 years American English seems to have had a greater impact on British English in terms of metaphorical conceptualization than the other way around (see Kövecses, 2000). There is a huge number of metaphorical expressions in British English that originated in American English. The English spoken in Britain was carried to North America by the settlers. The freshness and imaginative vigor of American English has been noted by many authors. Among them, Baugh and Cable (1983, 365) provide a useful comment:

He [the American] is perhaps at his best when inventing simple homely words like apple butter, sidewalk, and lightning rod, spelling bee and crazy quilt, low-down, and know-nothing, or when striking off a terse metaphor like log rolling, wire pulling, to have an ax to grind, to be on the fence. ... The American early manifested the gift, which he continues to show, of the imaginative, slightly humorous phrase. To it we owe to bark up the wrong tree, to face the music, fly off the handle, go on the warpath, bury the hatchet, come out at the little end of the horn, saw wood, and many more, with the breath of the country and sometimes of the frontier about them. In this way, the American began his contributions to the English language.

Many of these and other metaphorical expressions in American English owe their existence to the new landscape the settlers encountered, the many new activities they engaged in, and the frontier experience in general.
5. The style dimension

By style I mean linguistic variation according to setting, subject matter, medium, audience, etc. It is an open question whether metaphors are used differentially along these dimensions or factors. Some examples seem to suggest that some, or maybe most, of the factors can be regarded as dimensions along which metaphors vary.

Let us take subject matter or topic as our first illustration of the point. Jean Aitchison (1987) made an observation that might be relevant here. She noted that it commonly occurs that in newspaper articles and headlines about (American) football games the names of the teams may select particular metaphors for defeat. Here are some examples from Aitchison (1987, 143): “Cougars drown Beavers,” “Cowboys corral Buffaloes,” “Air Force torpedoes the Navy,” “Clemson cooks Rice.” These are headlines from American newspapers describing football games. Metaphors used in these sentences are selected on the basis of the names of football teams. Since beavers live in water, defeat can be metaphorically viewed as drowning; since cowboys corral cattle, the opponent can be corralled; since navy boats can be torpedoes, the opponent can be torpedoes, too; and since rice can be cooked, the same process can be used to describe the defeat of the opponent. The metaphors in the above sentences indicate that the target domain of defeat can be variously expressed as drowning, corralling, etc., the choice depending on the meaning (or, loosely, the subject matter or topic) of the constituents of the sentences.

As a second illustration, let us take audience-related variation in language. Given this factor, we can have formal, neutral (colloquial), informal, and slang usage. Do metaphors vary depending on the level of formality? In general, it can be suggested that slang in all languages is highly metaphorical—more metaphorical than the level that we call neutral or colloquial style. Let us see what this claim means in detail. In English (and in many other languages), the domain of anger is conceptualized as a hot fluid, fire, insanity, burden, vicious animal, etc. In American slang, there are several expressions describing anger that cannot easily and straightforwardly be assigned to any of these. Two such expressions are be flexed and be bent out of shape. These expressions appear to reflect a metaphorical conceptualization of anger, something like anger is physical tension in an object, which is primarily found in American slang. In other words, there is a conceptual metaphor here that chiefly characterizes slang, rather than neutral standard American usage.

Next consider two conceptual metaphors used in standard English for the concept of happiness: happy is light/bright and happiness is being off the ground. Both of these are highly conventionalized metaphors and are reflected in stylistically neutral contexts by a large number of well-entrenched expressions. Examples for the former include “bright future” and “brighten up.” Now in American slang we can also find expressions such as “I’m still sunny side up” and its opposite „He’s over-easy now,” where sunny side up means ‘happy face up’ and over-easy means ‘face down, passed out, not happy.’ Examples for the standard or neutral use of the happiness is being off the ground metaphor include „They’re on top of the world” and „When I saw him, he was walking on air.” In American slang, however, we can also have „He’s sportin’ the gravity boots,” „She heard the news and just went into orbit,” and „Man, I think I’m levitating.”
In these cases, the conceptual metaphors remain the same, but the slang expressions reflect exaggerated elaborations of the conceptual metaphors.

6. The subcultural dimension

Subcultures often define themselves in contradistinction to mainstream culture and they can in part be defined by the metaphors they use. And sometimes the self-definition of a subculture involves the unique metaphorical conceptualization of important concepts on which the separateness of the subculture hinges. There are many different kinds of subculture, including religious, artistic, scientific, gender-based, and so forth.

Closely-knit religious groups constitute some of the most obvious subcultures. The tight cohesion of the group often assumes the acceptance of core values and key ideas that are metaphorically constituted. In mainstream American society people are taken to be “agents with coherent intentions” (Balaban, 1999, 130). If they behave in ways that do not suggest this notion of agency, they are regarded as mentally and emotionally unstable. In other words, the notion that a person must exhibit agency with coherent intentions in his behavior leads to a particular understanding of mental illness: People who lack agency with coherent intentions are mentally unstable or deranged. Now some religious subcultures in American society work under the communicative pressure of reducing their agency by reason of being members of the subculture. However, if they do that, they are branded by mainstream society as being mentally unstable. One such group are the people who regularly attend a Marian apparition site. These pilgrims give accounts of miraculous signs that they have experienced. At their meetings, they tell each other about the divine events that have happened to them, the miraculous visions and thoughts they had, etc. They give accounts of knowledge that comes from outside their selves; they do not function as agents in the thoughts that they experienced. The knowledge that they possess comes from an outside agent. But they have to face a problem here: A lack of coherent agency indicates in mainstream American society that a person is mentally unstable. For this reason, the pilgrims to the Marian apparition site must conform to two contradictory pressures. In the words of Victor Balaban, the anthropologist who studied the group: “... the pilgrims in Conyers need to assert that their thoughts or feelings come from an outside agent, but at the same time make clear the speaker's control over his/her own mind” (Balaban, 1999, 130). How can this dilemma be resolved? The pilgrims have to use language that simultaneously presents them as nonvolitional speakers (to maintain the view of the divine nature of their experiences) and, at the same time, as reliable sources of authentic knowledge (to maintain the view that they are not unstable). What specific linguistic devices can accomplish this complicated task? Balaban suggests the hypothesis that a very important device that they use for this purpose is nonvisual metaphors for knowledge.

Perhaps the most common metaphor for knowledge among mainstream Americans is knowing is seeing (as in “I see what you mean” and “This much is crystal clear”). Seeing is a perceptual domain. Other perceptual domains include taste, touch, hearing, and smelling. Why is knowledge predominantly understood as seeing? It is because seeing is “associated with more certain and direct knowledge, while other senses are more associated with indi-
rect and inferred knowledge” (Balaban, 1999, 132). For example, hearing mainly has to do with understanding language and influencing people (as in, “I hear you”) and touch with emotional experience (as in “I was touched”). These verbs emphasize less intellectual ways of knowledge than seeing does. The vision metaphor produces an intellectual kind of knowledge that comes from the active and focused functioning of the visual system. The active agent that is presupposed by this metaphor would be, as Balaban suggests, inappropriate for the pilgrims, who attempt to portray themselves as passive but reliable sources of their divine knowledge. Within the category of nonvisual metaphor Balaban also includes what he calls biological (nonperceptual) metaphors (as in, “I knew it in my heart”), nonbiological (as in “The doors in my mind opened”), and an unspecified group (as in “I could tell things were changing”). Balaban’s hypothesis is, then, that the pilgrims will use more nonvisual than visual metaphors in the accounts of their divine knowledge, thereby satisfying contradictory demands of both their own group and the larger mainstream culture.

To test this hypothesis, Balaban collected 191 narratives from pilgrims in Conyers, Georgia and from the Apparition-list. Four categories of narratives were distinguished: (1) face-to-face religious narratives, (2) face-to-face secular narratives, (3) unelicited on-line religious narratives, and (4) elicited on-line religious narratives. Metaphors were then analyzed in these four types of narratives.

The overall result of the study was that pilgrims in Conyer used substantially more nonvisual than visual metaphors, thus confirming the initial hypothesis offered by Balaban. This finding, although not conclusive, shows that pilgrims may employ more nonvisual than visual metaphor in order to meet two different cultural pressures: (1) to present themselves as people who have undergone a major religious transformation in the capacity of nonvolitional and passive persons, but (2) they nevertheless have reliable and authentic religious knowledge that distinguishes them from people outside the group. More generally, the study may show how the use of metaphors by subcultures may depend on sometimes-contradictory demands that influence the group.

Another case of subcultural variation can be found in psychotherapeutic discourse, both in the speech of patients and therapists. As an example, let us take sadness. The concept of sadness is a key concept in psychotherapy because of its “close relative” in clinical and analytic practice: depression. The study of Barcelona (1986) indicates that sadness is often conceptualized as dark, heavy, and down in the everyday conceptual system. Given these metaphors for sadness, we can ask whether all of them are equally common and important in therapeutic discourse about depression, or whether some of them stand out in frequency and importance. This issue was taken up by McMullen & Conway (in press). They studied interviews with 21 patients who were previously diagnosed as having depression. Based on their study, they found four conceptual metaphors for depression: depression is darkness (“It’s really like a black cloud”), depression is weight (“I felt just so – so heavy”), depression is captor (“I want to break out of this”), and depression is descent (“I just was down”). As we can see, three out of the four source domains can be found among the metaphorical source domains identified by Barcelona for sadness in English on the basis of ordinary language use; depression is darkness corresponds to sadness is dark, depression is weight to sadness is a burden, and depression is descent to sadness is down. We suspect that Barcelona did not identify the captor metaphor because most people do not normally talk about being trapped by, wanting to be free of, or wanting to break out of sadness, although these are ways of talking and thinking about depression.
Communication and Culture

in a clinical context. But, to return to our original question, are all the metaphors equally significant in this kind of discourse? The study of McMullen & Conway clearly shows that they are not. They found that 90 per cent of the metaphorical expressions related to depression were instances of the conceptual metaphor depression is descent. This was the metaphor patients used most extensively to conceptualize their condition. Why should this be so? McMullen & Conway (in press) argues that this is so because the metaphorical appraisal of depression as a place that is down resonates readily with certain themes in Western cultures. While happiness is conceptualized as up together with such notions as power, high status, morality, rationality, health, etc. (see Lakoff & Johnson, 1980), sadness and depression are viewed in opposition to these highly valued states in an extremely negative light, together with lack of power, inferior social position, being immoral and sick. Since depression is evaluated in this way, the depressed person can easily be considered a “failure” in all these ways.

The study by McMullen & Conway shows two additional points for a theory of metaphorical variation. First, it tells us that variation can be found in several “forms”. It manifests itself in new source domains for a target (captor for depression) and that it can also reveal itself in richly elaborated language in already existing source-to-target correspondences (as we saw in the case of depression is down). Second, the components of metaphorical variation usually work together in real texts. We cannot deal separately with the individual components of dimension, form, and cause. In the analysis of depression, we saw how all three work simultaneously and inextricably together. Certain causes produce metaphor variation along certain dimensions in certain ways (forms).

7. The Individual Dimension

It is a fairly common observation that the metaphor usage of key cultural figures, such as presidents and media stars, as well as that of writers and poets can differ markedly from one person to another. A recent illustration of this point comes from Time magazine that lists some of the metaphors that anchorman Dan Rather of CBS used in his 2001 election coverage. Here are some examples from Time (Time, November 20, 2001):

The presidential campaign is
“... still hotter than a Laredo parking lot.”
Bush
“has run through Dixie like a big wheel through a cotton field.”
“... will be madder than a rained-on rooster ...”
“... is sweeping through the South like a tornado through a trailer park.”

We can assume that, among the star journalists and anchormen, these metaphors are fairly specific to Rather’s metaphoric repertoire. The images used seem to reflect Rather’s southern upbringing. However, we do not know whether other reporters who also come from the south use or would use exactly the same metaphors to describe the election campaign.

But it would be a mistake to believe that it is only a select few whose language and
thought exhibit individual variation in the use of metaphor. The phenomenon can be observed in perfectly “ordinary” people as well. As a first example, consider the case of one of my former colleagues in an American university who had acquired some reputation for expressing much of what he had to say in metaphors relating to ships and the navy. He described various activities of university life and administrative projects with metaphorical expressions such as the ones below: (The following are his actual definitions of the expressions.)

When we anticipate problems with one of our initiatives, we “stand by for heavy weather.”
When we complain about a lack of strategic vision, we need a “star to steer by.”
When we arrive in the middle of a discussion or debate, we “come in on the mid-watch.”
When we drop a program, we “bail out” or “abandon ship.”
When we commit wholeheartedly to a project, we order “full-speed ahead.”

As can be seen, some of the metaphorical expressions are more or less unique to a person’s individual style. However, some of the other expressions that he had employed are commonly used and well understood by most native speakers of English. What seems to be truly unique to his overall metaphor usage is the heavy concentration of metaphors relating to ships and the navy. In all probability, the reason for this was the fact that, as it turned out, he had been an officer in the navy for more than a decade.

Let us take another “everyday” example of how metaphors can vary in individuals. In a course I taught on the language of emotion in the US, I asked my students to write a personal account of what love is or means for them. I was interested to find out whether and to what degree individual people use unique metaphors to conceptualize their love experiences. One of my students wrote this:

For me I guess I’d say that love is like a wagon. We both have responsibility for pulling it along. When things are good, we can jump on the wagon and ride down the hill. When things are tough, we each have to grab on to the tongue and work together to get it up the next hill. All our stuff is in the wagon, bumping around together. Once in a while one can get up on top and ride, but not for too long.

It is clear that this is the conventional journey metaphor for love with several individual modifications. One is that the vehicle that corresponds to the relationship in the conventional metaphor is replaced by a wagon, a very untypical vehicle that is not capable of self-propelled motion. Second, in this individual variant of the metaphor it is the lovers who have to get the vehicle moving when they are facing difficulties. Third, the metaphor reflects a rather pessimistic view of love that is not characterized by effortless and happy progress most of the time. Thus the metaphor used by this person follows the general outline of the well-entrenched love is a journey metaphor, but deviates from it in ways that suggest a pessimistic outlook on love.

Interestingly, the same woman also provided an account of her partner’s view of love:
Communication and Culture

“P. has used the analogy of pulling a calf to describe our partnership, like giving birth in a way to this thing that is the relationship, but it is both of us out in the barn helping a cow deliver her calf. I have thought that that was a rich description also.” As one can tell, this is a highly unconventional metaphor for love. In it, the cow that is given birth to is the relationship. However, at a basic image-schematic level the man’s and the woman’s love metaphors are not that different. In both, it requires a great deal of joint effort to get the relationship moving along. Pulling the wagon uphill and pulling the calf out of the cow are image-schematically very similar. Given this, it is perhaps not accidental that the woman described the relationship as a happy one. We can surmise that this deep image-schematic similarity is part of the reason.

8. Conclusions

In this paper, the first tentative steps toward a cognitive theory of metaphor variation have been taken. I suggested that such a theory minimally involves three components: an account of variation in the form of metaphor, an account of the dimensions of metaphor variation, and an account of the causes that drive the variation process. I showed that metaphors vary in various ways along a number of dimensions, such as the social, ethnic, regional, stylistic, subcultural, and individual dimensions. There are some additional candidates for dimensions that have not been mentioned in the paper, one being the diachronic, or temporal one. Hopefully, such a view, when complete, will allow us to simultaneously account for both the universality of and variation in many metaphors.
References

1. Introduction

Within contemporary cognitive science one of the most exiting topics concerns the nature, acquisition and philosophical problems of naive theory of mind. Taylor (1996) and Flavell and Miller (1998) summarize the most important ontogenetic results of the research on the child’s theory of mind. Bogdan (1997) reviews the main evolutionary stages in the development of the capacity to interpret behaviour. The cognitive developmental, philosophical and evolutionary psychological approaches of naive theory of mind are well represented in the interdisciplinary volume edited by Carruthers and Smith (1996) which also discusses childhood autism of which one of the main characteristics is an inability to develop a normal theory of mind.

This paper places the formation of naive theory of mind during ontogeny into the broader context of conceptual development and investigates the relationship between naive theory of mind and language acquisition. I identify three developmental stages in the acquisition of mental terms (e.g. pain, belief, think, happy, etc.). I characterize the shifts between these stages as transformations of the child’s successive naive theories. The transformation of these theories raises the problem of incommensurability in cognitive development. Carey analyzes the incommensurability of the child’s conceptual system with the adult’s theories in the domain of naive biology (1985) and naive physics (1991). I extend the notion of incommensurability of conceptual systems to the domain of the acquisition of naive psychology. I consider conceptual change in naive theory of mind within the framework of present-day constructivist approaches to cognitive development (Elman et al. 1996; Johnson, 1997; Quartz and Sejnowski, 1997).

2. Naive theory of mind

One of the most important milestones in the acquisition of naive theory of mind is passing the so-called false belief test. This test was first employed in the cognitive developmental literature by Wimmer and Perner (1983). In this experiment three- and four-year-old children are presented with the following story: The protagonist Maxi sees his mother putting a piece of chocolate in container A. Then Maxi leaves the room. In his absence his mother places the chocolate in another container, B. Then Maxi returns to get the chocolate. At this point the children are asked by the experimeter where they think Maxi will look for the chocolate.
The main result of Wimmer and Perner’s experiment was that most of the three-year-old children said that Maxi would look for the chocolate in container B rather than A. Only four-year-olds were able to predict Maxi’s looking behavior correctly saying that Maxi would look for the chocolate where he thought the chocolate is, i.e. in container A. This result is generally interpreted as showing that three-year-old children are as yet unable to attribute a false belief to another person.

We can interpret the passing of this test as indication of the formation of the concept of false belief. Today we see this achievement as a metarepresentational turn in the acquisition of theory of mind. In order to understand the nature of this acquisition it is necessary to clarify a few basic concepts of cognitive science. One of the leading researchers of the naive theory of mind field, Alan Leslie sees the relationship between proposition and representation in the following way (Leslie and German, 1995, 138): “In the standard use of these notions, propositions are abstract entities that can be evaluated semantically, true or false.” In his view, two propositions differ from each other if they have different meanings. Representations, that are the physical embodiments of propositions, can be taken the forms of a picture, a sentence or a brain state. Representations differ from each other in terms of their physical characteristics. Representations are differentiated from each other syntactically while propositions semantically. For example, the sentences “Es regnet,” and “It is raining,” are different representations, but they express the same proposition.

By metarepresentation we mean the representation of a representation. When we speak about a metarepresentational turn in the development of the child’s theory of mind we mean that she can form a representation of such representational states as a belief. According to the dominant view of contemporary cognitive science, mental states (e.g. beliefs, thoughts, etc.) are representational states (e.g. Stich and Warfield, 1994).

One of the most important questions of current research on the child’s theory of mind concerns the date at which children become able to pass the false belief test. More and more experiments demonstrate that already three-year-old children can pass this test if experimenters modify certain components of this test (Wellman, 1993). As it is true for other domains of the research on cognitive development, these experiments are important not only as attempts to identify the correct age of acquisition, but also because they relate the appearance of a given ability to other competences of the child of the same age. For example, evidence for an earlier appearance of the child’s ability to ascribe false belief can provide important empirical support for those theories that argue that naive theory of mind is first manifested in pretend play between 18 months and the second year (Leslie, 1987; 1988).

In line with Leslie’s position, Jerry Fodor (1992) argues that the classical false belief test involves performance difficulties as a result of which the child’s real competence cannot be manifested. Fodor suggests that if we modify the task requirements in question we should be able to demonstrate the ability to attribute false belief already at an earlier age. Several experiments have tested Fodor’s suggestions but they could not prove the earlier formation of naive theory of mind (German, 1995; Wimmer and Weichbold, 1994). At the same time, experiments were conducted before Fodor’s suggestions in which the classical false belief test was modified in such a way that the chocolate was not placed from container A into container B but it was eaten by the experimenter. Under these circumstances younger children (around three year) were able to predict correctly that the protagonist would look for
the chocolate in container A (Russell and Jarold, 1991; quoted in Mitchel, 1994). So, according to the present state of research on naive theory of mind it is controversial whether three-year-old children have a meta-representational capacity or not.

The implicit presence of naive theory of mind was shown by Clements and Perner’s (1994) experiment in a variant of the false belief test in which two-year and eleven-month-old children looked correctly at place A, (where the protagonist mouse should search for a piece of cheese on the basis of his false belief), but these children gave an incorrect response in their verbal answers, saying that the protagonist would look for the cheese in place B (where the cheese was placed in his absence). The authors interpret the results of this experiment by drawing a distinction between representing a fact and making a verbal judgement about this fact.

The demonstration of the implicit presence of the naive theory of mind can be related to the influential theory of the different levels of representational organisation developed by Karmiloff-Smith (1992; 1994). She distinguishes four levels in the organisation of representation along the implicit-explicit dimension. The representation at the implicit level is procedural, operational and can only be accessed as a whole. The information at this level is not accessible to consciousness or to verbal report. At the E1 (Explicit 1) level the earlier procedural representations are redescribed into a more abstract form and they are available for the other parts of the cognitive system but these representations are still not accessible for awareness or for verbal report. The information at the E2 level is accessible for consciousness but not for verbal report. One of the essential messages of Karmiloff-Smith’s book (1992) is the distinction between conscious and verbally available representation. She gives us the example where the representation reaches the conscious level in our mind, which in turn enables us to draw a diagram of it, though we are still unable to express it verbally.

At the E3 level the information becomes accessible for verbal report and the representations of different domains are redescribed into a general linguistic code. The representations become more and more explicit due to a process called representational redescription as a result of which the information in the child’s mind becomes accessible for the mind.

Thinking in terms of Karmiloff-Smith’s representational levels we can say that according to Clements and Perner’s results a naive theory of mind is formed by the end of the second year but this does not yet reach the Explicit 3 level. At this age the child’s mind forms a representation of the other person’s belief, but this representation is not so strong that it could guide the child’s verbal response. Elman et al. (1996) introduce the notion of the gradually strengthening representation by which they interpret those experimental results that show that object permanence appears in the infant’s perceptual responses much earlier (e.g. Baillargeon, 1987) than in the classical tasks developed by Piaget to examine object-directed reaching in the child. In this way, we can apply the notion of gradually strengthening representations originally developed to explain the results of infant naive physics to the field of the child’s theory of mind as well.

3. Naive theory of mind and conceptual development

The research on the ontogenesis of naive theory of mind cannot be separated from the influential grand theories of cognitive and conceptual development. By concepts we mean
the units of mental representation (Carey, 1991). The question of the organisation of concepts is one of the central problems of contemporary cognitive science (see e.g. Margolis and Laurence, 1999). This is also illustrated by the fact, that one of the leaders of the cognitive movement, Jerry Fodor has recently critically examined the main theories of conceptual organisation developing his own view of conceptual atomism (1998a). The discussion of concepts also plays an important role in textbooks of cognitive psychology (e.g. Eysenck and Keane, 1990). Recently, the nature of conceptual organisation (e.g. animate-inanimate) or the investigation of the neural basis of category-specific (e.g. animals vs. artefacts) brain damages have become more and more important within cognitive neuroscience and cognitive neuropsychology (e.g. Caramazza and Shelton, 1998; Tranel et al., 1997), too.

The research on naive theory of mind examines the origin, organisation and change of mental state concepts. Such studies are related to the age-old epistemological problems of cognitive development and these classical problems reappear in the different theories developed in order to explain the acquisition of naive physics, naive biology and naive psychology.

Modern nativism revives the tradition of epistemological rationalism. The contemporary champion of this view is Jerry Fodor (1997) who defines his position according to his ancestors in the history of rationalist philosophy in a review of Elman et. al. (1996) Rethinking Innateness. According to this epistemological position the primary function of cognition is to form theories concerning one’s experience. Concepts play a crucial role in this process, in other words, the main function of concepts is also theory formation. But where do concepts come from? – Fodor asks. Of course, certain concepts come from earlier theorising, but this process must begin somewhere. Some of our concepts cannot come from earlier theorisation, they must be in existence in advance of any experience. In other words, they must be innate. Thus Fodor, interpreting the relationship between rationalism and nativism in the above manner, accuses Jeffry Elman and his colleagues of forgetting or ignoring this classical argument.

The other prominent member of the so-called new rationalist camp (Fodor, 1998b) is Steven Pinker who also stands up for nativism both in his book entitled The Language Instinct (1994) and in his more recent book about the mind (1997).

According to the nativist approaches to conceptual development, cognitive development is not more than the unfolding of inborn principles and concepts, so it is mainly an enrichment which does not involve radical conceptual change. Carey (1991, 259) characterizes Spelke’s nativist view (1991) in the following way: “Enrichment consists in forming new beliefs stated over concepts already available.”

These innatist approaches see the role of the environment primarily in triggering inborn structures and they emphasize the importance of biological maturational processes. According to Elizabeth Spelke, some of the principles of naive physics are inborn (e.g. Spelke 1991; Spelke, 1992) and Alan Leslie (1991) presents the nativist position in the research on the child’s theory of mind.

The other classical response to the question of conceptual development belongs to the tradition of epistemological empiricism. Following Locke, researchers in this tradition hold that the mind is a tabula rasa at birth on which experience writes its effect. This view reduces the origin of concepts to observation. For example, we learn that gravity produces an effect
on objects because we observe falling objects. This approach attributes a key role to observation, namely introspection in the domain of the acquisition of mental state concepts (e.g. Harris, 1992). This so-called simulationist view says that the naive psychological concepts derive from self-observation.

Carey (1991) describes the different theories of conceptual development and revives the very component of Piaget’s constructivist approach according to which certain new concepts that come into being during development cannot be derived from earlier ones. Carey fits her own research on the development on naive biology and naive physics that originally proves the existence of radical conceptual change in childhood (Carey 1985) into this constructivist approach.

Constructivism, going back to Piaget’s work, becomes the central idea of more and more approaches today that oppose the new rationalist nativist camp in cognitive science. Quartz and Sejnowski (1997) take over the main thesis of constructivism from Piaget and apply it to the neural development underlying cognitive growth. In their manifesto they oppose the representatives of contemporary nativism and question the grounds for it in the very domain where it has been most influential, i.e. the acquisition of syntax.

While discussing the basic processes of cognitive development (e.g. vision, orienting, face recognition, speech recognition, memory, object permanence) Johnson (1997) argues that the cortex is equipotential at birth and the neurobiological evidence concerning brain plasticity does not enable us to posit innate representations at the cortical level. Elman et al. (1996) draw the same conclusion.

These constructivist approaches emphasize that their views are not the renewal of the empiricist tradition and they list the innate constraints on development in detail. Although they refer to Piaget’s work in many respects it is usually unexplained what they take over from Piaget’s activism. In this question James Russell (1996) proves to be the most devoted Piagetian psychologist when he attributes a central role of the child’s own agency (defined as “the power to alter at will one’s perceptual inputs”) in the formation of naive theory of mind.

In way of summary, we can say that there are a number of different theories to explain the origins of concepts including mental state concepts. According to these different theories concepts or their primitives are innate, or they derive from experience. Experience could mean the observation of the outer and the inner world or the interiorisation of one’s own action, but it also could mean interpersonal communication and social interaction (e.g. Astington, 1996).

4. Naive theory of mind and language acquisition

The dynamically developing research on naive theory of mind have become combined with the research on language acquisition in the past few years. This combination has affected research on the child’s syntactic knowledge where one of the central questions relates to the way children acquire the structure of sentences and the predicate-argument structure demanded by the so-called Psych-verbs (psychological verbs) (see e.g. Beckwith, 1991). The acquisition of pragmatics has also established links with naive theory of mind (e.g. Happé,
The problem of meaning variance of mental terms in cognitive development

The problem of the acquisition of mental terms has become one of the most important questions of cognitive science in the past few years. The problem can only be handled if we complement the cognitive psychological theories with knowledge derived from philosophy of science, philosophy of language and mind.

Within this interdisciplinary approach a current view which draws a parallel between the development of children’s cognition and science plays a central role. This view is explained in detail by Gopnik and Meltzoff (1996) according to whom the formation, construction and changes of naive theories play a decisive role in cognitive development.

According to Gopnik and Meltzoff, the most important feature of theories is that they can be destroyed, defeated, eliminated or changed. The defeasibility of theories contrasts with other proposals for the organisation of knowledge such as modularism. Gopnik (1996) criticises the modularist view of the child’s theory of mind developed by Alan Leslie (e.g. 1991) citing precisely this feature of theories. Modularism cannot account for the central characteristic of cognitive development which is the continuous change of the naive theories of the child.

The so-called theory theory position developed by Gopnik and Wellman (1994) to explain the changes of the child’s theory of mind is mostly consistent with the constructivist approach
The problem of meaning variance of mental terms in cognitive development

Communication and Culture

discussed above. I would like to present my own view concerning the nature of meaning variance of mental terms within the framework of this constructivist approach.

Naive theories play a central role in conceptual organisation. Eysenck and Kean’s (1990) textbook on cognitive psychology shows convincingly the development of the history of cognitive science which led to one of the most influential theories of conceptual organisation, i.e. the theory theory. The authors discuss in detail that earlier theories of conceptual organisation (such as the classical theory of defining features which goes back to Aristotle, the prototype theory, the exempler theory, the theory of schemas and scripts) cannot account for the central feature of conceptual organisation i.e. the coherence of concepts. This characteristic can only be explained if we assume that concepts are embedded in naive theories. In other words, conceptual coherence is created by naive theories (Murphy and Medin, 1985). The view of concepts as embedded in theories was applied to cognitive development by Keil (e.g. 1994) and the role of this theory in the explanation of the child’s naive biology is summarised by S. Gelman (1996).

The meaning of mental terms in adults is organised around such a commonsense functionalist theory in which the inputs and the outputs of a given mental state as well as the mental state’s connections to other mental states are represented (for a critical discussion see Goldman, 1993). For example, the meaning of the term pain consists of the cause of the pain (e.g. touching a hot stove), the pain’s relationship to other mental states (the desire to get rid of the pain) and the pain’s relationship to behavior (pain produces wincing). This theory can be called folk functionalism as well.

This theory fits into the more general framework of philosophy of language that is called semantic localism by Devitt (1995). According to this position, the meaning of a word depends upon a few other words in the language. This view provides a viable alternative to the theory of meaning which denies that words have meanings (semantic nihilism) and to the theory according to which the meaning of a word depends on all other words in the given language (semantic holism). Semantic localism contrasts with the theory of semantic atomism developed by Fodor (1998a). Fodor and Lepore (1992) critically discuss the present day approaches of semantic holism and they argue convincingly against them. At the same time, Fodor’s view of nativism and conceptual atomism is inconsistent with the theory of conceptual coherence discussed above. Semantic localism is, however, compatible with the theory theory view of concepts.

Goldman (1993) primarily deals with the commonsense functionalist theory of adults and does not discuss the acquisition of this theory. But as a result of contemporary research on the child’s theory of mind we can conceptualise the developmental process whose end-state is the formation of folk functionalist theory.

The first stage in this process of the acquisition of the semantics of mental terms is when the child already uses mental terms, but she is not fully aware of their meanings yet. Or we can say, following a Fregean terminology, that she is not aware of their correct reference. In this stage the child uses mental terms referring to the behavioral correlates of the mental state only. For example, the term happiness refers only to the expression of the smile. Beckwith (1991) calls this semisuccessful reference.

At this stage the child has no concept of mental states, in other words she does not possess a naive theory of mind. We can find a number of views in the literature characterising
the developmental stage when the child does not mentalise yet. According to Perner (1991) the child interprets the other person’s actions as a small “behaviorist” who does not ascribe mental states. Csibra and Gergely (1998) also posit a stage when the child interprets the other person’s behavior teleologically, which means that she attributes goals but not psychological states to the other.

Such approaches to the formation of the naive theory of mind in childhood are consistent with Wittgenstein’s view (Montgomery, 1997) according to which the attribution of mental states is always based on behavioral criteria. The phenomenon of semisuccesful reference of mental terms is also compatible with Wittgenstein’s well-known remark that we use words whose meanings become clear only later.

The second stage in the change of meaning of mental terms is when the child discovers the inner subjective component (feeling or qualia) of mental states and she realises that the reference of the mental terms includes this component. In other words, at this stage the child recognises the phenomenological or experiential qualities of mental states.

Wellman et al. (1995) examine the acquisition of the emotional lexicon based on the investigation of the CHILDES database. The authors argue that the earliest usage of emotional words (at the age of two in their database) indicates that the child already refers to the subjective components of the emotional state. However, this argument is very questionable and one can find approaches to the earliest emotion concepts in the literature which represent the view that the early usage of emotional words refers only to the external components of the emotional state (see e.g. Smiley and Huttenlocher, 1989). So, it may be a later achievement when the child begins to refer to the qualia component of a given mental state. Mental terms have gone through meaning variance in relation to the first stage, but the child does not yet possess the full representation of the meaning of mental terms found in adults. This development is achieved only during the third stage.

The commonsense functionalist theory appears only after the metarepresentational turn at the fourth year. It is the result of a long learning process during which the child acquires the relationship between mental states and their eliciting conditions and the interconnections of mental states to each other and to their behavioral consequences. This requires the acquisition of coherent theories by which the child understands specific causal processes such as the fact that perception leads to the fixation of beliefs, or that beliefs can bring about other beliefs by means of inference and that beliefs and desires cause actions together. From then on the child recognises that the meaning of a mental word depends upon a few other (mental) words in the language and realises that the reference does not determine the meaning of mental terms completely.

So, mental terms go through changes of meaning during semantic development. This meaning variance of mental terms is similar to the meaning variance of scientific terms discussed by philosophers of science (see e.g. Fehér, 1983; Feyerabend, 1962). (In fact, I have borrowed the expression of meaning variance from this philosophical tradition.) According to Feyerabend (1962), the meaning of scientific terms depends upon the theory in which the term is embedded and if the theory changes so does the meaning of scientific terms. As a result, the meanings of identical terms embedded in different theories will also be different. As identical terms gain different meanings in different theories, the changes of meaning lead to the problem of incommensurability of various theories. This problem appeared in both Kuhn’s and Feyerabend’s writings at the same time, in 1962.
The problem of incommensurability found in philosophy of science was adopted by Carey (e.g. 1985; 1991; and Carey and Spelke, 1994) to explain the conceptual development of children in the domain of naive biology and naive physics. She argues (1991) that the adult’s conceptual system is incommensurate with the child’s system citing evidence of the radical conceptual changes in the development of naive physics (e.g. the changes in the notion of mass).

In my view, we can extend the notion of incommensurability to the acquisition of naive psychology. An excellent example of the striking difference between the young child’s theory of mind and the adult’s naive psychology is provided by Perner et al. (1994) who introduced the notion of prelief (pretend + belief). By prelief they refer to the child’s concept in which the action derived from false belief is not differentiated from the action derived from pretend play. This is a notion that is present in the thinking of three-year-old children but it is absent from the adult’s conceptual system.

The successive naive psychological theories of children determine the meanings of mental terms. The driving force of meaning change in the case of mental terms is the continuous change of children's theories. We can speak about radical conceptual change in the child’s naive psychology in the same way as Carey (1985) does in the domain of naive biology.

It is necessary to remark that I have deliberately conflated semantic and conceptual development up to now. (I have spoken about concepts embedded in theories and also about the meaning of words as determined by theories.) The conflation of semantics and conceptualisation in this way is unfounded, however, as it is shown, for example, by Pinker (1989) who argues for the autonomy of lexical semantics. Nevertheless, it is helpful for the presentation of the problem of incommensurability in cognitive development if we temporarily make the simplifying assumption that words are nothing else but the labels of concepts.

I can claim by now that conceptual change is one of the central characteristics of cognitive development. Surprisingly enough, the fact of radical conceptual change can be reconciled with the assumption of innate principles as it is shown convincingly by the joint work of Carey and Spelke (1994). Their view can also be seen as a response to Fodor’s prediction (1998b) according to which the views of the new rationalists (e.g. Pinker) which emphasize the genetic determination of human nature and cognition will soon confront the camp whose members speak about cultural relativism in a politically correct way. Carey and Spelke acknowledge that innate principles play an important role in cognitive development but they hold that it is possible to go beyond genetic determinism. They claim that children’s thinking and the culture can override the innate principles that guide cognitive development. In other words, the inborn principles of human knowledge can be altered as a result of conceptual change. Research on the driving forces of conceptual change as well as on the effect of culture and science on conceptual change is an important task for cognitive science in the future.

Acknowledgements
I wish to thank György Gergely for his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. During the preparation of this work I was supported by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences Ryoichi Sasakawa Young Leaders Fellowship and by the János Bolyai Research Scholarship of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
References


Feyerabend, P. (1962). Explanation, reduction
and empiricism. In Feigl-Maxwell (Eds.), Minnesota studies III.
1. Introduction

This paper began as a critical review of the relevance theoretic approach to translation as represented in Gutt (1991) and more recently in Vermes (2001). This critical appraisal led to an examination of similarities and differences between monolingual and interlingual communication, i.e. translation.

2. Relevance Theory

Relevance Theory, as developed by Sperber and Wilson (1986), claims that interpreting utterances is possible on the basis of the principle of relevance: an utterance is optimally relevant if it produces an adequate contextual effect at minimal (or reasonable) processing cost. Relevance is thus dependent on the interplay of contextual effects and processing effort. In simple language, this means that the hearer/reader receives some information they did not previously, which is worth the effort expended in trying to understand it.

According to the theory human communication works by inference: utterances are merely stimuli which in themselves do not represent a full expression of the sender’s informative intention, but have to be interpreted through inferencing. In this way, coded communication is subservient to ostensive-inferential communication.

Relevance Theory also makes a distinction between descriptive and interpretive language use. Descriptive use means that a mental representation (a thought in propositional form) is entertained as a description of a state of affairs of which it is thought to be true, while interpretive use means that there is resemblance between some mental representations whose propositional forms share logical properties with each other, and they also share their analytic and contextual implications in the context. This resemblance is a matter of degree.

Since two people never share their total cognitive environments, we can only get a partial representation of what the speaker means. This partial representation, however, ensures adequate communication in most cases.

3. Gutt’s theory

Gutt’s (1991) application of Relevance Theory to translation is a non-theory of translation, since it claims that there is no need for a separate theory of translation. Translation can be
regarded as interpretive language use and as such it shares properties with other kinds of interpretive language use. Therefore, translation can be treated within the framework of a general theory of communication, i.e. Relevance Theory.

Another reason why a science of translation is impossible is, according to Gutt (1998), that translation does not exist as a coherent subject. Since translations must resemble the original in some way, and the degree of similarity is variable, it is impossible to decide where translation ends: there is no natural cut-off point between translation and non-translation.

Gutt defines translation as an act of communicating in a secondary context an informative intention that interpretively resembles the original as closely as possible under the given conditions. In translation then the principle of relevance is manifested as the promise of optimal resemblance. Translation is interlingual interpretive language use, where the principle of relevance comes across as the presumption of optimal resemblance. A translated text achieves relevance not as a text in its own right, but in virtue of its interpretive resemblance with some source language original.

According to this model then there is no qualitative difference between interpreting something in the same language or another language: in both cases communication takes place in a secondary communicative context, a context different from the one intended by the communicator.

4. Criticisms of Gutt’s theory

I have been persuaded that Relevance Theory might very well provide illuminating explanations for some of the processes of translation. Despite its many attractions, however, the theory seems to have several weaknesses, which will be discussed below.

Earlier criticism levelled against the theory (Tirkkonen-Condit 1992) maintained that the theory was too general and vague. Indeed, it does not go into a detailed description of some of its key concepts, such as interpretive language use and secondary communicative situation, and it does not concern itself with many of the issues that have long occupied the interest of translation scholars.

Following Sperber and Wilson, Gutt regards *ostensive-inferential communication* as the primary mode of communication. Even if that is true, however, coded communication does also seem to play a role, and one would expect the author to define this role in different contexts. One would expect that poetic and scientific discourses differed along this dimension, and literary and technical translation would parallel that difference. Technical translation, however, is by and large ignored.

The idea that monolingual communication and translation are somehow similar is not new. Jakobson (1959) claimed that all communication was translation. He distinguished between intralingual, interlingual and intersemiotic translations. Gutt, while asserting the basic similarity between monolingual interpretive language use and translation as interlingual interpretive language use, does not make a systematic comparison between the two. While earlier translation literature regarded the differences between languages as the most important cause of translation problems, Gutt seems to dismiss the significance of this fa-
tor without due consideration, putting the emphasis on his (underdetermined) notion of secondary communicative situation.

4.1 Relation to Translation Studies literature

Gutt does not attempt to interpret the findings of Translation Studies from a new perspective and does not offer better explanations for regularities observed in the process of translation. This is deliberate, since he endeavours to establish a completely new paradigm, which I consider a futile attempt. If Relevance Theory is to be a theory of translation, too, it must be able to interpret or re-interpret the findings of Translation Studies so far. Gutt’s theory would pass the test if it could provide better explanations than those proposed so far, for phenomena such as translation universals (e.g. simplification and explicitation), psycholinguistic processes in translation, the role of language contrasts in translation, obligatory and optional translation shifts, the role of ideology, manipulation, postcolonial translation, the visibility of the translator, domesticking and foreignizing translation, just to mention a few. So far at least such reinterpretation seems to be lacking.

I do not agree with the view that Gutt’s approach is irreconcilable with earlier theories of translation. Many of the regularities in the process of translation, observed by other theories, could be explained on a relevance-theoretic basis. Thus, e.g. Hönig & Kussmaul (1982) propose the principle of ‘necessary degree of precision’, which can be determined on the basis of function in the given context. This is tantamount to saying that translation is governed by the principle of relevance.

This being the case, I think supporters of the relevance theoretic approach would do well to conduct comparative studies to show how Relevance Theory can provide a more systematic and more coherent framework to explain translation, thus ensuring greater explanatory power. Empirical investigations do not seem to be a characteristic feature of this approach. Gutt declares that translation, as interpretive language use, is not different from other cases of interpretive language use taking place in a secondary communicative situation. However, his definition of secondary communicative situation is rather vague and he fails to carry out a systematic survey of different types of interpretive language use.

In order to remedy this deficiency, in the second part of this paper I shall make an attempt to look more closely at the concept of secondary communicative situation and propose further lines of inquiry. Hopefully such an analysis will do justice to both the similarities and differences between primary and secondary communicative situations and monolingual and interlingual communication respectively.

4.2 Ostensive-inferential communication

Ostensive-inferential communication as against coded communication seems to be overemphasized by relevance theory. According to Gutt, ‘A proposition expressed by an utterance will normally be only a partial interpretation of a thought.’ Is this true for technical communication? Obviously, if inferential communication plays the same role in technical
communication and translation as in other kinds of communication, relevance theorists should provide evidence for this fact. So far no such research has been offered. Instead, Gutt seems to follow in the footsteps of other translation scholars who develop and polish their theories of translation on the basis of literary translation and declare them to be of universal application, as noted by Heltai (1997, 1999 and forthcoming). Most translation theories talk of intercultural communication, cultural mediation, pragmatic and discourse problems, skopos, translatorial action, manipulation and so on, and do not stop to think whether these concepts are applicable to technical translation.

Gutt illustrates his theory with examples taken from the Bible, which is quite legitimate. However, staying silent on the differences between Bible and operation manual translating does not seem appropriate. The practice of translation in the EU has raised some doubts about the universal applicability of the principles of literary translation (Pym 2000). In this context translators translate for an international audience, with a common institutional culture, using language in its referential function and using a number of prefabricated elements to refer to repetitive aspects of similar situations, using the same term for the same concept every time. What scope is there for inferencing in such cases? Or do implicatures and inferencing play a much diminished role in technical communication and translation?

4.3 Monolingual and interlingual communication

Translation is regarded by Gutt as a kind of communication taking place in a secondary communicative situation, and is not distinguished from instances of interpretive language use not involving code switching.

It is indeed easy to agree with Jakobson that all communication is translation. The speaker translates his thoughts into verbal form, and verbal forms are translated into thoughts by the hearer or other verbal forms by a translator. There is no denying that the processes of intra- and interlingual translation are similar. However, there must also be differences, and the question remains whether the differences justify a separate chapter for interlingual translation within a general theory of translation or communication.

Interlingual translation involves the use of a different code, and translation theories so far have regarded this fact as the major distinctive feature of translation. It is not this feature that Gutt regards as decisive, but the fact that it takes place in a secondary communicative situation. In order to see whether this is the case or not, I propose to take a closer look at the processes of monolingual and interlingual communication and the concept of secondary communicative situation.

4.4 Monolingual communication

If we consider the process of communication, we find that it can fundamentally be reduced to a preverbal message (Levitt 1989) being translated into an utterance by a sender and being interpreted by a receiver. The sender starts with an informative intention and encodes the
message observing the principle of relevance into a stimulus that is interpreted by the
receiver using the same principle of relevance and inferential processes, ultimately arriving
at a non-verbal representation of the sender’s message. Schematically represented:

\[\text{SENDER: INFORMATIVE INTENTION} \rightarrow \text{PREVERBAL MESSAGE} \rightarrow \text{ENCODING (relevance)} \rightarrow \text{UTTERANCE} \rightarrow \text{RECEIVER DECODING (relevance, inferencing)} \rightarrow \text{NON-VERBAL REPRESENTATION OF MESSAGE}\]

Encoding the preverbal message involves selection: the sender has to decide first what to
say, what aspects of the situation they want to refer to and in what detail, and then they
have to select among competing verbal forms and decide what part of their meaning to
express as explicatures and what part as implicatures. The sender has to decide how they can
make their message relevant to the receiver so that they can achieve the intended effect, and
has to assess shared knowledge (mutual manifestness), cultural background, needs, interests,
intelligence, personality traits, expectations and the social and physical conditions of
the receiver. They also have to assess the physical setting, the social and the discourse con-
text (register, style, genre).

Selection is constrained by several limiting factors, such as the conceptual systems, cultural
assumptions or schemata, and the code used by the sender, which predispose them towards
encoding certain meanings and not encoding some other kinds of meanings. The sender is
also constrained by their communicative competence, i.e. their ability to use the code. (In
interpreting the utterance, the receiver is similarly constrained.) Due to the limiting factors
optimal relevance is not always achieved. The end product of the process is a partial representation
of the original preverbal message in the receiver’s mind (since two participants in a dis-
course never share their total cognitive environments, and achieving full representation is
impossible). This fact acquires special significance from the point of view of translation.

4.5 Interlingual communication

The processes of interlingual communication can be represented as follows.

\[\text{SENDER: INFORMATIVE INTENTION}^1 \rightarrow \text{PREVERBAL MESSAGE} \rightarrow \text{ENCODING}^1
\text{(relevance)} \rightarrow \text{UTTERANCE}^1 \rightarrow \text{TRANSLATOR} \rightarrow \text{DECODING}^1 (\text{relevance, inferencing}) \rightarrow
\text{NON-VERBAL MESSAGE} \rightarrow \text{INFORMATIVE INTENTION}^2 \rightarrow \text{ENCODING}^2 (\text{relevance}) \rightarrow
\text{RECEIVER} \rightarrow \text{DECODING}^2 (\text{relevance, inferencing}) \rightarrow \text{NON-VERBAL MESSAGE}\]

This process is longer: there is double encoding and double decoding, and losses in recon-
structing the original message increase accordingly. The translator encodes a message that is
only a partial representation of the original message. In addition, the translator may be
influenced by the linguistic form of the original. In applying the principle of relevance the
translator may have to take into consideration not only the receiver, but also a client (if dif-
ferent from the former).
4.6 Interpretive language use in secondary communicative situations

The major elements of a communicative situation are the sender (with their cognitive environment), the setting and the receiver (with their cognitive environment). The code used could be regarded as part of the cognitive environment of the sender and the receiver respectively, but in this case, since I am trying to explore the differences between monolingual and interlingual communication, I shall regard it as a separate component of the communicative situation. These factors may vary independently and may give rise to sixteen different situations, shown in Table 1.

Table 1 shows that secondary communicative situation is a graded concept: it may differ from a primary communicative situation in one or several respects. Number (1) is a case of simple repetition: there is no change in any of the components of the situation, yet even this might be a secondary communicative situation. If the same speaker addresses the same audience on the same occasion in the same code, it might have various reasons: they may just want to repeat because the audience did not hear or seems to have difficulties in processing. In such cases the speaker may try to better adapt to the physical conditions (raise their voice) or the cognitive environment of the listener; they may also try to incorporate interpersonal elements not present in the first utterance, and may even adjust their original informative intention. Apparently, a repeated utterance is seldom if ever completely identical with the original one. The adjustments taking place in repetition could be described as ‘repair’, with the speaker trying to improve their linguistic performance or to better adapt to the listener.

The same sender might wish to repeat their message in a different code to the same audience (2). Thus, for instance, in the course of a lecture for students of English a lecturer might

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Sender</th>
<th>Setting</th>
<th>Receiver</th>
<th>Code</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>same</td>
<td>same</td>
<td>same</td>
<td>same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>same</td>
<td>same</td>
<td>same</td>
<td>different</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>same</td>
<td>same</td>
<td>different</td>
<td>same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>same</td>
<td>different</td>
<td>different</td>
<td>different</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>same</td>
<td>different</td>
<td>same</td>
<td>different</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.</td>
<td>same</td>
<td>different</td>
<td>different</td>
<td>same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>same</td>
<td>different</td>
<td>different</td>
<td>different</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8.</td>
<td>different</td>
<td>same</td>
<td>same</td>
<td>same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9.</td>
<td>different</td>
<td>same</td>
<td>different</td>
<td>different</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10.</td>
<td>different</td>
<td>same</td>
<td>different</td>
<td>different</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11.</td>
<td>different</td>
<td>same</td>
<td>different</td>
<td>same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12.</td>
<td>different</td>
<td>same</td>
<td>different</td>
<td>different</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13.</td>
<td>different</td>
<td>different</td>
<td>same</td>
<td>same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14.</td>
<td>different</td>
<td>different</td>
<td>same</td>
<td>different</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15.</td>
<td>different</td>
<td>different</td>
<td>different</td>
<td>same</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>different</td>
<td>different</td>
<td>different</td>
<td>different</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
repeat a sentence in the students’ native language. A similar case arises in (4), when we have
a mixed audience and use two languages alternately. These are cases of self-translation.

The same sender might repeat the message in the same code to a different receiver (5). This is the case e.g. when the audience includes both children and adults, and the speaker adjusts their message now to the needs of the former and now to the latter.

A sender might repeat a previous message in the same code to the same listener in a different setting, e.g. remind the receiver of something said on the previous day, or telling them a joke again (forgetting that they had already told it). Repetition in a different code may occur if both the sender and the receiver are bilinguals (6). Re-telling jokes to different people at different times might exemplify (7), while the same sender in a different context may send a message to a different audience in a different code, e.g. give the same paper at two different conferences in different languages (8).

Numbers (9) to (16) are different from numbers (1) to (8) in that different senders are involved. Number (9) exemplifies simple repetition by a different sender, while (10) could be regarded as interpretation for a bilingual audience. Number (11) parallels (5) with the difference that a different sender is involved. Number (12) represents the classical case of oral translation, i.e. interpreting.

Number (13) represents the case of the forgetful person who says the same story to the same audience every time. Number (14) resembles (6), with a different sender, while number (15) is the classical case of retelling other people’s stories. Number (16) represents the classical example of translation.

There is a gradual transition from what we usually regard as intralingual translation to what we usually regard as interlingual translation. However, it does not follow from this that translation does not exist or cannot be distinguished and studied separately from other cases of interpretive language use. It simply means that translation is a prototype category, as suggested by Snell-Hornby (1988) and Vermes (present volume), and some kinds of translations are better examples of the prototype than other kinds of translation.

The question we have to answer now is this: what message adjustments are triggered by changes in the various components of the secondary communicative situation, and which components are responsible for the message adjustments that characterize prototypical member answers, i.e. the use of a different code. Linguistic differences in surface structure, taken in themselves, may seem trivial, but there is no reason why we should look at them in themselves. Slight differences in the system may give rise to translation problems that can only be resolved on the discourse and pragmatic levels at the expense of severe adjustments. Klaudy (1994) shows that seemingly slight differences in the systems of English and Hungarian pronouns lead to inevitable message adjustments at the discourse and pragmatic levels. She summarizes the situation in this way: “We have dealt with the problems of concretising personal pronouns at such length because we think that it provides a good example of a simple difference in the grammatical systems of two languages having far-reaching effects for translation, and of the high number of linguistic and non-linguistic factors that a translator has to consider in using a simple translation shift” (Klaudy 1994, 167; my translation). In this way, differences in the code are ultimately responsible for a substantial part of translation problems.

Without embracing some form of Whorfian linguistic determinism, it seems counter-
intuitive to accept a theory of translation that says nothing about the effects of linguistic differences. Relevance, to some extent, must be determined by the code.

Differences in the code are also important since they are typically associated with a change in the person of the sender (10, 12, 14, 16) and the cognitive environments of sender and receiver. Self-translation (2, 4, 6 and 8) is less prototypical than translation involving a different translator. The prototypical case of translation is number (16), with (2) being a peripheral member of the category. Both self-translation and translation proper start from a pre-existing text: this is a common feature. However, there is also a significant difference: the self-translator may have access to the original preverbal message, while the translator does not. A translator has a cognitive environment different from that of the original sender and, consequently, different ideas of relevance. Moreover, their communicative abilities may be different in the two languages. As a result, message adjustment may be expected to be more significant than in self-translation.

A change in speaker is also significant since it means that there is double encoding and decoding. Interpretive language use can be defined (and is actually defined by Gutt as such) as the interpretation of a thought, putting a preverbal message into words. (This preverbal message is referred to in the English phrase I get the picture). The end product of this process is the utterance, which serves as an input for the translator, who converts the utterance into preverbal form again. On the basis of this mental representation the translator encodes it in a different language. A consequence of double encoding, due to deficiencies in communicative competence, may be double loss or double failure to achieve optimal relevance. Furthermore, the determination of optimal relevance will be doubly subjective. A crucial difference between the intralingual translation of a preverbal message into utterance and the interlingual translation may be that the author of the original message has direct access to the original ‘picture’, while the translator has to work it out on the basis of linguistic form and context, so in translation there is double interpreting. There is also double encoding, usually performed by different communicators with different linguistic skills in different codes.

Interpretive language use not involving a change in code may parallel the cases that we identify a translation, but the extent of adjustments made is usually much smaller. Cases where the sender is the same, having access to the preverbal message, are indeed very far removed from interlingual translation.

A more serious difference between intralingual and interlingual translation is in informative intention. In monolingual communication the communicator conceives of an informative intention due to various motivations, but the default case is internal motivation, and only rarely external (default case: “Say something!”). In interlingual communication the motivation for translation is usually external (default case: “Translate this!”).

5. The main differences summarised

The main differences between monolingual communication and (the prototypical case of) interlingual translation are summarised in Table 2. Due to limitations of space, no further comments are added. Hopefully the comparison, based on my systematising arguments above, will speak for itself.
### Table 2. Monolingual and interlingual communication

|                      | Monolingual communication                                                                 || Interlingual communication                                                                 |
|----------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------||-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| **Input**            | non-verbal/preverbal (thought)                                                            || has access to original informative intention and preverbal message only through the text |
| **Sender**           | has access to original informative intention and preverbal message                        || the message may be linguistically ambiguous: the translator may misinterpret it           |
|                      | does not misunderstand; for him the message does not contain linguistic ambiguity         || does not necessarily have native language competence in the code and in the culture      |
|                      | has native language competence in he code and in the culture                              || tends to play safe and turn implicatures into explicatures (cf. the explicitation hypothesis) |
|                      | takes responsibility for deciding on explicatures and implicatures                         ||                                                                                           |
| **Constraints**      | selection constrained by conceptual system and cultural schemata                          || selection constrained by a different conceptual system and a different set of cultural schemata |
|                      | selection of what can be communicated constrained by the code                               || selection of what can be communicated constrained by a different code                      |
|                      | communicative success [achieving relevance] limited by communicative competence; the sender does not always succeed in saying what they mean || limited by communicative competence in native language plus another language; the sender does not always succeed in decoding what is meant and in saying what he means on the basis of what he thinks should be meant |
|                      | the sender may be aware that they failed to communicate the intended meaning                || the translator has to assume that the sender said what he meant                              |
|                      | readers of an original know that they are reading an original                              || readers of a translation know that they are reading a translation: any linguistic or stylistic problem will be seen in light of this knowledge |
|                      | readers have no opportunity to check whether the sender says what they mean                 || readers of a translation may be able to check whether the translator says what the original means |
| **Receiver**         | sender’s cultural schemata largely overlap with those of intended receiver                 || Sender’s cultural schemata are different from those of the secondary receiver              |
| **Code**             | sender is influenced by the linguistic means available to him                              || translator is influenced by the linguistic means available to him and the linguistic form of the original text |
|                      | some linguistic forms are automatically activated by preverbal message                     || some linguistic forms are automatically activated by source language forms                |
|                      | ready-made language is used extensively based on preverbal message                          || ready-made language is used on based on source language text                              |
|                      | relevance is to some extent determined by the code                                          || relevance determined by code in the SL text is not always distinguished from language-independent relevance |
|                      | sender has to observe the norms of their native language                                   || Translator has to observe the norms of his native language and the norms of translation   |
References


Translation: Intercultural communication or interlinguistic transfer?
Albert Péter Vermes (Eszterházy Károly College, Hungary)

1. Introduction

The question that set me thinking is this: “I wonder if literary and special language translation have enough in common to be covered by the same theory, and if so, whether the practice of developing theories of translation solely on the basis of literary translation and then declaring them general theories of translation can be continued” (Heltai, 2002). These are actually two separate but related questions, and in my paper I will attempt to give answers to both of them.

2. Translation as an interpretive form of communication

My basic assumption is that translation is more than a mere linguistic exercise (although it is performed on and in languages) – it is a form of communication. The essential question here is how translation is different from other forms of communication.

One specific characteristic of communication through translation is, of course, that it involves, apart from the original or source communicator, an extra communicator, the translator, who mediates between the source communicator and the target of the translation process, the target audience. In this respect, translating seems similar to the situation where in a noisy place somebody has to render the words of the person standing on his right side to the one standing on the left because under the circumstances they cannot communicate with each other directly, even though they may share a common language. What makes the rendering of the messenger necessary here is that there is noise in the channel of communication, which blocks the transfer of information between the communicator and the audience.

There are other situations in which the signal gets through to the audience, who are familiar with the code, yet it does not seem to make sense to them. This might happen, for instance, in the case of sophisticated or technical texts on elaborate topics (such as e.g. linguistics or communication theory), where the recipient (i.e. the reader), although familiar with the language, will be puzzled at what the language really conveys and will ask for the help of somebody who can explain or interpret the text for him.

Translation, however, is different from the above cases in that the interference of a mediator is necessitated not simply because the signal needs to be amplified or because the audience is unable to make sense of it but, first of all, because the signal as such is unintelligible to the audience.

Thus, translation may be seen as a form of communication where the translator,
functioning both as a mediator and an interpreter, interprets the source communicator’s message for the target audience, since the latter is obviously incapable of interpreting it for himself. This can happen for two main reasons. Firstly, because the audience may not be able to identify the source signals (problems with the code). Secondly, because the audience may not possess the necessary background information for making sense of them (problems with the context).

Unfortunately, this definition of translation as an interpretive communicative process is still too wide and imprecise in that it allows for the inclusion within its bounds of phenomena which are not normally thought of as instances of translation, such as hermeneutic interpretation or telling a fairytale to a child. However, it puts into focus the notions of communication and interpretation, which may serve as the starting point of the quest for a more rigorous definition of translation.

3. Translation as intercultural communication

To begin with, we can narrow down the concept of translation in such a way that it is taken to apply only to interlingual communication, that is, to situations where the source language is different from the target language. In a trivial sense, this entails, since languages may be regarded as the embodiments of different cultural identities (see e.g. how Czech and Slovak, or Serb and Croatian linguistic-cultural identities relate to each other), that translation is also an intercultural form of communication. However, I would not like to stop at this trivial interpretation of the term. Clearly, translation is an intercultural process in a non-trivial sense, too. Some authors even think it is a definitive feature of translation. There are then scholars, like Pym, who even use the notion of translation in defining culture: “It is enough to define the limits of a culture as the points where transferred texts have had to be (intralingually or interlingually) translated” (Pym, 1992, 26).

Recently this conception of translation as intercultural transfer has been questioned in the light of the new conditions that constrain translation performed for the EU institutions. Schäffner (2001) asks, for example, “whether traditional concepts of translation studies, such as source text and target text, source culture and target culture, translation as intercultural communication, are indeed appropriate concepts with which to explain translation processes and products in the EU context.”

According to Koskinen (2000), EU translations are divided into two types: intracultural and intercultural translation, where intracultural translation means internal communication within a specific national EU culture (within the Commission), in which case target readers are “fairly accustomed to a specific EU rhetoric and are well acquainted with the terminology, so they do not expect or need extensive cultural adaptation” (Koskinen, 2000, 86). In the EU Translation Service, Koskinen writes, the official policy is that documents translated into all the official languages are regarded as ‘language versions’ rather than translations, and the way they are produced is “a very limited version of translating, closer to interlingual than intercultural communication” (Koskinen, 2000, 84). In this context, intercultural translation means communication between the EU institutions and the different national cultures of the member states.
What we can see here, then, is that not all translation is intercultural: in certain situations translation, while it does take place between different languages, does not seem to cross cultural boundaries. At least, to be more precise, the intercultural aspects of the process may be downplayed out of some overpowering consideration.

4. Translation and adaptation

We are thus left with a concept of translation as interlinguistic (though not necessarily intercultural) communication. At this point the question may be raised whether all instances of interlinguistic transfer are at the same time instances of translation.

Rey (2001) examines to what extent renderings of scientific articles published in semi-specialised journals and magazines can be considered ‘translations’ in the proper sense, that is, “integratedly transferred into another language without major changes” and when they become ‘adaptations’ rather than translations, that is texts “in which some elements have been changed or deleted”. One thing that is noticeable here is that Rey does not, or cannot, provide definitions for ‘translation’ and ‘adaptation’ any more distinct than these very general and vague formulations. For it is unclear what a “major change” should mean, and is it not true that in translation some elements are always necessarily changed or deleted?

In Rey’s study, translation shifts that occur in the target texts are classified into four groups: (1) shifts in text structure (narrative vs. argumentative vs. interactive), (2) shifts linked to specialised knowledge (scientific background), (3) shifts linked to specific elements of the source culture (references to the cultural realia of a community), and (4) shifts linked to intertextuality (references to other articles). It is important to note here that even in this kind of specialised translation problems related to cultural differences may and do arise.

The main finding of this research is that while shifts of type (1) seem to make a text an adaptation and shifts of type (4) a translation, in the other cases it is often difficult to draw a clear dividing line between translations proper and adaptations. Thus, not surprisingly, it remains uncertain how adaptation can be systematically distinguished from translation.

Valdés (2001) discusses the case of advertising translation. She points out that advertisements (as elements of a specific promotional campaign) are often created simultaneously in several languages and it is thus difficult to apply the traditional categories of source and target text here, although there is often a draft model (usually in English), serving as the source, which contains the main features of the final versions. This situation might be described by the term ‘co-writing’: the source text and the target texts, produced for different target audiences, share the same communicative function, even if expressed “with different conceptual elements and structure” (Harris, 1983, 124, cited in Valdés, 2001). This sort of interlingual transfer brings into focus again the question where the division between adaptation and translation should be drawn: are co-written advertisements examples of the first or, rather, of the second?

The same question is raised, in a somewhat parallel situation, by the translation of legal texts in the EU. Legal documents are created in all the eleven official languages of the EU, as a result of a process of turning a draft initiative into a regulation or directive through a series of recycled and rewritten versions. This process, again, is perhaps best described as
one of co-writing, in the sense explained above, with no definite candidate for the status of source text, as noted e.g. in Dollerup (2001), Koskinen (2001) and Schäffner (2001).

One further, partly similar, point is exemplified by user guides or instruction manuals. The aim of such a text is to instruct the reader how to operate some equipment and what to do in problematic situations relating to its use. A user guide in one language may be produced on the basis of one in another language. For instance, the following English excerpt from a guide for a Siemens cellular phone in (1) may have been produced on the basis of the German excerpt in (2).

(1) Older SIM cards are only compatible if they are 3 V mini SIM cards. Contact your service provider if you have any questions or problems.

(2) Beachten Sie, dass ein älterer SIM-Karten-Typ nur kompatibel ist, wenn es sich um eine 3-Volt-Mini-SIM-Karte handelt. Wenden Sie sich bei Problemen oder Fragen an Ihren Dienstanbieter.

Here (1) seems to be in a close enough interpretive relationship with (2). However, this relationship between the two texts is incidental inasmuch as (1) would have had to be formulated in a completely different way, or would have been left out altogether, if circumstances were such that older SIM cards had not been in use in Britain at all, because what counts here is not the extent to which (1) is a correct interpretation of (2) but that it provides correct instructions. In this sense, we could say, along the lines Gutt (1991, 45-65) sketches, that the English guide could have been written by somebody who can operate the phone and is familiar with the service provider without ever having read the German version. Therefore, the status of the German guide as source text is seriously challenged and, consequently, so is the status of the English text as translation.

5. Translation as a prototype category

We find that the examples discussed in the sections above vary along two scales. One is the extent to which cultural differences (apart from linguistic differences) play a role in the transfer process. To be more precise, this scale represents the degree to which the source text contains culture-specific elements, which need to be transferred to the target text. In certain cases, as in literary translation, the notion of culture can even be used in defining translation. In other cases culture seems to play no, or no significant, role, as in certain kinds of EU translation. The rest of the cases can be seen as occupying various positions between the two extremes.

The other scale relates to the extent to which the target language text is intended to be a faithful interpretation of a particular source language text. Scientific texts may serve as examples at the one extreme, where the intended closeness of interpretation is (normally, let us say) as great as possible. Exemplars of the other extreme are e.g. advertisements where the target language text is intended to be not so much a correct interpretation of the original but rather an adequate means of achieving a particular promotional goal.

These two scales define a two-dimensional plane, on which the various forms of transla-
Translation: Intercultural communication or interlinguistic transfer?

Communication and Culture

May be approximately represented in the form of points of a co-ordinate system, where axis X represents the scale of cultural transfer, ranging from 0 (intracultural translation) to 1 (intercultural translation), and axis Y represents the intended closeness of interpretation scale, ranging from 0 (no interpretive relation) to 1 (complete interpretive relation). I assume that the closer we come to degree 0, the more likely it is that the target text would qualify as what is traditionally called adaptation, and the closer we come to degree 1, the greater the chance that it would be called a literal translation. In Figure 1, I have tentatively placed the above-discussed forms of translation on the plane, to illustrate how they might be related to each other with regard to these two dimensions.

It turns out that these instances of communication display a rather wide and varied spectrum of forms which are commonly all taken to be instances of one and the same concept: translation. But how do we bring them together under the umbrella of an analytical definition? This has been, I think, one of the major obstacles in the way of forming a general theory of translation. To the best of my knowledge, no such definition has been proposed so far. I suggest that it would be more fruitful, perhaps, to consider these forms as members of a common category tied together by a system of family resemblances, in Wittgenstein’s (1958) sense, where some members are felt to be more typical examples than others. This way the problem of defining the concept of translation (in the commonly used sense of the term) dissolves into one that establishes links of resemblance between prototypical and less central members of the category (see also Rosch et al. 1976).

Venturing a typicality judgement here, we could say that literary translation is a more prototypical member than, for example, advertising translation or EU translation. Generally speaking, I assume that the closer a form approximates point (1,1), the better example of the central concept of translation it is (after all, translation is a transfer process between different, culturally embedded, conceptual systems), and the closer it comes to point (0,0), the better example it is of non-translation.
6. Translation as interpretive language use

However, accepting the above claims concerning family resemblance and prototypicality in case of translation phenomena, the problem of defining translation cannot reasonably be skirted round. If there is to be a truly scientific theory of translation, it needs to be able to define its object of investigation. We need to be able to clearly distinguish translation from non-translation, at least for the purposes of scientific study. Going along with Toury (1978) saying that translation is whatever is accepted as such in the target culture, merely amounts, in my view, to admitting our failure to provide a scientific definition.

A possible solution, as argued in Gutt (1991), is to make a distinction between the descriptive and interpretive uses of language, as explained originally in Sperber & Wilson’s (1986) relevance theory, and use this distinction in setting apart translation from non-translation.

In an ordinary assertion, all the analytic and contextual implications of the proposition expressed by the utterance are exactly the same as those that the communicator actually intended to communicate: this proposition is a literal interpretation of a thought of the communicator. The resemblance between a proposition and a thought, however, is normally less than literal. A proposition expressed by an utterance will normally be only a partial interpretation of a thought, in other words, they will share some, but not all, of their analytic and/or contextual implications. We can say that a propositional form and a thought or more generally two propositional forms (since a thought itself is a mental representation with a propositional form) interpretively resemble one another in a context to the extent that they share their analytic and contextual implications in that context (Wilson & Sperber, 1988, 138).

An utterance is a public representation of a thought of the speaker. A representation with a propositional form can represent things in two ways: either in virtue of its propositional form being true of a state of affairs, that is descriptively, or in virtue of a resemblance between its propositional form and the propositional form of some other representation, that is interpretively (Sperber & Wilson, 1986, 228-9). Thus, in a strict sense, every utterance is an interpretation of a thought (which, in turn, may be a descriptive representation of a state of affairs). It does not necessarily have to be a literal interpretation - and in most cases it is not. The audience can judge the closeness of the interpretation on the basis of the principle of relevance. A thought, in turn, may be in an interpretive relationship with another thought or in a descriptive relationship with some state of affairs. Sperber & Wilson (1986, 231) argue that all the basic tropes and illocutionary forces can be explained in this way: metaphor involves an interpretive relation between the propositional form of an utterance and a thought; irony involves an interpretive relation between the speaker’s thoughts and thoughts or utterances attributed to others; interrogatives and exclamatives involve an interpretive relation between the speaker’s thoughts and desirable thoughts; assertion involves a descriptive relation between the speaker’s thoughts and a state of affairs; and requesting and advising involve a descriptive relation between the speaker’s thoughts and a desirable state of affairs.

Translation can, in this framework, be defined as the act of communicating in a secondary context an informative intention (message) that interpretively resembles the original informative intention as closely as possible under the given conditions (in the secondary
context), in consistency with the principle of optimal relevance (Gutt, 1991, 100-101), which is the presumption that the processing of any utterance will yield adequate benefits for the reader for a reasonable effort (Sperber & Wilson, 1986, 158).

Therefore, according to Gutt (1991, 65) any text that is not an instance of interpretive use is not a translation. For example, a text, such as the English version of the Siemens guide, which is not intended to interpretively resemble another text but is rather an instance of descriptive usage in the loose meaning of the term, is not a translation in this technical sense, since it is not intended to achieve its relevance in virtue of an interpretive relationship with another text but by being an adequate description of a state of affairs. However, I would argue that Gutt (1991) fails to make a distinction between how a text achieves its relevance for a reader and how the translator intends it to achieve relevance. For the translator, producing the target language manual is clearly an interpretive task and remains so even in the face of the fact that what the target reader wants is not a correct interpretation but a correct instruction manual. The translator, of course, is aware of this expectation and uses it as an assumption in the secondary context, which will influence their decisions as to in what respects the target text should resemble the original to make it relevant for the target reader.

What, then, about advertising texts? An important point here is that interpretive resemblance is a matter of degree: it may range from the case of complete, or literal, resemblance through partial to marginal resemblance. Thus, as long as we accept a definition of translation as interpretive language use, where the interpretation is consistent with the principle of optimal relevance, there is no reason to say that such renderings, even if, given the circumstances, the degree of resemblance is not particularly high, are definitely beyond what we call a translation. These might be called marginal cases that would, perhaps, in traditional terms be regarded as examples of adaptation, yet as instances of non-incidental interpretive use are still covered by our definition.

7. Conclusions

Returning now to the questions posed at the beginning of my paper, my answer to the first one is yes. I think literary and special language translations have enough in common to be covered by the same theory inasmuch they both represent cases of interpretive language use. To the second question, whether theories of literary translation can be declared general theories of translation, the answer would be no, since literary translation is but one possible point on our co-ordinate plane representing the different forms of translation, and a theory built around this specific point will not be a theory of the whole plane. If we want a general theory of translation, it will have to cover all the points of the plane. As the relevance theory of communication is able to account for the whole plane, in terms of the difference between interpretive and descriptive language use, it seems to be a good framework within which the systematic study of translation can be advanced and carried out.
References


The Narrative Perspective in Subjective Literary Experience: A Cross-Cultural Study

János László and Tibor Pólya (University of Pécs, Hungary & Institute of Psychology of the HAS Budapest, Hungary)

In this paper, our goal is to give an overview on the problem of understanding stories that result from the differences between various perspectives used in and applied to the stories. In the first part of the paper we shall describe the most important views on perspectives as discussed in the literature in psychology and literary criticism. This is followed by a summary of the results of our own experiment conducted in order to examine the effects of perspectives in the comprehension and reception of literary texts. In this experiment a cultural variable was also introduced.

A relationship between change of perspective and cognitive processing is suggested by taking into consideration the fact that accuracy in recalling a situation subjects read about in a text is influenced by the perspective given in the instructions. Abelson (1975) examined the generality and richness of detail in the recall of a situation as a function of the distance from a spatially fixed point of observation. Despite the fact that subjects received exactly the same description of a situation, those subjects whose instructions indicated a more distanced perspective were able to remember the general aspects of the situation better, whereas those whose instructions indicated a close-up perspective could recall the details of the situation more easily.

The observer-participant attributional difference known from the field of social cognition (Jones & Nisbett, 1987) can be achieved by manipulating the perspective given in the instructions. Subjects reading the same story will identify a different person as the main character depending on the instructions given. Regardless of which person they thought of as the main character, subjects reading the story will explain the actions of the chosen main character with situational factors, supposedly because they identified with him/her (Black, 1982).

The experiments just described indicate the connection between perspective and the processing of textual situational information, with special respect to absorbing information from a situation according to a given perspective. However, these experiments do not explain the notion of perspective; they treat it as a one-dimensional variable, being altered at certain points within a text. Furthermore, they do not describe the various ways perspectives can take effect, nor do they enumerate possibilities of changing perspective.

Uspensky (1974), in The Poetics of Composition, enumerates such possibilities for the first time, and formulates a taxonomy for the description of perspective change. He distinguishes four conceptually independent forms of perspective: evaluative, spatio-temporal, phraseological and psychological.
Perspective at the psychological level relates to the method of introducing characters. The narrator - not necessarily identical with the author - can choose between the various methods of introducing characters. Character depiction might be limited to the description of behavior. The contrasting alternative to the external introduction is the omniscient narrator, who guides the reader through the inner world of the characters, describing their emotions, experiences and thoughts. Merging these alternatives, the author might choose to depict a character by referring to his or her inner states, but from an observer’s perspective. In this case the author, through the acts of perceiving those states, merely supposes their presence (e.g. “it seemed he thought that x”). The depiction of characters as just described - going from the outside perspective towards inner states - is revealed in the verbal composition of the text. The narrator uses action verbs to describe the behavior of characters, whereas in the description of the characters’ mental states, verbs descriptive of mental states (verba sentiendi) are used. In the third, combined form the narrator states the target’s unobservable mental states with the so-called alienating expressions suggestive of the perceptions of an observer (e.g. “one sees that x”). Another possible manifestation of perspectivization at the psychological level is that the author directly interweaves a character’s emotions and thoughts into the text without distinctly signaling this in the composition.

Levinson (1983), from the field of pragmatics, summarizes the expressive possibilities included in Uspensky’s evaluative-ideological, spatio-temporal and phraseological dimensions under the label of deictic expressions. Deictic expressions have no meaning independent of context, gaining meaning only in association with characters appearing in the text - or in other words, only when becoming perspectivized. Uspensky’s psychological dimension is also of linguistic interest but, since depicting the mental life of characters is a constitutive element of the interconnected system of narratives, linguistic studies have not been able to exhaust the questions related to the presentation of the characters’ mental states.

In addition to his primary goal of explaining how perspectives take effect, Uspensky also examines the function of changing perspective in literary texts. His analysis is based on the assumption that literary text is representational in nature. According to his view, representational arts are characterized by the duality of substantial (depicted) and expressive (depicting) dimensions. The process of representation in Uspensky’s view, however, necessarily implicates the depicter as well as the content and process elements. In relation to the person who organizes the perspective, Uspensky distinguishes another aspect of perspective: internal and external. He suggests that in external perspective the author’s perspective is dominant, whereas in internal perspective one of the characters’ perspective is dominant. This duality of internal and external perspective is applied to all four dimensions. He uses the following regularities common in literary texts as his basis for describing the role of the structure of perspective: while introducing the first character the external perspective is dominant; then a change in perspective follows to internal perspective; and, at the end of the text, again external perspective returns. Such sequencing in perspective change (external–internal–external) constitutes the borders of a piece of art, as well as creating inner borders of smaller units within the text (when it is used for the introduction of further characters). These inner borders of smaller units within the text constituted by changes in perspective, outline and define the inner structure of literary texts. A similar system of perspectivization, applied both to the
characters’ as well as to the narrator’s consciousness, is elaborated in Cohn (1978).

Thus, The Poetics of Composition summarizes and provides a theoretical framework for the varieties of perspectives. At the same time it describes the function of perspective in literary texts in terms of their structure and enriches the meaning that characterizes this type of text.

Uspensky also offers some grounding for the psychological function of perspective. Although his analysis is intentionally limited to the structuralist frame of literary criticism, he mentions a few examples from the field of psychology when he interprets the understanding and accepting of others’ perspectives as a manifestation of empathy. An association between empathy and perspectives has been supported by empirical studies in psychology. Readers relate more emphatically to those characters who have been depicted from the internal perspective than to those depicted from the external perspective (Kuno, 1976).

It is more significant, however, that Uspensky’s approach is similar to the one used in cognitive psychology, namely that he analyzes the effect of perspective in connection with representation. It is important to note that discussions of the relations between the point of view and the representation in cognitive psychology emerged out of a debate on mental representation. Looking at Uspensky’s view of the structure-forcing role of perspective by considering the debate on mental representation, it can be seen as an attempt to amalgamate the linguistic and visual forms of external representations. This view is in accordance with Johnson-Laird’s theory of the organization of mental representation (Johnson-Laird, 1980; 1983). He states that the most important form of inner representations - which he refers to as mental models - is the combination of the analogical and propositional forms of mental representation. From our perspective - which is the narrative one - the significance of the concept of mental models is that an expanded and reinterpreted version of it provides us with the possibility of organizing Uspensky’s dimensions into a unified framework.

Organization and application of mental models allow people to interpret the spatial configurations of objects - according to Johnson-Laird’s definition of the concept. He says that propositional representational form alone is in some cases insufficient to represent spatial configurations of objects properly: creating propositional representations means the transformation of visual and verbal input. In order to transform information into propositional form, concept-based inference rules are used. Transforming spatial terms into propositional representations incurs difficulties arising from the fact that qualities related to transitivity of spatial expressions depend not only on their meaning, but also on the arrangement of the connected objects. (Such expressions describing spatial relations are context dependent, and hence they might be called deictic.) For instance, if we know about the spatial arrangement of objects A, B, and C, say that A is to the right of B and B is to the right of C, we cannot deduce A’s spatial relation to C unequivocally. If A, B, and C are placed along a line, then the spatial expression “to the right” is transitive: in other words, A is to the right of C. If, however, A, B, and C are arranged on a circle, the expression “to the right” is not transitive or, in other words, it is not necessarily true that A is to the right of C. The uncertainty of the transitivity of spatial expressions can be resolved if descriptions of concepts for spatial arrangements include the observer’s relation to the word. Mental model theory thus suggests that because of the insufficiency of transition rules, the transformation into propositional representations should be completed with the assumption of
mental models: with a structure that is isomorphic with the structure of the situation to which they refer. This hypothesis is supported by Johnson-Laird’s experiment (reported in Johnson-Laird, 1983), in which subjects were asked to read a Conan Doyle story followed by questions about spatial arrangement: “Which direction did Holmes and Watson go after stepping out from the balcony: from right to left or from left to right?” This question was answered correctly by the subjects. Since there was no mention of walking direction in the text, Johnson-Laird concluded that this knowledge must be the result of the construction of a mental model of the arrangement of the house.

Allowing for formal and substantial identity of propositional representation and mental models, Johnson-Laird emphasizes the functional difference between the two representational forms. Mental models represent by virtue of their structural reference to the relevant aspects of a given arrangement. In contrast, propositional representation is a description which, being completed by the relevant mental model, can only be understood in relation to a given context.

Others (cf. Lindsay, 1988) building on Johnson-Laird’s concept of mental models did not accept the form of spatial relations grounded on rule-based inference. Yet another approach to the study of the construction of mental models interprets them as a further level of representation - as opposed to being a new form of representation. This view suggests that mental models reveal the structure of the knowledge already represented. Such reinterpretation of the mental model construct is reflected in the coining of new concepts such as cognitive model, or mental space theory, but it is often the case that the name of the construct remains the same, but is now intended to apply to the level of representation. From the point of view of our topic, the concept of perspective change, this alteration of the construct of mental models bears important consequences. The reason for this is that according to Johnson-Laird, mental models are different from imaginary images in that while the latter are guided by effects of perspective, the former - by definition - not. The above mentioned alterations of this definition, however, lead us back to observer involvement, and consequently to the involvement of perspective in the organization of representation.

Fauconnier (1985), in the field of cognitive linguistics, worked out a cognitive model for mental representation that conceptualizes mental models as a level of representation. This theory was the basis for Sander’s model (Sander, 1994) interpreting the phenomenon of narrative perspective within the “reader’s text processing cognitive model.”

In summary, the expansions and reinterpretations of the concept of mental models assume psychological and cognitive linguistic constructs. Such constructs help in the description and representation of situations depicted in texts, in such a way that the representation preserves patterns of the denoted situation that result from its person-(observer-)related aspects. In contrast to the event-denotative explanations of narrative, Bruner (1986) emphasizes that the functions of narratives should be looked at in relation to the person who presents those narratives (author or narrator). Thus, within narrative analysis of literary texts Bruner brings phenomena related to the effect of perspective to the center of attention. The idea that subevents of a story are related to an observer (subjectification) means that in each case we learn about the events of a story from someone’s perspective. According to Bruner the key to understanding narrative texts is that the effect of perspective - or often multiplicity of perspectives - allows readers to move the reality presented in a narrative into their own subjective world.
In the second part of this paper we are going to discuss the results of an experiment we conducted examining the psychological function of narrative perspective in cultural context. Our experiment was aimed at discovering the effects of narrative perspective through the study of the relationship between the reader and the narrative text at the level of subjective experience. In designing the experiment, our theoretical basis was Uspensky’s distinction of internal and external perspective. Distinguishing between external and internal perspective seemed to provide a good anchor for the supposedly differing psychological effects of different ways of perspectivization.

We chose a short story by Ferenc Sánta entitled Nazis, which predominantly uses external perspective in character depiction. The writer rarely allows the reader to learn about the inner lives of his characters. For our purposes we also used another version of the story which contained exclusively external perspective, in order to compare the processing of a narrative that contains internal as well as external perspective with one that uses only external perspective. As an added constraint, the manifestation of internal and external perspective was manipulated only regarding its psychological features - which essentially means Uspensky’s fourth dimension. This change affected only a limited aspect of narrative perspective, and since the psychological dimension is relatively independent of the others - it did not lead to contradictions in the understanding of the text.

Our experiment (László & Larsen, 1991) concentrated on the phenomenological experience of subjects when reading literary texts. We were curious to find personal memories of subjective experiences that subjects spontaneously recollected. We think that such enquiries do not take us away from the field of imagination. They merely switch the focus of examining mental activity. In the previous experiments we examined mental images in relation to texts, whereas in this one, we examined mental images in relation to people. For these purposes we developed a method we called self-probed retrospection. The method consists of subjects reading the given text without any extraneous distraction, and in conjunction being asked to mark those sections of the text where memories of some personal experience came to mind. After finishing reading, the subjects were asked to go back to each recollected memory, and fill out a questionnaire in which they indicated the content, time, and place of the event recalled. They were also asked to rate each memory along three phenomenological qualities: vividness, pleasantness and level of aggression. For this we used 7-point scales. This experiment again used the short story by Sánta, both the original version and the version including only external perspective. It additionally compared culturally proximal Hungarian readers and culturally distant Danish readers.

Based on our previous studies we expected that memories recalled while reading the version enriched with inner perspective would be richer in detail, and phenomenologically more vivid. By introducing the variable of cultural difference we wanted to answer the question of how special knowledge related to one’s culture affects spontaneous recollection of memories, and how they interact with the effects of internal and external perspective.

Regarding the cultural variable, memories recollected by Danish and Hungarian subjects during the reading did not significantly differ in their number. However, the content and characteristics of the recalled experiences did differ, in reading both the original and the external perspective versions of the text. Hungarian readers recollected significantly more richly contextualized personal memories. At the same time, there were no significant dif-
ferences in the cultural variable with regard to the phenomenological vividness of these memories. Analyzing the interaction of the cultural and perspective variables, we found that the narrator’s perspective influenced the recollected experiences in the dimension of aggressivity, but this effect was dependent on cultural closeness: using inner perspective resulted in the recollection of more aggressive memories in the case of Hungarian readers than in the case of Danish readers.

Phenomenological qualities related to internal and external perspective showed an independence of cultural effects in that both aggressivity and vividness were affected a great deal by perspective: segments with internal perspective resulted in recollection of more aggressive and more vivid memories.

The results of our experiment suggest that internal and external perspective differ in their impact upon the phenomenological quality of recollected images. These results strengthen the differentiation between these two types of perspectivization, which difference was shown in the speed of creating mental images in our previous experiment. We explain these results - the fact that memories recalled based on a text containing internal representation are more aggressive - with the richer, and more meaningful quality of internal perspective, in the same way as we did in our previous experiment.

In summary, we could not put our finger on the precise source of difference between internal and external perspective. These results are congruent with the view that during transformational processes, in addition to the preservation of information, some data about the character to which this information can be related is also preserved. However, our studies did not succeed in indicating that internal and external perspectives influences cognitive processing differently. Our experiment included the personal experiences of the reader, by examining the imaginative and spontaneous processes of recollection. With this broader approach to the study of text understanding, we found a difference in the phenomenological quality of spontaneously recalled memories associated with text segments affected by internal vs. external perspective. Our results support the view that methods of perspectivisation applied in texts are important contributors to the understanding of the text, but nevertheless their differing effects can be detected only at the experiential level of reading. The phenomenologically more vivid experiences associated with internal perspective, can be explained by the meaning-enriching quality of such text.


Communication as Social Practice: The Interface between the Cognitive and the Social Sciences
Michiel Leezenberg (University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands)

1. Introduction

Most contemporary theoretical approaches to the meaning and use of language tend to take a synchronic, individualistic, and mentalist (or cognitivist) perspective, which delegates diachronic factors and questions of the social and cultural world within which communication takes place to a secondary status. Here, I would like to reopen discussion of these methodological choices that have long been taken for granted, and to sketch an alternative. I will do this mostly in the form of a discussion with some forms of cognitive semantics, which is one of the more influential frameworks at present. Interestingly, among cognitive scientists, there seems to be an increasing awareness of the desirability of a more sophisticated account of culture, and of a more intensive interaction with social science, witness the various contributions to Gibbs & Steen (eds.) 1999 and especially Turner 2002. But whereas those attempts take a starting point in cognitive science, here I would like to start at the opposite end. That is, I will sketch some recent insights from the social sciences and discuss how these may be brought to bear on linguistic and cognitive questions. I will focus on three Cs that are central to the study of both cognition and language use: concepts, culture, and communication. I will link these to three Ps that to me seem essential to a more adequate understanding: respectively, practice, performatives, and power. Recent cognitivist approaches, I will argue, rest on outdated views of the Cs that do not (or not sufficiently) take the Ps into account. I will keep a fourth C as a surprise; it will be revealed in the conclusion.

2. Concepts and Practice

Despite their phenomenology-inspired insistence on ‘embodied experience’ as the basis of cognition, representatives of cognitive semantics treat metaphor as a primarily conceptual or cognitive notion in the sense that it is, first and foremost, seen as a private mental phenomenon, of which linguistically expressed metaphors are but a derivative externalization.

* An earlier version of the paper, not including the results and the discussion of the empirical cross-cultural experiment on subjective reading experiences, was submitted to an international editor in 1996 but no feedback has been received yet. Should the original version ever appear, the authors take responsibility for some common ideas and methods figuring in the two versions. However, the present analysis of and especially the narrative perspective on the cross-cultural experiment lend novel features to some old topics.
tion. Lakoff (1987) claims a non-metaphorical rock bottom of our cognition in his so-called basic-level concepts like mother and table, which are claimed to be directly meaningful or intrinsically intentional. But basic-level concepts cannot be culture-transcendent (tables are obviously cultural artifacts, and mothers are not simply biological entities but first and foremost actors of specific social roles, witness the extensive anthropological literature on kinship and kinship terms). But if they are culture-dependent, perhaps less emphasis should be given to strictly cognitive (and allegedly universal) principles of cognition. The crux is that even such allegedly basic-level concepts result from an interaction with a world that is social through and through, and cannot in any sense be given or meaningful prior to such interaction. Gibbs (1999: 162) shows an awareness of this problem, as appears from his remark that cognition arises and is continually re-experienced when the body interacts with the cultural world, but he stops short of its more radical implications. On a more radical review, the task would not merely be to extend the study of conceptual metaphors to the social and cultural world, but to revert the very order of explanation. The patron saint of such an approach is, of course, the later Wittgenstein (what follows is a Guinness Book of Records-style attempt at summarizing, roughly, paragraphs 1 through 202 of the Philosophical Investigations (1953)). The main Wittgensteinian criticism states that private mental images or representations cannot determine or explain our linguistic behavior (para. 139-41); more in general, no rule can determine any specific way of acting. Rather, ‘following a rule’ (or applying a concept) is in itself a practice. That is, on a Wittgensteinian account, possessing a concept does not consist in entertaining a mental representation, but rather in having a practical skill: the ability to use a linguistic expression correctly. At the theoretical, this ability cannot adequately be captured in representationalist or mentalist terms, but is more fruitfully seen in terms of correct usage, of which truth conditions are but a subset. Now Lakoff’s ravings against any form of truth-conditional (or better model-theoretic) form of semantics are too well known to need restating or refuting again (see Lakoff 1987: ch. 15; Leezenberg 2001: 145-7); but the general point of truth-conditional semantics and the complementary pragmatics, conceived along more or less standard lines, would seem to be the fact that they aim at capturing precisely these eminently practical skills of correctly using language, regarding both propositional content and pragmatic adequacy.

Finally, the correct use of language is not just a practical skill, but a pre-eminently social practice. Literal meanings are fixed, and concepts are stabilized, by specific communicative practices, like education in school, and language standardization by state agencies like language academies. A theoretical acknowledgement of such institutional realities may yield interesting revisions in our long-cherished accounts of language and cognition. To assume that concepts, let alone in the shape of highly complex, structured ICMs and the like, are given in isolation from, and indeed in advance of, such social practices, is to put the explanatory cart before the horse. Cognition is not a private mental event but a social practice.

3. Culture and Performatives

The mentalist view of cognition prevalent in cognitive semantics leaves unanswered the epistemological problem of how such private mental states or episodes may come to be
shared at all; this view faces a serious threat of solipsism that makes anything social or inter-subjective, let alone the outside world of things, something of a mystery. But apart from such Wittgensteinian considerations, doubts may also be raised regarding the cognitivists’ notion of culture.

Until recently, the themes of culture and society have received surprisingly little attention in cognitive semantics, despite their obvious relevance to arguments concerning the cultural background of our basic-level concepts. The emphasis on practical skill and embodied experience on the one hand, and on mental representations on the other, leads to a profoundly ambivalent view of culture, at least in Lakoff (1987), and, I would surmise, in many another practitioner of cognitive semantics.

In the last few years, an awareness of the need for more attention to cultural factors appears to be on the increase. Even the most recent statements by cognitive semanticists, however, betray a rather naïve view of culture. Thus, Lakoff (2001) describes ‘Islamic culture’ as shared by all Muslims, and as involving values different from those of ‘our’ Western culture; Gibbs (1999: 153-4) thinks of cultural models as ‘intersubjectively shared cultural schemas’ that do ‘real work for individuals and collective communities in shaping what people believe’. Both betray the still widespread view of a culture as a collection of concepts, norms and values (or more abstractly, rules) shared in a community. This conception, however, is theoretically outdated and empirically untenable. First, the idea of a homogeneous cultural or linguistic community is an illusion. Talk of an alleged ‘community’ of speakers of, say, Dutch, Hungarian, or English masks a complex reality of widely divergent dialects and sociolects, with various groups actively cultivating a desire to be different. Likewise, ‘Dutch’ or ‘Hungarian’ culture is not a single integrated or coherent whole, but a tension-ridden amalgamation of opposed positions, the variation being deliberately maintained across divides of, among others, class, gender, subculture, and age group.

Second, viewing culture as shared threatens to reduce it to a domain of social ‘structure’ that lies wholly outside the realm of, and hence is inaccessible to, human agency. Such methodological assumptions make it much harder to account for variation, conflict and change within a culture.

As an alternative, I would recommend a closer attention to the recent social-scientific conception of culture as an arena for competing claims to legitimacy, where cultural facts and cultural differences may be put to strategic uses of various kinds. Indeed, the very appeal to one’s culture as something given, shared, timeless and hence uncontestable, may, and indeed should, be treated as just one strategic move in communication among various others—and especially a move that reflects a claim to the legitimate authority to speak on behalf of a whole group of people.

Culture is not simply an inherited element of structure, but continually produced, and reproduced, by human agency. This view of “culture in the making” (Fox 1984: ch 11), emphasizes the theoretical importance of social practice. This notion, as developed over the past few decades in the social sciences, promises to cut across the age-old structure-agency divide, in that it presumes neither. A further central aspect of social practice is its typically performative character: that is, often one can actually create social realities by merely saying that they exist. The simplest case is, of course, baptizing a child or a ship, or declaring two people legally married; but this notion of performativity has a much wider application, as partly constitutive of, e.g., ethnic, national or sexual identity. The social world is never
simply given, but actively constituted and reproduced in the practices of specific social actors, who may create social facts by naming them. Such a reconceptualization of ‘culture’ as involving the continuous, and partly performative, affirmation of specific social facts will put us in a better position to account for cultural variation, conflict and change than a view of culture as given and shared.

4. Communication and Power

Finally, I will address a pervasive assumption in theorizing about language in the Anglo-Saxon tradition from which cognitive semantics has sprung. Most if not all such theorizing appears to involve a largely tacit folk theory, a cultural model, an Idealized Cognitive Model, or language ideology, which highlights specific aspects of communication at the expense of others. According to this ideology, language is a kind of social contract. This becomes clear from several aspects of such a view.

First, language is, almost by definition, treated as a form of cooperative social action; conflict, uncooperative behavior, and the assertion or arrogation of power are all seen as abuses, or at best as exploitations, of the means of communication. Second, this cooperation is held to be a matter of pure self-interest: speaking the same language is often considered simply a prerequisite for adequate mutual understanding, and by extension for the effective pursuit of (communicative and other) individual goals. Third, the actors entering in a social contract are assumed to be free, autonomous, and equal, if not in actual communicative situations, then at least as a ‘regulative ideal’ that informs all genuine communication. Thus, the social-contract view of language is not simply a form of methodological individualism; it also delegates questions of power to a secondary status of marginal or anomalous phenomena (for a more detailed argument concerning the language-as-social-contract view, cf. Leezenberg 2002).

Now the main objection to this view of language can be stated quite simply: power relations are not only intrinsic to all empirically real situations of communication; they are also constitutive of both language and its users. That is, there are neither autonomous, power-free actors to enter into any contract, nor language systems that are as consensual as they are presented.

I would like to emphasize the methodological character of this claim. Ever since Saussure, the considerable success of the theoretical language sciences has in large part resulted from the methodological choice of precisely abstracting away from social factors; but now, the question is precisely how to bring such factors back in. I would like to argue for their recuperation, not as independent variables that may or may not interact with language, but as something internal to, indeed constitutive of, both the language system and the language user. Lack of space precludes a detailed argumentation of this claim (for which see Leezenberg 2002), but it is readily entailed by the two claims that language is a social practice, and that all social practice involves power. This may sound like a radical claim, but even so liberal a theoretician as John Searle acknowledges that “power .. permeates every nook and cranny of our social lives” (1995: 94). But whereas Searle treats power as arising from a collectively agreed upon imposition of a specific social status, and therefore as legiti-
mate by definition, in actual social life things are a good deal more complicated. Performatives may typically function in virtue of a legitimate and acknowledged authority (such as the civil servant declaring two people legally married), but they may also involve the arrogation of specific, and often symbolic, forms of power. This becomes clearest in performatives of a patently political, and therefore contentious, character:

(1) I hereby proclaim the independence of the state of A.
(2) B is not a dialect of D, but a distinct language.

The felicitous utterance of these sentences crucially depends on who has, or successfully arrogates, the authority to execute such a performative: in (1), the authority would seem to be primarily political, in (2) it is rather of an academic, that is, broadly symbolic character; if the speaker’s authority is recognized, the truth of her utterance of (2) will be more readily acknowledged, with all the possible social and political implications for the speakers of dialect/language B.

That is, communication may often if not always involve relations (and possibly conflicts) of power, but this power need not be of a purely political and visible character. Indeed, it may well be that all apparently cooperative communication involves what Bourdieu (1991: ch. 7) has called ‘symbolic power’, which is the power to constitute the meanings of expressions, and thus the beliefs expressed by them; or the power to constitute the common-sense categories with which we think and perceive the social world surrounding us. This power is articulated through institutions of mass communication, education, language standardization, and the like, which thus reproduce specific ways of speaking and thinking as most legitimate, i.e., most authoritative and prestigious. According to Bourdieu, symbolic power is not normally recognized as such, and it is indeed a precondition of its successful functioning that it is mistaken for cooperative and power-free action.

Bourdieu’s own main interests appear to lie mainly with the explanation of the remarkable stability of social institutions that in themselves are inherently arbitrary entities, and sites of contention, competition and contest. This emphasis on stability makes problematic the question of how to account for change; but I believe that Bourdieu at least provides some of the tools necessary for such an account.

The idea of the language system itself as free from power relations, and language usage as inherently if not essentially cooperative, is predominant in contemporary linguistic theory, if not in everyday communication. But it really is no more than an unreflected, and indeed ‘ideological’ assumption that may be criticized once it is made explicit. It is not cross-culturally shared either. To mention but one counterexample, the famous doctrine of the ‘rectification of names’ in ancient China, according to which a prime task of government is to ensure that words like king, father and son have, and retain, their ‘correct’ (one is tempted to say ‘literal’) meaning, shows that the earliest Chinese ideology of language was of a non-contractarian character. In Confucius and other ancient Chinese philosophers, the linguistic action of the rectification of names is intimately linked to the practice of government: rather than treating categorization as biologically given, this emphasizes classification as a distinctly social practice. The correct naming of human and other beings is believed to performatively create the obligations belonging to their social status, and thus to the creation
and maintenance of social; stability. Likewise, languages are seen as the result of a continuous application of the power to name things, and linguistic communication is treated as prototypically involving participants unequal in power and social status. The topic of the rectification of names also suggests that power relations may actually be productive of meanings, and hence should not be conceived of as just negative matters of domination or repression (cf. Leezenberg 2001b for a more elaborate discussion).

5. Conclusion

The above three strands of thinking that inform cognitive approaches to communication (concepts as private mental representations; cultures as shared sets of rules and norms and values; and communication as a kind of social contract) are not arbitrary or unrelated. They form part of an integrated, though largely implicit, view of social action, the main features of which are an assumption of methodological individualism, which takes the individual as an autonomous actor, and a consensus view of culture, which treats language usage, ritual behavior, and other forms of social action as functionally geared towards social, cultural and conceptual integration. These two broad assumptions may be traced to respectively, Max Weber and Emile Durkheim. More recent research in the social sciences, however, suggests that neither of them is at all unproblematic.

In opposition to such a consensus view social action as inherently or essentially cooperative and directed towards social integration, I would like to propose (and this is the fourth C promised in the introduction) a conflict view of communication. This takes its inspiration from social scientists like Fox (1984), Foucault (1983), and Bourdieu (1991), and emphasizes the fact that all social action (including communication) involves relations of power, the legitimacy of which may be challenged. On a conflict view, no ‘shared culture’ is required for successful communication; and in so far as there is something like a shared culture involved, this is the result of a prolonged and continuing process of socialization that is the result of power relations as much as of active consent.

This does not imply, of course, that all communication necessarily involves conflict, or that all power is illegitimate. Rather, it merely involves the explicit and systematic incorporation of power as an independent variable, a power, the legitimacy of which cannot be assumed in advance. A closer attention to the potential for challenge and conflict will put us in a better position to account for variation and change.

Political and cultural communities are constituted less by a quasi-contractual consent than by the assertion or arrogation of legitimate authority, that is, by and exercise of or claim to power. They may even be formed by the threat or use of violence. Although a detailed substantiation of this claim would take us too far afield here, violence may be seen as an extreme means of forming and maintaining an ethnic group or nation, i.e., a group alleged to share cultural material like a language.

A reconceptualization of cognitive approaches to language among lines that are more informed by the social sciences has two advantages. First, it seems empirically more adequate in accounting for the complexities of actual social life. Second, as a methodological choice, it may bring phenomena to the fore that had hitherto been delegated to secondary
status as anomalous or marginal. It calls for more attention to phenomena like diachronic language change (whether or not involving a metaphorical change of meaning) and sub-standard varieties of language as an integral part of the dynamics of the social and communicative world.
The expression ‘correctly’ masks the important and complex problematic of the essentially normative aspect of language usage, and hence of cognition. This problem is especially pressing for those cognitive and other approaches that tend to depict cognition naturalistically as a quasi-biological process; but I have no space to address this issue here.


The question in how far this notion involves a metaphorical mapping, as calling it an ICM would suggest, is irrelevant to my main point here. Personally, I prefer to call it a ‘language ideology’, as it brings out the contestable (and, indeed, political) nature of such views. Likewise, it is not very important whether or not, as Zoltan Kövecses (p.c.) has argued, the social-contract view is as widespread as its potential counterpart, the familiar ARGUMENT IS WAR metaphor. Suffice it to say that clear traces of it can be found in practical all analytical philosophers, including Grice, Searle, Putnam, and various others.

As I argue in Leezenberg (2002), Searle (1995) acknowledges such cases of power struggle in the social world, but has considerable difficulty accounting for them.
References

Section II

Cognition and Conceptualization
1. **What is cognition?**

According to Neisser (1976, 1) “[c]ognition is the activity of knowing: the acquisition, organization and use of knowledge.” This definition, however, is not valid for humans only, but can be extended to other organisms as well. Since the acquisition, organization and application of knowledge/information is a biological function that is characteristic of all living organisms in one form or another, we can speak about cognition in a general. We can even speak about the evolution of cognition as such because cognition is not only characteristic of all living organisms, but it is an indispensable condition of life, since this is the fundamental basis of an organism’s contact with its environment. Thus, cognition is primarily a biological function in animals for constructing an internal model of their environment.

There are of course evolutionary differences in cognitive functioning that characterize different living organisms. All organisms exhibit the cognitive functioning of picking up information from the environment, processing that information, and changing their behavior in accordance with that information in order to enhance their average probability of survival in a given system: “Cognition is a function ... [which] ... within the given system increases the probability of survival of the component ... actively involved in cognition. ... Knowledge is the part of a component that has evolved in the course of cognition ... [and] ... on which ... the increased probability of survival of the component [depends]” Csányi (1989, 205).

Evolution has produced two basic levels of this acquisition, organization and application of knowledge/information in organisms (Bonner, 1980). For the first organisms to appear in the course of evolution it was genetically determined, i.e., hard-wired, what kind of information they could acquire, how they could organize this information and how they could apply it. In the case of this type of information processing, when performance is based on gene expression, it is customary to speak about a genetic memory (Csányi, 1988) or biological knowledge (Plotkin, 1994). This is the information that has become genetically coded in the genom of the individuals of a species during evolution. This genetic level of information processing was later supplemented by a completely new type of cognitive processing when later on in the course of evolution organisms evolved that were equipped with a nervous systems. “The nervous system is the special organ of adaptation that evolved to adjust the organism to rapid changes” (Csányi, 1988, 299). An organism with a nervous system became capable of a more flexible behavior because individual experience began to play a much greater role in the modification of its behavior. Thus, the possibility for the acquisition of individual knowledge became greatly enhanced in a direct proportion to the complexity of...
the nervous system. When the neural mode of cognition began to supplement and interact with genetic cognition, the adaptive flexibility of the organism became the function of the proportion of the two types of cognitive activities in an organism because this determined the amount and type of experience that could be processed.

2. The relativity of cognition

Cognition has an adaptive role: it is the biological function which forms the basis of an organism’s interaction with its environment through operating an internal model of this environment. Because of this, it necessarily involves an interpretation of reality in terms of the perceiver’s biology. In other words, cognition means knowing the world in a way that is permitted and at the same time required by the biological functions of an organism. Rosch (1978, 29) formulates this idea very clearly: “[T]he perceived world ... is not a metaphysical world without a knower. What kinds of attributes can be perceived are ... species-specific. What attributes will be perceived ... is undoubtedly determined by many factors having to do with the functional needs of the knower interacting with the physical and social environment.”

Cognition is thus not simply knowing reality, but knowing reality in a way that it facilitates an organism’s optimal adaptation to it. Because of this, parts of reality are cognized according to the roles they play in the interaction between organism and environment. Cognition is not a purely objective amassing of information about the world but involves an interpretation of reality in terms of the perceiver’s biology in order to be able to interact with the environment in a functional way. This is reflected in Rosch’s (1978, 29) most basic principles of categorization, which she terms cognitive economy. According to this principle, stimuli are considered similar as long as their differences are irrelevant to behavioral purposes. Thus, the perceived similarity of stimuli is relative to their role that they play in an organism’s behavior. Behavior in this context means any kind of interaction between an organism and its environment.

On the basis of the above, similarity does obviously not reside objectively in the entities themselves, but emerges in their subjective cognizing by an organism. This kind of similarity is called analogy, which, according to Holyoak (1984, 204) “is structured similarity with functional import.” It is in this sense that we can speak of cognition as a subjective process. The correspondence between objective reality and its subjective cognition is regulated by the adaptive value of the organism’s ‘view’ of reality. This means that the subjectivity of the internal model of reality that an organism operates cannot go as far as to endanger the organism’s survival. In the ideal case subjectivity goes just so far that the facilities of reality are utilized in terms of the organism’s biology to an optimal degree. For different organisms, but also for the same organisms under different environmental conditions (which may not only include the physical but also social, cultural, etc. aspects), different construals of phenomena may gain validity according to their adaptive value.

A functional approach should not exclude subjectivity, but view it as the basis for adaptive behavior. Of course, subjectivity must be held within certain limits, and it is just its adaptive value that will regulate these limits. In other words, there has to be a feedback
between adaptive value and subjectivity. A construal of reality that hinders optimal adaptation to the environment rather than facilitates it is not likely to gain validity because it would jeopardize the organism’s survival. In the case of human beings the problem is, of course, much more complex. Adaptation and survival are by no means to be understood in the strict biological but rather in a socio-cultural sense.

3. Social cognition and language

As we have seen, the internal model operated in the cognitive processes is partly based on genetically determined knowledge of the environment and of the necessary behavior therein and partly on individual experience. In this sense cognition is to a large extent a subjective process in an individual. However, it can be made social to the extent to which individually acquired knowledge can be made collective within a group, population, species, society, culture, etc. The sharing of such knowledge is based on information transfer, which can be achieved through different forms and mechanisms of communication. Species participate in social cognition to the extent that they rely on social interaction for their survival. Social cognition is “[t]he application of intelligence to the review of social information and the exploitation and management of social relationships toward attainment of short- and long-term goals” (Quiatt & Reynolds, 1993, 141).

Humans are the species that possess the most powerful device for sharing knowledge: language. With the help of language we are capable of exchanging knowledge by far to the largest extent within the animal kingdom. Human beings are no exceptions from the fact that their behavior can be described as the outcome of genetic and neural cognitive mechanisms, although they probably rely most heavily on neural memory among all animals. But this is not the basic reason why the nature of human cognition appears to be qualitatively different from that found in other animals. Just as there is a qualitative difference between the acquisition of knowledge through genetic transmission and through experience and learning based on a nervous system, there is a further qualitative difference between these two conditions and the evolutionary innovation in knowledge acquisition found in humans. While most other organisms can only acquire knowledge through sensory experience gathered individually, human cognition is characterized by the fact that humans can acquire knowledge without direct physical experience. This type of cognition without experience is a result of human linguistic capacities. Symbols of language carry information about reality and symbolic communication is capable of substituting direct experience. Humans gather the larger part of their knowledge from symbols in this way.

Evidently, the larger part of human knowledge is not of first hand experience but has been mediated in linguistic form. Many symbolic structures do not even qualify as representing something that can be physically experienced. But even in the case of symbolic structures that represent parts of perceivable reality, the type of knowledge contained in these structures differs from the simple neural type of cognitive processing of physical experience, which happens in the form of iconic and categorical representations, i.e., “analogs of the proximal sensory projections of distal objects and events” and “learned and innate feature detectors that pick out the invariant features of object and event categories from their
sensory projections” (Harnad, 1990, 335). This does not mean, however, that earlier evolved types of cognitive activity, genetic and neural, are not found in humans. They are, though to a very large extent, only supplemented by the symbolic one and interact with it in basic ways. We must not forget that symbolic structures are after all based on neural mechanisms. This does not apply only to the physiological level: symbolic cognition is ultimately grounded in more basic genetics and experience determining cognitive structures (Harnad, 1990). According to Harnad symbols are of two kinds, elementary symbols and higher order symbols. The meanings of the former are directly grounded in iconic and categorical representations (see above) through our direct interaction with our environment, whereas the latter are created through composition of the former and thus inherit the grounding of the elementary symbols. In this way they remain indirectly grounded because “the grounded names ... [are] strung together into propositions” (Harnad, 1990, 343) and thus the underlying symbolic representations “consist of symbol strings describing [new] category membership relations” (Harnad, 1990, 335).

Several other authors also agree that our linguistic capacity is based on our sense of space, both visual and kinesthetic, and thus human symbolic knowledge is rooted in our interactive behavior with our environment. Givón (1998, 46) argues “that a big chunk of the neurology that nowadays support human language is but an evolutionary outgrowth of the visual information processing system.” Lakoff (1990, 73) claims that spatial perceptual mechanisms lie at the bottom of human rationality. Langacker’s (1987) Cognitive Grammar is also founded on the conviction that our knowledge of spatial relations forms the basis of linguistic structures. Johnson (1987) has given a detailed explanation of how linguistic meaning emerges through the metaphorical projections of image schemata, which arise in the mind from bodily experience.

Let us return now to our major issue, the function of language in social cognition. Clearly, human beings are not the only organisms with the ability of cognitively modeling the environment. The brain (of any animal including humans) is an evolutionary adaptation with the function of constructing and operating a model of the environment for facilitating the organism’s interaction with it, i.e., to process and store incoming information and coordinate the organism’s behavior accordingly. But for the construction of this model non-human animals have to rely on their individual experiences because no animal’s communication is powerful enough to be able to exchange parts of their models to any significant degree. Though the cognitive-modeling ability in organisms existed already prior to language, the appearance of language can probably be explained by the huge selective advantage which its social advantage must have provided. This is rather obvious from the fact that the mechanism of group selection has usually been invoked in accounts of language evolution (Csányi, 2001; Mayr, 1988, 79-80). Language, as a behavioral trait, is a social phenomenon and an inevitable product of complex social interaction in human evolution (Csányi, 2000; Armstrong et al., 1995, 199). Because of this several individuals must bear the same trait in order for it to be of any advantage to any of its possessors.

Thus, language can be said to be a completely new function of the human brain, but only in the sense that it is a new mode of the brain for building a model of the environment. With the emergence of language mental modeling could be carried out in a much more efficient way than ever before. Language enhanced and qualitatively changed the faculty of
the human brain for modeling the environment. Language did not only enable humans to construct much more precise and detailed mental models of their environment, but with language the parallel connection of the modeling brains became possible, which resulted in the construction of a social supermodel of the environment synthesized from the mental models of a group of individuals (Csányi, 1992). This is the real social advantage of language compared to the role of information transfer that communication plays in animals. Via this supermodel members of a population could share each other’s individual experience to a degree unmatched in other animals. Such a social supermodel means that all members of a speech community can benefit from the knowledge of others, even from that of previous generations, without direct experience. On this basis I would claim that the basic evolutionary advantage of language lies in the unique human capacity for symbolic cognition, which can substitute direct experience (Györi, 2001).

Linguistic communication made it possible for the individuals of a group to have similar knowledge of their environment without physically sharing all the experience. (In addition, much of the knowledge that we possess in a linguistic form is not even of empirical character and many symbolic structures do not represent something that can be physically experienced but form our abstract mental world.) Language also enabled the group to construct more and more adequate models of reality, since it secured the control of the adequacy of these models by making the comparison and correction of individual models possible. The evolutionary role of linguistic communication was thus the diminishing of the subjectivity of individual models, which vastly increased the possibility of effective cooperation. Neither the increased communicative potential nor the increased modeling capacity in itself can account for the emergence of language. Without being linked to symbols that bear a cognitive-representative function in the mind, communication can increase in volume and scope but not in efficiency. The same goes for cognition. Its efficiency cannot be changed qualitatively unless it is freed from being locked up in the mind of the individual. That is why the emergence of language appears to be connected to the combination of the exclusively inter-individual function of communication and the exclusively individual function of cognition in one system as a result of the ability to manipulate cognitive symbols that can be used both externally in communication and internally in cognitive representation simultaneously. Thus, language must have emerged as a cognitive adaptation in the social interaction of evolving hominids for distributing and representing individually acquired knowledge and thus creating a culturally shared mental model of reality for the benefit of the whole group (Györi, 1999).

4. The adaptation of language to social cognition

As I have tried to show above, the basic cognitive function of human language is that it serves as a social supermodel of reality on which every individual in a community can rely for the construction and operation of their own mental models of the environment. This supermodel is not a model that is shared by everyone on the basis of the same genetic endowment and/or the same experiences. Quite the contrary; this supermodel is symbolic in nature because its building blocks, grammatical rules and linguistic signs, are the
‘material’ out of which this model is created. In this way, new cognitive structures constructed actively and subjectively, but with the help of this symbolic device, by any one individual, can be planted in the minds of other individuals, and thus substitute direct experience for them.

In order for this social cognitive process to function correctly, language, as a social instrument for cognizing the environment, always has to suit our cognitive needs. In other words, in order to be a functional social supermodel of reality, it is crucial that language be adapted to cognition in the proper way. Thus, the way language is structured is obviously not only influenced by reality, but this influence must come indirectly through our interpretation of reality. The reason for this is that it is an evolutionary necessity for cognition to be relativistic: the general function of cognition is knowing one’s ‘world’ for the purpose of interacting with it in an optimal way (Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 1993, 205) and human cognition, through employing the symbolic power of language in the form of a social cognitive supermodel, has the same evolutionary function.

Thus, the way we see the world and think about it in non-propositional ways clearly influences the way language is. But this is not just a general effect. A particular language must be adapted to the particular physical, social, cultural, historical, etc. environment which it is to model and in which it is to be used. When cognition shapes linguistic structure to its needs (though naturally within the boundaries of the general properties of natural languages and even leaving room for arbitrary linguistic phenomena), these different environments will exert their effect on the various languages. The social validity of these structures is achieved in the process of conventionalization in a speech community by coordination through speaker-hearer interaction (Clark, 1996).

Furthermore, the environment is never a stable metaphysical reality, but a changing one. Because of this, any changes in the environment that are relevant at the level of a speech community call for an adaptation of language to these changes. Thus, when cognizing reality, our conceptual system continuously exhibits an interplay between stability and flexibility in order to fit stable conditions but at the same time also to be able to adapt to novel ones (Medin & Barsalou, 1987, 468), and language will always reflect this motion and will thus function as an efficient cognitive device. Efficiency means here that language will provide an interpretation of the world that proves to be adaptive in the given environment by providing ready-made knowledge about the given environment but only relative to the stability of these phenomena over time (Palmer, 1996, 52).

This interpretation in the form of ready-made knowledge is manifest in the cultural system of categories, i.e., a certain common repertoire of categories stored in the minds of the individuals of a speech community, which the lexicon of a language defines at every historical stage in its development. Comparing the semantic structures of different languages, it becomes immediately obvious that different languages impose different categorizations on the world. On the basis of what has been said above about the general function of cognition, this obviously results from the way different languages adapt to their environments. Linguistic categorization very often reflects a very intricate complex social and cultural environment, as can be seen for instance in the case of various classifiers in many aboriginal languages (Lakoff, 1987, Chapter 6; Palmer & Woodman, 2000).

For reasons observed above, it should be obvious why meanings of a language specify the
categories they do and not others. The specific categories of the human mind that get coded in any particular language are not a result of historical accident (or any other arbitrary process) but the product of functional principles of categorization (see Rosch, 1978) and working with those categories should be the most efficient way to deal with the environment. An appropriate orientation in a given socio-cultural environment often requires different conceptions of the same phenomenon. Different peoples and cultures often construe the same phenomena of reality in different ways because their different environments demand different ways of adaptation to them. Etymologies reveal a great deal about this process as they show how reality can be construed in alternate ways to facilitate this adaptation. Thus, the process of cultural category formation is functional in nature since it is based on a speech community’s social cognitive adaptation to its environment.

The formation of these categories happens in the process of semantic and lexical change in the course of the history of a language (Hopper, 1990). These new meanings are products of historical categorization processes, i.e., they are fossilized conceptualizations of previous generations which have gained cultural validity (Györgi, 1996; Györgi, in press). They have outlived the speakers of the times of their emergence and later on they impose a given categorization of the world on future generations. But just as these linguistically coded categories are results of previous conceptualizations on the level of a whole culture, they also provide an ever-ready source for the operation of similar cognitive processes in the future. When novel expressions with no established conventional meanings in a language are employed for the sake of adapting the language to changing communicative and cognitive needs, mutual intelligibility between speaker and hearer is a basic requirement. For this purpose the interlocutors must coordinate their expectations of each other’s intentions on the basis of all those various commonalities that actually constitute their culture (Clark, 1996).

The best possible basis for mutual intelligibility is the analogical character of human mental processing: it is a basic characteristic of human thought that all new phenomena are mentally grasped via an analogy to already familiar cognitive structures (Heit, 1997; Gentner & Markman, 1997; Holyoak & Thagard, 1997). This analogical character of human thinking gains expression in figurative language, and it has been concluded that our minds understand and interpret the world around us with the help of metaphorical and metonymical processes, image schematic projections, and idealized cognitive models (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980; Lakoff, 1987; Johnson, 1987). A cognitive analysis of historical semantic data also shows that a huge part of our symbol system is metaphorical and metonymical in nature (Dirven, 1985; Hopper, 1990; Sweetser, 1990).

However, semantic change does not only show how cognition influences what categories will be created in language. It also shows how the linguistically established categories influence further categorizations. One of the reasons for this is that the relevant commonalities needed for the mutual intelligibility mentioned above are mostly manifest in language through conventionalized expressions, which will necessarily constrain the choice of applicable and modifiable expressions. The other reason derives directly from the analogical character of human thinking. As Rosch (1978, 29) says, “one influence on how attributes [in category formation] will be defined by humans is clearly the category system already existent in the culture at a given time,” which she takes to be “coded by the language” (Rosch 1978, 28). In other words, linguistically coded categories will provide the input to
cognitive mechanisms of metaphorical and metonymical transfer when new experience is described in familiar terms. This is probably why any metaphorical or metonymical process will in itself show linguistic relativity, i.e., while a metaphorical or metonymical transfer can be made in one language, it will most of the time not work in another.

Linguistic relativity appears to follow from the cognitive function of language, and can thus be considered an evolutionary adaptation (Györi, 2000). The cognitive function of language derives in turn from the general function of cognition: the construction and operation of an optimal internal model of reality of a given organism in a given environment. Language, as a social cognitive model of cultural validity, will serve its function only if it is adapted to the particular natural and socio-cultural environment of a given speech community and is flexible enough to accommodate any change of cultural relevance in this environment.
References


1. Introduction

No-one, we surmise, would deny that the capacity to recognize co-specifics is essential for the evolution of the human, and many other, species into social animals: the capacity to recognize another \textit{qua} individual lies at the very basis of sustaining social communities, based on partnership, kinship, or even common interest like the maffia (cf. Hurst et alii, 2001). Many would, however, accept that recognizing an individual is an instance of categorial perception so that it would be tantamount to recognizing a specific configuration of properties that uniquely characterizes him or her.

We argue that to recognize specificity is an entirely different capacity from categorial perception: it cannot be reduced to any of the possible modes of categorization. Surely, in many cases (a possibly unique) category membership is sufficient to identify an individual, provided that certain epistemic and pragmatic conditions obtain. But identifying is not recognizing specificity. For one reason, a set of features like having long, brownish curly hair may be identifying in a context, but it is not sufficient to constitute an individual across contexts, or a-contextually, simply because there could well be other individuals exemplifying the very same property. That it constitutes a unit set (in some contexts) is purely a contingent fact. And it remains so irrespective of how complex a property we would wish to choose.\textsuperscript{1}

For another reason, the capacity to recognize individuality in this digitalized way requires a far too intricate and time consuming computation, and one for each individual. It is doubtful that evolution had bothered to develop such a complicated recognition mechanism. That may be too costly when compared with available analogue cognitive procedures.\textsuperscript{2} The main thrust of our argument is that evolution, through the properties of the niche together with those of the organism, offers a cognitively less costly solution to this problem: the recognition of individuals is based on the detection of indexical, non-categorizable information about their specificity. Our self-assigned task here is three-fold: (i) to define the conditions of possibility of this capacity, (ii) to account for its emergence, and (iii) to relate it to the ability of language.

\textsuperscript{*} During the writing of this paper the first author was supported by a research grant from OTKA (No. T 026656)
2. The physical conditions on perceiving specificity

We take it to be uncontroversial that Nature “exists” in different types or patterns of energy, such as mechanical, chemical, electromagnetic, kinesthetic, etc. It is the task of physics to individuate these patterns. But physics also teaches us that energy manifests itself, or “appears”, in innumerable various forms of what we call “matter.” Matter is structured forms of energy. These latter forms tend to be unique and singular in that there are no two forms with the same material structure: there are no two snowflakes, crystals, eggs, or twins completely alike. (It is in the sense of uniqueness and singularity that we will use the term “specific” and “specificity” in this paper.) These two aspects, identifiable patterns (of energy) and variable singular forms (of matter) are the two sides of the same coin, viz. Nature. Organs with which a proper trade-off between pattern and variability can be accomplished are normally called ‘sense organs’: they are said to be attuned to particular types of energy, or ‘modalities.’

For the sake of our argument here, it suffices to correlate the capacity to perceive and process categorical information, viz. to discriminate among categories, with the aforementioned first side of Nature, and the capacity to recognize specific individuals qua individuals, viz. to discriminate among singularities, with the second. The first capacity yields conceptual understanding in humans, the second is tailored to tracking down individuals non-conceptually by being attuned to perceiving specific material forms such as smell, sound, shape, etc. as indices: they inherently belong to the individuals precisely in the sense that there can be no two indices which are (perceived as) exactly the same (while different indices can signify the same individual).

The perception of color illustrates that finding the proper trade-off is not an easy task. Human vision is considered as one of the greatest achievements of evolution. It can discriminate 1400 different frequencies from one another. On the other hand, it is acknowledged that people recognize roughly 80 distinct pitches. Thus, “[t]here are many more phenomenal experiences than there are concepts of them.” (Block, 2002, 135) Here the two capacities come apart despite the fact that both are supported by the very same sense organ. But what is the function of discriminating so many pitches if there are no proper concepts for them? (cf. Raffman, 1995)

This is the question that underlies our approach here. Thus, the variability of the physical substance that constitutes the source of stimuli for any organism can be called intrinsic in the sense that energy tends to appear in ways which are never physically completely alike. Organism can develop organs, which are sensitive to different ranges of their environment’s physical diversity. They are “avenues’ into the organism for information about the physical state of the external world” (Keely, 2002, 11), adding that only those discriminations of the physical energy type constitute a given modality for an organism which have a particular function in the organism’s behavior. Thus, human sense organs are “dedicated” to particular energy types which influence man’s actions. Thus, the detection of great many of the 1400 frequencies may be seen as a simple by-product of human vision, while those which are conceptualized play a proper function.

We can then make a distinction between the intrinsic physical variability of Nature in which energy appears (possible stimuli our sense organs can detect) and a variability in
which Nature appears to us, viz. a variability that we can both detect and make sense of. We can also dub the first kind of variability as the proximal, while the second the distal condition on recognizing (specific) forms. The latter is distal in the sense proposed by Ruth Millikan that the historical (i.e. evolutionary) success of a given behavior does not depend on the system itself, whether it produces correctly the responses to which it is wired, and neither on the proximal stimuli (the type of information the organism is attuned to); rather it is determined by a chain of events in the environment that can have triggered off the organism’s specific response. Thus Millikan (1990) describes the hoverfly as something that reacts to proximal stimuli every time there is a black spot moving at a given angular speed on its retina, irrespective of what that spot is standing for: a co-specific female, a pebble, a leaf, or anything. It is the type of distal stimuli, more particularly, the more than the average rate of frequency that there is a proper co-specific rather than anything else that determines the reproductive success of the hoverfly’s reaction. The hoverfly’s reaction cannot be regarded as specific with respect to the types of distal stimuli. Rather, it “perceptually categorizes” them as the same on the basis of the proximal stimuli (the moving black spot). The latter serves for it as a vehicle for categorization.

Basically, there are two kinds of condition on utilizing the specificity of information about the physical world, rather than carving out certain ranges of stimuli as vehicle for categorization. The first has to do with the architecture of sense organs: they must be sensitive enough to distinguish the specific manifestations of physical substance, the tokens of physical properties as indices of specific individuals. We cannot go into the problem of what “sensitive enough” means, here. By analogy to color perception, regarding other modalities, we might ask something like this: How many different violins can a master musician distinguish on the basis of the physical properties, the overtones, of their sounds? Or: How many different wines can an expert distinguish by their tastes?

To answer such questions, we have to examine the selective pressures imposed by the actual environment, and understand when and why the recognition of specificity becomes functional. We point out three distal factors through which selective pressure manifests itself: (i) the physical aspects of the niche, viz. the variability in the physical substance (sound, color, shape, smell, taste, etc.); (ii) the improvement or reinforcement of the reproductive capacity of the organism; (iii) the contribution to the social coherence of the species the organism belongs to. Let us formulate the first – evolutionary – kind of condition on specificity recognition as (CSR1):

(CRS1) Specificity sensitiveness appears at a given evolutionary stage under certain pressures exerted through the physical properties of the niche to enhance and secure reproduction.

We have no room here to adequately justify (CSR1). Let us briefly refer to one example. There is recent evidence that the vomeronasal system in humans “is primarily responsible for detecting pheromones, which in turn have been shown to play a central role in reproductive behavior.” Notably, women, who are especially good at discriminating smells “do not report that they experience ‘male’ vs. ‘female’ qualia associated with the breaths.” (Keely, 2002, 24) In fact, women are so good at detecting pheromones that they can identify
not only gender but specific individuals (their new-born babies, for instance) by their smell. (See Wedekind, 1988)

3. The bio-logical conditions on perceiving specificity

Our hypothesis at this point is this: the selective pressures that the physical and the social environment exerted on man were such that they singled out four possible sensory fields where the capacity to recognize specificity could have evolved and functionalized. These are smell, voice or sound, face, and gait. We also assume that different environmental conditions favor different fields. While specific sound recognition is preferable in richly textured, impenetrable niches like rainforests precisely because sound can travel long distances, smell and/or face recognition acquires an individuating function when couples live in a tightly bounded space. Possibly, gait individuates only in ‘higher’ cultures where the artificial environment of city structure, mass movement, background noise, etc. severely restricts other modes. Be that as it may, it leads to an important insight concerning the difference between the two concurrent (the category- and the specificity-driven) capacities; in species, from birds to higher primates, which live in communities, categorial perception is less efficient than specificity recognition in sustaining and reinforcing the cohesiveness of the group. It is this insight that we would like to elaborate on more in detail below.

Before doing so however, let us propose a second condition on recognizing specificity (CSR2), a logical one, for it specifies how the variability of parts of the physical environment (stimuli) can become functional. We propose the following formulation:

(CSR2) The variability of physical substance such as smell, sound, face, and gait can become functional if it is to indicate (or designate) the singular and unique character, viz. the specificity of the individual whose index it thus becomes.

Expanding on (CSR2), we should note that by index we do not mean something like a Peircean sign, but a kind of ostensivity that is not dependent on the context. Ostensive categories such as ‘the inhabitants of this village’, or ‘the footballers who ever scored and will score a goal’ imply a descriptive content: we need also to know what it is to be a villager or to score a goal in order to decide if a given individual is a villager or a goal-scorer. Clearly, a similar procedure is not sufficient for the recognition of specificity. For suppose a (specific) individual moves out of identifiable context and returns (a bird flies away and alights on nest); the identification of the returning individual as such requires a stored representation of either (i) the individual and/or (ii) the context he or she appeared in originally. It implies pattern recognition, that is a configuration of features. However, we suspect there is an upper bound to what could be represented in complexity, somewhat analogously to the limited capacity of understanding multiply embedded clauses.

If so, there is a serious problem every ‘returning’ bird or individual has to face. Namely, that it is always possible that there is (or there has already been) another individual that comes at least as close to the prototype (coded in the given pattern) as the ‘original’ one. If it is a satisficing condition (of category membership, even of the unit set), then any individual
Recognizing Specificity and Social Cognition

that satisfies them, be they as complex as they may, is apt for being taken to be the ‘specific’ one in a given context. To recognize the ‘returning’ individual is to buy genuine specificity with context independence. Or more importantly, the potential recognizer is required to keep track of the same individual irrespective of the context in which he or she got originally acquainted with the individual. (Consider the case of the Prodigal Son.) What is needed here is often called the anchoring relation between the ‘returning’ individual, or the referent, and the vehicle defined as the index of the individual above. We contend that the anchoring relation obtains between the referent and some physical substance as its proper part (smell, sound, shape or taste); the latter condition renders the relation context-independent and at the same time enables the recognizer to (re-)identify the specific individual in any new context. Let us add this condition of keeping track or re-identifying to (CSR2):

(CSR2’) The variability of physical substance such as smell, sound, face and gait can become functional only in a way that it indicates (or designates) the singular and unique character, viz. the specificity of an individual in any context in which the individual appears. In other words, it becomes functional precisely as a means (an index) to keep track of the individual.

These considerations lead us to propose that specificity is represented, if at all, in a way that closely resembles what representations are in Active Perception Theory (APT). (See especially Thomas, 1999; Dreyfus, 1999; O’Regan & Noë, 2002; Neisser, 1994; Norman, 2002 and Stoffregen & Bardy, 2002 for accounts.) The main idea is that one does not recognize specificity by comparing a given stimuli to some stored representation, but rather one recognizes it directly by being attuned to the specificity of the physical substance that functions as a vehicle for the individual. That is, one does not select the right representation on the basis of some similarity with the given stimuli, but one ‘sees it directly’ as a deviation from existing patterns or representations. We believe, following APT, that specificity recognition in most cases does not rise to the level of consciousness, but it triggers motor reaction more immediately. More radically put, ‘seeing deviations’ instead of categorical similarity precedes categorical perception, viz. recognizing that two individuals are alike qua members of the same category. Thus categorical perception and specificity recognition appear to be orthogonal. Let us formulate this idea as a further logical condition on recognizing specificity:

(CSR3) The perception of difference logically and empirically precedes categorical perception. Hence, individual recognition is direct, i.e. it is not mediated by categorical structure or category membership.

However, in the field of social cognition and communication it is hard to contest at least the possibility of the experiential quality of recognizing our fellow human beings or family members. So we turn our attention to this field.
4. Social behavior and the ‘specificity’ of specificity

There is a growing literature on the existence and functionality of two visual, the dorsal and the ventral systems in humans (see e.g. Norman, 2002). The dorsal system is egocentric: it processes movement in the first place. It can make very fine temporal discriminations, and it operates very fast. It processes absolute size and distance by comparing them to the body of the actual subject. (Note that it is generally said to process moving ‘blobs’, rather than objects in the ordinary sense.) The ventral system is allocentric: it processes relative size, depth, colors, shapes, etc. It can also make very fine spatial discriminations so that the perception and categorization of objects belong here. It is however relatively slow in operation. This is one of the major reasons why certain scientists and philosophers associate consciousness or reflexivity with ventral processing. Although we cannot recapitulate our version of the evolutionary history of the two systems, we assume that the dorsal system is adapted mostly to a richly textured environment, with short visibility, where depth or distance does not offer much time for the organism’s reaction. That is, the faster the reaction, the more it is rewarded. The ventral system, on the other hand, is fit to operate in open territory, with far visibility, where there is enough time for deliberate reaction and contemplation. Here, the better computed the reaction is, the greater its reward. In other words, the dorsal processing is more dependent on the actual niche the organism is living in, whereas the ventral system provides a capacity to make fine distinctions giving rise to – even higher – categorical structures. Categorical thinking in turn offers more freedom in behavior with respect to the niche.

The differences between the two systems become especially acute when it comes to social perception. In our view, categorical perception tends to be less efficient in a socialized environment. Why? We suppose that social structure (or membership) is grounded in the recognition of individuals qua individuals. We do not mean any partnership requires the recognition of individuality in this strong sense. We embrace whole-heartedly the idea proposed by Konrad Lorenz (1935) that in many species of birds an intruder may receive similar treatment by the parents as their young ones, while in other cases the young might become inimical toward their parents, all this because the intruder or the parent respectively does or does not display an expected pattern of behavior. Recognition in these cases means pattern recognition, viz. categorical perception. Hence, one cannot say the individual bird is treated as an individual (in the strong sense). On the other hand, individuality in the strong sense is functionalized especially in those birds which are nest-leaving. In a nest where the young develop very quickly the capacity to fly, the importance of recognizing the returning ones may well be great. Lorenz is explicit on this point: these birds do not recognize the others simply as co-specifics or as category-members, but in their individuality. He alleges that they recognize their family members by the form of the head primarily – and the analogy with human facial recognition is hard not to make.

Genuine specificity (specificity in the strong sense) is essentially ostensive in character in that with the rise of hierarchically structured higher primate and human society it is not necessarily governed by an underlying genetic relation. On the one hand, changing hierarchy among members in social groups would not be possible if specificity were a question of pure category membership. Furthermore, social often means that the group is open to
‘newcomers’ (cf. the maffia again), even though openness does not imply that there are no particular conditions a newcomer will have to satisfy. What our argument states is that the cohesiveness of the group is parasitic on, and is enhanced by, the capacity of direct recognition of specificity. From this it follows that genuine specificity is not similarity-based but intransitive. Last but not least, we found that the capacity to recognize specificity makes possible re-identification in a context-free manner, i.e. the tracking down of individuals. This process is also exercised linguistically. But it shall turn out that the linguistic tracking down of individuals most often termed as co-reference is an impoverished way of recognizing specificity.

5. Specificity in language: de re vs. de dicto

Following a suggestion in (Kvart, 1993, 316), we can identify three conditions on linguistic specificity. They include (i) certain causal conditions that are external to language in the sense of the anchoring relation. Although there are considerable differences between approaches incorporating such relations into the semantics of language and those which exclude them (see theories of wide and narrow propositional content), what matters is whether the objects of perception are reducible to, or are equivalent with, the objects of (propositional) belief; in other words, if there is an identifying non-conceptual part of belief-content. This idea is closely connected with a second type of conditions that linguistic specificity is often said to imply. Namely, that (ii) specificity imposes certain epistemic constraints that guarantee either that the speaker know who a given individual $a$ is (Hintikka, 1962), or that $a$ exists (Kvart, 1993), or simply that the speaker be non-descriptively acquainted with $a$. Sometimes, the conditions are formulated cognitively in that specificity boils down to having a particular individual in mind, and it is this mental fact that enables one to track down individuals verbally or non-verbally. The idea that substance concepts are a means to (re-)identifying individuals can be ranked here (cf. Millikan, 2000). Now, if we accept that perceptual content is in itself “too specific to feature in a suitably objective belief-content” (Bermudez, 2002, 95), the non-conceptual content of any (hence specificity-involving) perception can only enter belief at the expense of losing the sense of specificity as understood in this paper.

Finally, when it comes to the third kind of conditions, it turns out that formal linguists (such as the adherents of Discourse Representation Theory or Dialogue Game Theory) tend to simply take no notice of the ‘specificity’ of specificity or they exclude it from the proper domain of linguistics. (see Kamp & Bende Farkas, 2001) What they are after are the so-called (iii) descriptive adequacy condition: they propose language-internal, viz. semantic, and mostly technical, strategies to explain away anaphoric chains as the condition of possibility for co-reference. The resultant techniques range from {syntactic or formal} co-indexing through variable binding to file keeping or embedding discourse representations.

The basic problem with these approaches is not only that they do not handle specificity, but also that they simply do not have the means to take specificity ‘specifically.’ It is also that they presuppose a ‘perspectival’ understanding of specificity, for they analyze genuinely specific, viz. de re interpretations in terms of a de dicto one. The reduction of de re to de dicto is, however, only reasonable, if specificity means sameness under different perspec-
tives which are otherwise definable or describable, hence they can enter into propositional content. The problem whether specificity can be analysed as changing perspectives is old. Remember the Russelian attempt to define singular propositions (implying knowledge by acquaintance) versus descriptions. The dilemma is this: if perspective is perceptual, to (re-)identify individuals across contexts cannot be grounded in language. If perspective means the ‘horizon’ of language, de re specificity falls outside its scope and remains a mystery. And it does not help much to refer to a difference between internal and external anchors (Kamp & Bende-Farkas, 2001) or to use anchoring relations as a pragmatic guarantee of specificity (Gronendijk & Stokhof, 1982, or Kvart, 1993). This dilemma is well illustrated with the much debated case of evolutive anaphor. (See e.g. Reboul, 1994) The moral for linguistics appears to be that there can hardly be given any other foundation than metaphysical to how one can continue to talk about the ‘same’ individual even when all its properties have been changed. It is along these lines that we reach our very tentative and somewhat sketchy conclusion.

6. Conclusion

If we accept what we have been arguing for so far, namely that genuine specificity is orthogonal to categorial perception, hence to its linguistic variants (since it falls outside the scope of language), language can only provide a very truncated version of it. What at first sight might seem a proper linguistic variant of specificity, namely fiction with its (co-)reference to non-existent but specific individuals, turns out to be parasitic on sensory perception. But the orthogonal character of the two capacities is even stronger. For while language is a means to make always finer distinctions by creating new categories, this can only do at the expense of reducing its capacity to represent specificity. So, not only the two capacities, but perception and language are orthogonal as well. So much so that an account of the fact that we, humans, reached a high level of categorial thinking like mathematical abstraction and succeeded in building up a hierarchical society and telling individuals by their faces would in our opinion have to offer a less than an optimal solution, rather than a cost-benefit type of optimalizing in evolutionary theory.
There seems to be a crucial difference between ‘natural’ individuals like organism and artifacts in this respect, that is, a difference in how individuation is made. For an artificial object like the Eiffel Tower may be individuated in terms of (micro-)features, viz. digitally.

To avoid misunderstanding, we use the analogue/digital discrimination not to refer to the continuous/discrete character of the world in general, but to highlight, as in Bermúdez [2002], the difference between (the content of) perception and (the possible content of) belief; while the first could be nonconceptual, holistic, etc., the second is normally taken to be propositional, hence categorical. Also, our aim is to contrast them as rival capacities with respect to a given purpose (viz. specificity recognition).

As Keely emphasizes, there are many modality-like discriminations, like the ones made by the vestibular or the vomeronasal system, which are not cognitively penetrable, hence non-conceptualisable, and yet have a proper function.
References

The Relationship of Conceptual Structure and Grammatical Structure in Modals
Péter Pelyvás (University of Debrecen, Hungary)

1. The background

Cognitive Grammar, a theory that is still regarded as a relatively new development in linguistics despite the fact that it has been around for more than two decades now, gives radically different answers to most questions that linguistic theory is interested in. The version of holistic cognitive linguistic theory developed in Lakoff & Johnson (1980), Lakoff (1987) and Langacker (1987, 1991, 1999), to mention just the most significant landmarks, rejects the arbitrariness of the linguistic sign, refuses to separate synchronic and diachronic analyses, finds it impossible to distinguish the system and its use, and does not believe in strict compositionality or in the autonomy of levels of linguistic description, notably in the autonomy of syntax.

Cognitive linguistic theory is a thoroughly modern discipline with its roots in cognitive science and cognitive psychology, which relies heavily on the successes and failures of generative theory and can produce results that may often be very different in nature but are frequently comparable to the findings of Generative Grammar (cf. Langacker (1995) for a cognitive analysis of raising/exceptional case marking). It has also hopes of describing with some success areas of grammar that have resisted analysis in generative terms.

Since in this paper I cannot undertake to discuss all the questions mentioned above in any detail, I will be concentrating my efforts on some significant details of one issue. The issue is the relationship of semantics (conceptual structure) and grammatical structure (autonomy of syntax). The specific issues I will be examining can be formulated in the following questions:

1. How is the conceptual structure of some English, Dutch, Romanian and Hungarian modals reflected in the grammatical structures they occur in?
2. How are the complex changes in the conceptual structure of the modals brought about by metaphorical extension into the epistemic domain are accompanied by changes in grammatical structure?

The assumption that conceptual structure and grammatical structure are related can itself be regarded as the rejection of the strong version of the generative hypothesis of an autonomous syntax. I will not regard this as my chief concern, since most generative grammarians would not be inclined today to defend such a view (cf. e.g. Szabolcsi & Zwarts (1993), who argue that weak island phenomena can be accounted for by the fact that specific NPs are anchored directly in the language user’s reality who is thus spared the effort of following
each of their occurrences in an antecedent chain). I will be more interested in the cognitive view, which I think needs some refinement at this point.

There is a tendency in Langacker’s earlier work (Langacker 1987, 1991) to downplay the importance of syntax. The relationship between conceptual structures and phonological structures is seen as symbolic in nature, with the background assumption that no formal and autonomous system of representation is required to establish a connection between the two. On closer observation (e.g. Langacker 1997) it nevertheless becomes apparent that conceptual or phonological groupings are created by processes particular to the field in question and that grammatical constituents, although emergent rather than essential in nature, and often quite different from the canonical or well-behaved form (Langacker 1997, 13) that traditional theories would force them into, do have some independence in organizing thought.

Linguistic expressions involve many kinds of conceptual and phonological groupings. Conceptual groups are candidates for symbolization, and phonological groups offer themselves as possible symbolising structures. A “classical constituent” emerges as a special case when a particular kind of conceptual group happens to be symbolized by a particular kind of phonological group ... (Langacker, 1997, 1)

Since in the case of modals both conceptual and phonological structures are rather complex, and the metaphorical extension of a grammatical category can easily result in further complexity, this seems an ideal ground for investigating the problem. In addition, the analysis forms an integral part of and can contribute in interesting ways to my current research into the nature of epistemic grounding. It can also show that, as with any other respectable theory, the tools of cognitive grammar developed for the analysis of a certain range of grammatical phenomena can be extended to the investigation of other areas of the grammatical system.

2. Metaphorical extension and grammatical structure

The tools (metaphor, metonymy, etc.) that cognitive grammar uses in describing the conceptual structure of ordinary lexical items can be extended to the description of grammatical items as well. In ordinary lexical items metaphorical extension of (elements of the) conceptual structure does not usually result in radical changes in grammatical structure. In (1) the meaning of defeat has been extended from ‘war’ to ‘argument’, but most linguists would agree that the change is insignificant as far as grammar is concerned.

(1) I defeated my opponent.

In other cases minor changes may occur. If go under is used metaphorically in (2), it is virtually impossible to specify the medium which is clearly identified as water in the non-metaphorical reading. This may be a significant factor in the development of the grammatical category adverbial particle, often hardly distinguishable from the preposition.

(2) He went under [ ... ] for the third time.
The acceptability of passives, which basically depends on the lexical properties of the words involved, is nevertheless closer to grammar already and the rules to be applied here appear to be rather more complex, especially in prepositional passives. A prepositional passive is only acceptable if the subject is a true patient, i.e. is affected in some way by the situation described by the sentence, as in (3b), cf. Bolinger (1977).

(3)  
   a. The town was *walked about a lot.  
   b. talked about

The emergence of the true patient role is so easily attributed to metaphorical extension alone that some grammars, e.g. Quirk et al. (1972, 804) state that passivization depends on the concrete/abstract distinction. Although this is not necessarily the case, cf. the sentences in (4) taken from Bolinger (1977),

(4)  
   a. *The bridge was walked under by a dog.  
   b. The bridge has been walked under by generations of lovers,

metaphorical extension certainly contributes a lot to the emergence of more abstract cognitive models in which the purely spatio-temporal relations of the source domain give way to more complex relationships that favour the emergence of the true patient role.

The relationship between modified conceptual structure and grammatical structure can become even more complex when grammatical categories are involved in the extension. In the case of our object of investigation, i.e. the metaphorical extension of the modals, the factors increasing complexity are likely to be

- grammaticalization processes,
- the highly different nature of the two domains (root/deontic – epistemic),
- or, more probably, a combination of the two.

3. The modals

All linguists concerned agree that the modals underwent a long and complicated process of grammaticalization. They likewise agree that they were ordinary verbs in the Old English period. There is some disagreement on how exactly the new category modal emerged, Lightfoot (1979) maintaining that after a relatively long period of accidental changes a sudden reanalysis resulted in the emergence of the new category around 1500. More recent works, e.g. Winston (1993) argue that even the earliest changes were already part of a grammaticalization process that led in this direction. Pelyvás (2001a) elaborates this idea from the cognitive point of view, adding that the end-point of the grammaticalization process is not clause member status as is claimed in Lightfoot (1979), but that of the grounding predication, which epistemic modals also share with cognitive predicates.

It is interesting to examine the effect of these processes on grammatical structure. The syntactic structures that all modals occur in leave unexpressed some of the participants and relationships that can be shown to be essential in understanding their conceptual struc-
ture. This primarily concerns root meanings. In addition, metaphorical extension of these meanings into the epistemic domain creates further discrepancies between conceptual and grammatical structures, some of which we can only highlight in this paper, without offering fully satisfactory explanations.

In an attempt to create an analysis of the conceptual structures of the English modals that accounts for the facts of English grammar in a more satisfactory way than Sweetser (1990) does, in Pelyvás (1996, 2000, 2001a,b) I have created a force-dynamic framework in which the modal meanings are described in terms of interacting forces alone rather than in terms of forces and barriers. The analysis permits a clearer distinction than given in Langacker (1987, 1991) between root (mainly deontic) and epistemic modals in terms of conceptual structure, regarding only the latter as grounding predications owing to the subjectification processes that are only characteristic of this group. The analysis also offers a natural way of including cognitive predicates among grounding predications and accounts for their erratic syntactic behavior in terms of their grounding predication (reference-point) status.

I will not attempt here to give the full details of this analysis. I will only give an outline of its essential properties and emphasize the points where the relationship of conceptual and grammatical structure appears to me to be less than straightforward.

3.1. Deontic meanings

In the deontic meaning of MAY Pelyvás (1996, 2000) replaces Sweetser’s force/barrier analysis with a pair of forces one of which stands for the DOER’s intention to perform the act and the other for the PERMISSION GIVER’s relinquishing authority that could disallow (not necessarily prevent) some potential purposeful action. This is compatible with the original sense of MAY (‘be strong enough’) which also serves as the basis for epistemic MAY (not to be discussed here). Although the relatively weak position of the speaker may look a bit counterin-

![Figure 1. Deontic may](image-url)
tuitive at first sight, there is independent evidence (e.g. in concessive MAY) that the speaker can put himself in a relatively weak position giving way to the doer’s intention to perform the act (a factor that is altogether left out of Sweetser’s (1990) analysis). The postulated conceptual structure of deontic MAY is given in Figure 1.

(Overall) scope contains all the factors relevant to the situation, whereas immediate scope or the objective scene (OS) only contains the entities and relationships that are indispensable. Deontic meanings are describable in terms of counteracting forces, marked by arrows in the figure. Dotted lines mark correspondences.

Deontic MUST is built along the same lines: the force associated with the IMPOSER (prototypically the speaker) is stronger than the one associated with the DOER’s reluctance to perform potential purposeful action. The corresponding conceptual structure, which also serves as the source domain for extension to epistemic MUST, is given in Figure 2.

These conceptual structures reveal two factors of direct relevance to our topic here. One is the fact that the speaker/conceptualizer, although an element of overall scope, is not directly part of immediate scope (the objective scene). Identity with the permission giver (MAY) or imposer of obligation (MUST) is only established through correspondence.\(^5\) The two participants could in principle be different entities, as the following Dutch example suggests:

\[5\] Jan moet van Klaas thuisblijven.

‘Jan must [by order of Klaas] stay at home’ (Sanders & Spooren, 1997, 97).

The source of obligation is also a significant factor in the difference between English deontic MUST and SHOULD/ought. In deontic SHOULD/ought it is identified as social norms and expectations rather than the speaker.

---

![Figure 2. Deontic must](image-url)
The other factor of direct relevance is the dual role of the DOER in conceptual structure (cf. the correspondence lines in Figures 1 and 2). One role is clearly agentive: wilful performer of some potential purposeful action. This explains why deontic meanings do not prototypically permit perfect/progressive forms or non-agentive predicates as indicated by the possible interpretations of the sentences in (6):

(6)  
\begin{enumerate}
\item John must be tall. (only epistemic)
\item John must have been tall. (only epistemic)
\item You must be really tall to be able to pick those apples.
\end{enumerate}

(epistemic or deontic with general subject [One must ...])

The other role of the DOER in conceptual structure is that of PERMITTEE/OBLIGEE, a subordinate role in the focused relationship in OS. Rules of the grammar will only allow for one of the two roles to appear in phonological structure. In English it is only the agentive role that is allowed to appear:

(7)  
\begin{enumerate}
\item He may/must clean his shoes every day.
\item *Him may/must clean his shoes every day.
\end{enumerate}

In Hungarian, however, either of the two roles can appear in phonological structure, with the subordinate role as the default case:* Both the DOER and OBLIGEE roles are possible with KELL (MUST), but only the PERMITTEE role with LEHET/SZABAD (MAY):

(8)  
\begin{enumerate}
\item Jánosnak ki kell tisztítani(a) a cipőjét.
\item Jánosnak ki lehet/szabad tisztítani(a) a cipőjét.
\end{enumerate}

(9)  
\begin{enumerate}
\item János ki kell, hogy tisztítsa a cipőjét.
\item *János ki lehet/szabad, hogy tisztítsa a cipőjét.
\end{enumerate}

This appears to be a significant difference in the grammatical structure of the two languages, which, however, does not appear to be based on any significant difference in conceptual structure. There is virtually no difference in the meanings of the two Hungarian structures. We can only state at this point that the choice of either construction is well motivated in conceptual structure and that the existence of the sentences in (8) can be regarded as evidence for the existence of the DOER role in the ‘interplay of forces’ part of the conceptual structure, together with the force associated with it.

It has to be added at this point that cognitive grammar is only interested in the motivatedness of the alternative structures and will make no attempt at predicting which or how many of them will actually appear in the phonological structures of different languages. Russian, for example, will only have the dative forms.

Romanian is more interesting, along with the standard nominative option, colloquial
Romanian also seems to admit a dative construction, but the dative forms will only appear with human subjects when the complement is a complex predicate, as in (10):

(10) Copilulu îi trebuie să mănânce.
    [Child-Dat. Pers pr.3rd pers.Dat must conj. eat-subjunctive]

With non-human subjects the complex predicate construction is only possible with a nominative subject, as witnessed in (11):

(11) Copilul trebuie să mănânce.
    [Child-Nom. must conj. eat-subjunctive]

This is a very interesting development that will require further study. It suggests that in Romanian grammatical structure follows conceptual structure more closely than in Hungarian, as it is prototypically humans that can be compelled to perform actions.

3.2. Epistemic meanings

There are two factors that play a decisive role in the extension of the root modal meanings into the epistemic domain: a restriction of immediate scope (OS), and a special extension of overall scope in the process known as subjectification. The differences will be illustrated on the conceptual structure of epistemic MUST, shown in Figure 3.

Restriction of immediate scope (OS) is essential in the extension owing to the very different nature of the source and target domains.
As we have seen, in deonticity a significant part of the objective scene was taken up by force-dynamic relationships between the DOER of a typically purposeful action and a source of obligation/permission, typically associated with the SPEAKER (indirectly, through correspondence with the speaker/conceptualizer of the ground). We have seen grammatical evidence of their existence.

In the epistemic sense these forces can no longer be interpreted in the same way, since the restrictions of grammar (no anteriority, no progressive, only purposeful action in the root senses) will no longer hold. The objective scene is reduced to include only the situation. What remains of the forces of the deontic field is reoriented in the process of subjectification.

Subjectification is the decisive step in the extension of the modal meanings into the epistemic domain. It is a process in which one facet of a relationship previously interpreted objectively is reinterpreted along the subjective axis (Langacker, 1991, 215-6). In the case of the modals this means that some of the forces active between the participants of OS in the root meaning will be rearranged (reoriented to the subjective axis). This involves the extension of overall scope to include the speaker (S/G) directly, if only temporarily, as a reference point (cf. Figure 3) – the essential ingredient of the grounding predication.

The essence of the reference-point construction is that it selects a salient entity (the reference point) for the purposes of easy access to another entity (the target). Once the target has been reached, the reference point recedes into the background. This is exactly what happens in the grounding predication.

The example taken from Dutch (discussed in (5)) can provide direct syntactic evidence that the prototypical epistemic meaning relies on direct inclusion of the speaker rather than on the kind of correspondence seen in the root senses. In the deontic sense, as we have seen, it was possible in Dutch to indicate the source of an obligation different from the speaker. This is no longer possible in the epistemic sense. In this construction, only the speaker/conceptualizer can be given reference-point status: syntactic structure is motivated by the image schema of the modal.

Further evidence is provided by the English epistemic modals should/ought, in which the deontic overtone ‘remaining’ over the extension (cf. footnote 4) can also be attributed only to the speaker, even though there was no correspondence in the root sense: obligation was attributed to social norms, expectations, etc.

As we have seen, the relationship between conceptual and grammatical structure is rather controversial in the case of the modals, for the following reasons:

- Lightfoot’s (1979) and Warner’s (1993) different analyses of very similar data (cf. Section 3) suggest that the semantic changes that led to the emergence of the category modal were accompanied by appropriate changes in grammatical structure, but the connections between the changes are far from clear. The first change observed in the process is that premodals lose the ability to take direct NP objects in the Old English period, which may be interpreted as the first sign of the appearance of the more elaborate deontic schemas, but important participants and relationships of the emerging schemas (permission giver/issuer of obligation, intention/reluctance of the DOER to perform the act, etc.) are not made manifest at all. This may be a general property of grammaticalization processes, where lexical information tends to be lost.
In the extension of the root modal meanings into the epistemic domain two changes in conceptual structure can be identified:

• The changes resulting from subjectification are truly reflected in grammatical structure.
• Some changes resulting from restriction of immediate scope are also reflected in the grammar of the modals, although the changes are functional rather than structural: the embedded situation no longer has to be purposeful action; anteriority/simultaneity are permitted (perfect, progressive forms).

But not all changes in conceptual structure are reflected in grammatical structure. In the epistemic meaning the DOER no longer has a dual role, since the interaction of forces part of the deontic scheme is no longer regarded as relevant. This would predict no direct consequences for English, where, as we have seen, only the essentially unchanged (agentive) subject of subordinate structure role can appear in phonological structure. But significant changes are expected in Hungarian, where the role previously grammaticalized is no longer relevant. But, as the sentences in (12) and (13) indicate, no changes occur with KELL (MUST).

(12) Jánosnak itt kell lenni(e) valahol.
   [John-Dat. here must be-inf-3rd sing. somewhere]

(13) János itt kell, hogy legyen valahol.
   [John-Nom. here must that be-3rd sing.imp. somewhere]

If the analysis we have given so far is correct, this can only mean that in this case a grammatical structure that has no relevance at all in the epistemic sense is retained.

I can now think of three possible reasons for this:

• there are usually no significant changes in metaphorical extension, as we have seen in Section 2;
• there may have been a tendency in the system to maintain a uniform appearance for the modal. Lightfoot (1979) proposes to see this as a motivating force for the non-occurrence of some changes in the word order of epistemic modals in the shift of English from SOV to SVO word order;
• we cannot claim full symbolicity for language. Sometimes an ‘inappropriate’ structure is used with no apparent reason, as in (14):

(14) And of course you want to change the title.

When this sentence means ‘I want you to change the title’, there seems to have occurred a shift of want from a ‘narrow scope’ deontic meaning to a ‘wide scope’ one (for details, see Pelyvás 2001a,b,c).

4. Extension of the findings

The fact that want is not a modal suggests that our findings can be extended to other phenomena of English grammar. Conceptual structures similar to those of the modals also
appear with cognitive predicates and in a number of other constructions as well. Some have been analyzed in Pelyvás (2001c), and I would like to give a brief overview of other possible extensions, most of which will require further study.

**Intensional/cognitive predicates**

In this group of predicates grammatical structure appears to be quite symbolic of conceptual structure:

\[(15)\]
\[\begin{align*}
\text{a} & \quad \text{Mary permitted John to go to the disco.} \\
\text{b} & \quad \text{The policeman ordered John to get out of the car.} \\
\text{c} & \quad \text{It is likely that John has arrived.} \\
\text{d} & \quad \text{John is likely to have arrived.}
\end{align*}\]

These predicates, especially (15c) and (15d) may bear witness to the history of the development of the modals. Pelyvás (2001a,c) argues that cognitive predicates like likely reach the status of grounding predications from ‘above’: they lose some of the vital characteristics of a true matrix predication.

**‘Causative’ constructions**

\[(16)\]
\[\begin{align*}
\text{a} & \quad \text{I had John paint the fence a second time.} \\
\text{b} & \quad \text{I made John paint the fence a second time.} \\
\text{c} & \quad \text{I got John to paint the fence a second time.}
\end{align*}\]

To different degrees, elements of the deontic conceptual schema are observable in these constructions. Interplay of forces fades out of immediate scope, but the participants do not. There is no degree of subjectification: no assumed correspondence between speaker/conceptualizer and CAUSER.

**Order, etc.**

\[(17)\]
\[\begin{align*}
\text{a} & \quad \text{The lieutenant ordered his men to jump into the icy river.} \\
\text{b} & \quad \text{The lieutenant ordered his men into the icy river.}
\end{align*}\]

The two sentences differ in terms of factuality of the subordinate action. Most speakers agree that the implicature that the men actually jumped into the river is stronger in (17b). In this case the ‘potential action’ part of the schema is affected.

**5. Conclusion**

In this paper I have attempted to show that the cognitive analysis of the English modals, based on Sweetser’s (1990) analysis and modified to a significant degree in Pelyvás (1996) in terms of force dynamics and metaphorical extension of the root meanings into the epis-
temic domain, reveals a rich conceptual structure much of which is not at all or poorly represented in grammatical structure. Language-specific differences are also encountered that can be used in the verification of the conceptual structures postulated for the modal meanings. The latter can also be verified through comparison with the far more 'transparent' grammatical structures for cognitive predicates.

Since extension of the modal meanings into the epistemic domain (contra Sweetser) is envisaged as a far more complex operation than the extension of ordinary lexical meanings across domains, there is reason to assume that in these cases at least, the symbolic relationships that link conceptual and phonological structure cannot be considered to be trivial.
Evidence from grammatical structure to support this view will be provided in Section 3.

I see this as a major difference from epistemic modals: one of the factors that can account for the inability of root modals to function as grounding predications.

I am assuming here that in nominative languages like English or Hungarian the nominative case marks the head of the profiled portion of the action chain (typically an agent-like role), whereas an oblique case marks its end (a patient/theme like role), cf. Langacker (1999, 31-34).

Sometimes this occurs as early as in the deontic meaning—cf. ‘wide scope’ deontic should/ought and the deontic overtone of the epistemic meanings that results from this, discussed in detail in Pelyvás (2001b).

In may and must correspondence between the speaker (conceptualizer) and permission giver/imposer roles is part of the OS of the deontic sense as well. The latter roles are not temporary and are at most weakly subjective, in opposition to the reference point construction described here.

For a detailed analysis, see Pelyvás (2001a).

SZABÁD [MAY] is not used epistemically at all and LEHET [MAY] is only used as a matrix predicate (we will not discuss this in detail here).
References


ON THE SOCIAL-COGNITIVE AND LINGUISTIC STATUS OF VARIOUS TYPES OF KNOWLEDGE AND KNOWLEDGE STRUCTURES

József Andor (University of Pécs, Hungary)

1. Background

The literature on the social-cognitive, sociolinguistic and psycholinguistic status and relevance of different types of knowledge, knowledge structures, schemata, conceptual structures such as frames, scenes and scripts is vast. However, as was pointed out in (Andor 1985) and others, delineating the boundaries and describing the scope and domains covered by these notions still lack clarification today. Substantial empirically-based research is required. Frame semantics is a field that addresses such issues, but the models that have so far been proposed and elaborated for use, for instance (Fillmore 1985, 2000), have been too narrow and restricted in scope and domain. To my knowledge, no systematic, integrative description of the operation of the mental processes involved in processing linguistic or other types of non-linguistic communication has been put forward, for instance, in the field of textology, which I and others, such as (de Beaugrande 1997, 283-87), would clearly separate from discourse analysis. Fillmore’s approach is too much lexicalist in nature, and even though he and his followers in the FrameNet project have tried to extend the scope of their investigation to analyzing linguistic constructions within the dynamically developing field of Construction Grammar, they have not yet been able to extend their analysis to the level of discourse and text. Those whose main interest focused on the application of mentally stored knowledge structures to the analysis of discourse have failed to come to grips with providing a systematic description of the multi-level set of the operation of norms on this linguistically represented macro-organization: the text. They have not been able to give a theoretically well-established description of the criteria and operation of connectivity-related operations, cohesion and coherence. In my view, Herbert Clark’s idea about the notion he and others called common ground constitutes a fruitful attempt to meet the demands referred to above (cf. Clark 1992, 1996). In this paper I want to offer an integrated description of types of knowledge and knowledge structures, with special emphasis on what is referred to as conceptual structures in the literature. I will attempt to investigate their role in textual production and comprehension, studying sample texts of media language, that is, newspaper articles representing the same background news. With this objective I wish to point to the social-cognitive facets these types of knowledge and knowledge structures can offer only to complement the much too vague term common ground.
2. Types of knowledge

Herbert Clark and other researchers attempted during the 1980s and 1990s to describe the contribution of the various types of knowledge to common ground. Such types of knowledge are **lexical or dictionary knowledge**, **encyclopedic knowledge**, **generic knowledge**, and **individual or private knowledge**. Since I do not have the space here to go into a detailed comparative analysis of the use of these terms by different authors, I will instead briefly outline my own understanding of them.

By **encyclopedic knowledge** I understand common knowledge about states of affairs with their participants, actants, constituents and terms shared by members of a given community that are stereotypically known to them and, therefore, are expected during communication. For instance, when talking about certain animals, there is a shared stereotypical knowledge about their standards of behavior, their expected appearance, living conditions, relations to humans, etc. No doubt, there exists a long list of such decisive but stereotypical features. Particular features that such animals may have concerning the above domains and particular events, happenings in their lives or relations to particular human individuals constitute our **private knowledge**. My understanding of the concept of **generic knowledge** concerns general, stereotypical pieces of information about states of affairs and things related to their potency to form parts of a category, a type, which type of knowledge critically and importantly forms the basis of human categorization. Generic types of information, similar to the building blocks of encyclopedic knowledge, are stereotypical in nature. However, they are narrower in nature and constitute a more homogeneous body of information. **Lexical or dictionary knowledge** results from data whose features are filtered out of encyclopedic and generic knowledge, taking shape in the form of words representing the lexical sets of a human language.

Very closely related to these major types of knowledge are represented (and mentally stored) types of knowledge structures called **conceptual structures**, of which particularly three have been studied extensively in the relevant literature: scenes, frames, and scripts. All three are global and stereotypical in nature. However, whereas scenes and frames are horizontally structured and are constituted by a list of particular features, scripts have a vertical structure and refer to a fixed series of actions taking place in a stereotypical situation, have various depths of their representation and, on such grounds, have an internal hierarchy. I take the main difference between scenes and frames to lie in scenes (and the basis scenic knowledge) being based on experience gained during direct exposure, whereas frame-based knowledge is based on indirectly gained information. For instance, all of us who live here in Hungary would have scenic knowledge about houses, rooms, theatres, whereas possibly not every one of us would have scenic knowledge about such concepts as “mother-in-law”, not to say about “stepmothers”, “chimeras”, or even “tigers.”

Concerning the linguistic utilization of the above given types of knowledge and knowledge structures, we can say that generic and dictionary types of knowledge play a critical role in shaping the content and the relations between the members belonging to the linguistic ‘encyclopedia’, whereas private knowledge plays a critical role during textual interpretation. Encyclopedic knowledge fulfils a sort of bridging role between the two domains. The activity played by these types of knowledge can be seen during studying the lexis of
textual representation. The three kinds of conceptual structures, on their part, critically contribute to the architectural aspects of textual representation, with special regard to the productive versus receptive activities in dealing with texts, contributing critically to setting constraints on textual coherence, and, to some extent, hand in hand with the above listed types of knowledge, contributing to the cohesive devices used during text production and comprehension. There also exists a close link between encyclopedic and private, individual knowledge and the comprehension of scripts, and through them towards the shaping of coherence, whereas lexical and generic knowledge have a critical role in shaping constraints on cohesion, mainly concerning the lexical relations in texts. All in all, we can state, different types of knowledge have different types of format represented mentally and mapped communicatively in the form of one or another type of conceptual structure.

In a recent paper (van Dijk 2001) the social facets of knowledge are emphasized. Referring to (Clark 1996), van Dijk writes: “without ... a social basis, knowledge would be no more than personal belief. Consensus, common sense or common ground, are among the many notions that define this social dimension of knowledge. It is this social nature of shared knowledge that defines presupposition and that allows discourse to be understandable without making all relevant knowledge explicit all the time.” (van Dijk 2001, 3) Knowledge, thus, is conveyed, accepted and shared in discourse and other forms of social interactions, among others, in written texts as well. The epistemic common ground that allows text production and comprehension undergoes filtering by cultural standards and stereotypes. Thus, all the above listed types of knowledge and knowledge structures are in a critical sense culturally dependent concerning their internal content and mechanisms of operation. Hence, along the lines of argumentation presented by van Dijk, there is an interface relation between components of types of knowledge (and hence the mind) and textual or discourse meaning (and hence social interaction) (van Dijk 2001, 4). This is exactly the issue that provides the relevance of my paper for this conference.

In discussing the cognitive properties of the way knowledge and discourse are related, van Dijk defines social cognition in the following way. It is “the system of mental structures and operations that are acquired, used or changed in social contexts by social actors and shared by the members of social groups, organizations and cultures. This system consists of several sub-systems, such as knowledge, attitudes, ideologies, norms and values, and the ways these are affected and brought to bear in discourse and other social practices.” (van Dijk 2001 6). Such an understanding of social cognition, as we can see, clearly corresponds to our understanding of the types of knowledge and knowledge structures outlined above. In trying to give a typology of knowledge, however, van Dijk brings additional types of knowledge into the picture: among them declarative knowledge, which mainly represents our factual knowledge about facets of our own personal or our own universal human culture. This type, I believe, shows close correspondences and links with my understanding of encyclopedic knowledge. Socially shared knowledge, van Dijk argues, may be interpersonal, group-based or cultural. The first forms the basis of social conventions utilized in interpersonal conversation, letters, and other forms of social interaction. Group knowledge refers to stereotypical, expectable information shared by members of given social groups. The term expert knowledge has been used to cover the domain of this type of knowledge by others. In my mind, Van Dijk’s understanding of general vs. specific knowledge parallels facets of the same distinction.
Van Dijk characterizes cultural knowledge by saying that it refers to “the common ground of all discourse, communication and interaction.” This is in clear parallel with Clark’s idea of ‘common ground’, which is based on common sense and consensus, facets, components of which body of knowledge have been outlined above under other terms. Finally, the last pair of van Dijk’s terms are abstract vs. concrete knowledge, which distinction also shows parallels with Clark’s four types listed and interpreted above, with the addition of one characteristic feature: whereas Clark’s notions constitute knowledge types intensionally, van Dijk’s terms refer extensionally to the very phenomena that knowledge is about, namely “concrete objects or events, or abstract ones” (van Dijk 2001, 10).

3. News Analysis

With the aim of giving empirical evidence to the argumentation above, I studied the textual representation and tested the comprehension of a set of newspaper articles based on the same news, a sad event that recently occurred in the British Royal Family: the death of Princess Margaret. The ordinary expectation of any society of news represented in news papers is that they should represent the news normatively and truthfully, they should not deliberately lie, they should provide essential information about newsworthy events and they should not provide insignificant or irrelevant personal information that might hurt group, party or personal interests. This set of normatives is well established in the Gricean communicative-pragmatic program, especially as represented in the Gricean principles. However, we are fully aware of the fact that news articles do not fully present samples of maximally co-operating types of texts; they do – to a smaller or larger extent – manifest types of violations to Gricean maxims. Their representation is semi-collaborative in nature. In what follows, I will propose a text analysis to trace the nature of these mechanisms. I will analyze five articles on the sad event published in Hungary on the same day: on Sunday, 10 February, 2002. The articles studied were the following:

1. Meghalt Margit hercegnő (Princess Margaret Dies) – Vasárnapi Hírek
2. Elhunyt Margit brit hercegnő (British Princess Margaret Passed Away) – Metro
3. A szépasszony halála (The Death of the Beauty) – Mai Nap
4. Meghalt a hercegnő (The Princess Dies) – Vasárnapi Blikk
5. Elhunyt Margit hercegnő (Princess Margaret Passed Away) – Dunántúli Napló

With the aim to assess the factors dominating readers’ reading strategies and their comprehension of the textual relations of our sample articles, we performed two experiments with 40 adult native speakers of Hungarian used as experimental subjects. In the first experiment we asked them to express their preferences by rating the texts relying on their intuitive judgment. Our subjects were not given any previous training concerning eliciting the rate and factors dominating over the connexity, cohesion or coherence of textual representation, and they were not informed about the source of the selected newspaper articles either. The results are given in Table 1.
Table 1: Readers’ preferences of the sample newspaper articles

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position, name of newspaper</th>
<th>Type of paper</th>
<th>Index based on preferences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Vasárnapi Hírek</td>
<td>national, quality</td>
<td>1.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Metro</td>
<td>national, tabloid</td>
<td>2.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Vasárnapi Blikk</td>
<td>national, tabloid</td>
<td>3.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Mai Nap</td>
<td>national, tabloid</td>
<td>3.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Dunántúli Napló</td>
<td>regional, quality</td>
<td>3.60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data gained from readers’ preferences clearly show the marked and striking superiority of the article taken from the national quality paper, the only quality paper that appears in Hungary on Sundays. The other striking fact is the lowest ranking of the article taken from the regional quality paper.

As a second part of the same experiment our subjects were also asked to give reasons for their ratings. The significant positive or critical remarks and observations are summed up below.

Text 1

The verb died rather than passed away occurs in the headline. Dies, on grounds of lexical and also of encyclopedic knowledge, usually refers to the factual statement of a sudden, unexpected occurrence of death. Although Princess Margaret’s death could have been expected on the basis of the facts and events listed in the first part of paragraph 2 of the article, the sad event still occurred suddenly and unexpectedly, due to new episodes in her health condition highlighted in the second sentence of paragraph 1. Thus, the occurrence of dies in the headline has a shocking effect which greatly contributes to the newsworthy nature of the reported event. The shocking effect is slightly reduced by the occurrence of passed away in the first sentence of paragraph 1, which unit has the status of a lead in the article (Bell 1991, 1998, van Dijk 1998). Both die and pass away serve as key words in the text, therefore, their text organizing role is outstanding. Pass away in the readers’ judgement (mainly based on their encyclopedic knowledge) is mostly associated with an ordinary, “peaceful” case of death, which, in most cases can even be expected. Although its immediate occurrence right after the occurrence of dies in the headline definitely weakens the cohesion of the article (and also its coherence) at first reading, its lexical cohesive status is further supported by the communication issued by Buckingham Palace referring to the conditions: she passed away (died) peacefully, in her sleep. These details, especially the first lexical item, play a critical role to contribute to the coherence of the article. Its status as a key word with a double message is enhanced by the details given about the Princess phrased as one of the most controversial figures in the Royal Family in the final paragraph. Died peacefully, in her sleep occurs, and has a key word status in 4 out of the 5 articles.

A weakness of the headline – as noted by a significant number of my informants – is that it does not specify clearly which Princess Margaret has died. We have to note here, however, that most of our informants agreed that upon reading a newspaper headline in which the word Princess occurs, most Hungarians tend to associate the British Royal Family by default. Buckingham Palace, which is lexically represented in the same paragraph, also critically
contributes to bridging the informational gap referring to Margaret in the headline due to its position taken in the conceptual frame (and thus in the body of stereotypically based encyclopedic knowledge that constitutes the basis of the common ground) of the ordinary Hungarian intellectual reader. Hungarian readers well-informed about British society would also have encyclopedically stored knowledge about the Princess, namely that she actually lived in Kensington Palace, but they would also know, as part of the same body of knowledge, that news about the Royal Family are mostly (and expectably) issued by the Buckingham Palace.

A further critical remark concerns the last sentence of paragraph 2, which evokes the coherently expectable frame and the related script of the funeral, which frame could have gained a more relevant position following the last paragraph.

Our experimental subjects agreed without exception that the newsworthy pieces of information about Margaret’s life were objectively and modestly presented (contrary to the other articles) and this fact greatly contributed to the very high position given to this article in their ratings.

Text 2
This short article consists of two paragraphs only, of which the first short one serves as a lead. The key word *passed away* occurs in the headline followed by a euphemistic phrasal synonym in the first paragraph, both referring to an expected, lingering case of death. This kind of lexical choice reporting on the occurrence of death gains its cohesion by the detailed representation of the health condition frame (represented by a rich set of key words) dominating paragraph 2, which condition significantly contributes to the high level of coherence in the article. Due to such lexical representation the phrasing *died peacefully, in her sleep* does not carry a double face for the ordinary reader. However, it certainly results in a frame break in the case of those readers whose cultural knowledge shows greater richness with respect to elements of expert knowledge.

All of the experimental subjects attribute a great significance to the powerful cohesive role played by *British* in the headline and *Buckingham Palace* in the first line of paragraph 1 grounded in their encyclopedically based background knowledge. All in all, they agree that although it is short, article 2 still has a high level of coherence within the limits of the low number of frames instigated by its lexis. However, most of our subjects also expressed their view that this article lacks the required level of background knowledge represented in a complex of frames.

Text 3
This article was rated very low in testing readers’ preferences, mainly because of its highly negativistic tone, already instigated by the keywords in its headline. No respect or honors have been served, and this radically violates the commonly known social stereotype which says: Don’t speak ill of the dead.

Another of the many weaknesses is outstanding: the photo attached (with a caption referring to the mourning Royal Family) shows the Princess herself, in dark clothes, which results in a weird frame break.

The paragraphs are unreasonably long. Although the key word *passed away* appears in the
addition to the headline, *die* also occurs in the first sentence of paragraph 1 and its nominal pair *death* can be read in the headline. The communications issued by the Royal Family: *died peacefully, in her sleep* evoke a frame-based contrast with the negative details about her life listed in the whole of the second paragraph, which details, however, are rated negatively with regard to standards set by the Royal Court only.

The evaluation of this article by our subjects clearly points to the fact that although an article may be well-structured in connexity-related norms and it may have a high rate of internal cohesion, the coherence it evokes in its readers may still be rated low if it does not accord with the socially accepted and expected norms, stereotypes, facets of frame-based and encyclopedically grounded knowledge.

**Text 4**
This article is similar to Text 3 concerning its textual building strategies, but it is less negativistic in tone. It uses *die* as a central key word to report on the death event in paragraph 1, in a faint contrast with the meaning facets imposed by *pass away*. It highlights the unpleasant events in Princess Margaret’s life with a lexis that occasionally does not meet the norms set by the register of the text type, and represents three unmatching frames (negative events of private life, health condition, public appearance) in the unnecessarily long second paragraph. The frame-internal lexis, however, meets the demands of cohesion.

**Text 5**
This is a brief report on the death event published in the Sunday issue of a provincial daily. It consists of just a single paragraph and lacks the details of required information. Hence the frame break caused by citing the words of the Royal Court remains too outstanding and deep. The key words in the text evoke contexts that are not represented in the required level of details, and hence the coherence and the cohesive norms of textual representation are seriously violated.

As a second part of our experiment we asked the same 40 Hungarian subjects to identify key words in each sample text: lexical items or lexical patterns which had a textual organizing role and the potential to evoke frames or scenes, or which had a critical function to serve as the central category in scripts at the macro-, mezzo-, or micro-levels of the internal hierarchy of these types of conceptual structures. The results were the following:

**Article 1:**
passed away, Princess Margaret, died /peacefully, in her sleep/, health, stroke/s/, bid farewell, private funeral, controversial figure, unhappy life

**Article 2:**
passed away, Princess Margaret, died /peacefully, in her sleep/, health, strokes, hospital, London

**Article 3:**
Princess Margaret, passed away, circulatory disorders, stroke, high life, beauty, private funeral
Communication and Culture

Article 4:
Princess Margaret, died, stroke, disorders of circulation, unhappy marriage, royal life, hospital, social life

Article 5:
Princess Margaret, passed away, stroke, hospital, died /peacefully, in her sleep/

It can be observed that basically the same lexical items or patterns were selected in each of the textual representation of the same background news. Although the articles varied greatly in their length, the lists of the key words selected did not show significant differences in this respect. It can also be seen that some frames were considered to have multilevel representation according to readers’ judgements due to a multiple occurrence of their key words.

As two of the key words: meghal (‘die’) and elhuny (‘pass away’) had an outstanding role and a powerful status in the above lists of key words, we intended to investigate their prototypical status among other Hungarian verbs of dying constituting a synonym set and a lexical field. Using the same 40 adult native speakers of Hungarian as experimental subjects, we tested their rankings for both the prototypes and the distance from the prototypes as well as from other verbs of dying in the same set. The total number of verbs or verbal phrases given to the subjects of the experiment was 13. The results are shown in Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hungarian verbs of dying</th>
<th>Index of position</th>
<th>Corresponding verbs of dying in English</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. meghal</td>
<td>1.76</td>
<td>Die</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. elhalálozik</td>
<td>3.36</td>
<td>die, decease, pass away</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. elhuny</td>
<td>3.64</td>
<td>pass away, decease</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. életét veszti</td>
<td>4.64</td>
<td>lose one’s life, perish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. eltávozott közülünk</td>
<td>5.80</td>
<td>left us</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. elpusztul</td>
<td>6.52</td>
<td>perish, die, succumb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. kiműlik</td>
<td>7.76</td>
<td>die, pass away, decease, perish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. exitál</td>
<td>8.24</td>
<td>die, be lost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. megdöglik</td>
<td>9.52</td>
<td>die, perish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. elpatkol</td>
<td>10.52</td>
<td>croak /it/, kick the bucket, pipe off</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11. feldobja a talpát</td>
<td>10.52</td>
<td>kick the bucket, turn up one’s toes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12. beadja a kulsot</td>
<td>10.88</td>
<td>kick the bucket, turn up one’s toes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13. bekrepál</td>
<td>11.72</td>
<td>drop dead, croak /it/, kick the bucket</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Testing prototypicality and distance from prototype of Hungarian verbs of dying

It can be seen that our two key verbs take very high positions concerning prototypicality in the table; actually, meghal (‘die’) was considered to be the prototypical instance in the group by our subjects. After it a marked fall in the indices of the verbs can be observed. From the second position up to the end of the list the positional indices of the verbs show an evenly falling tendency. Elhuny (‘pass away’) takes the third position in the list, its distance from the
prototype is not significantly marked. Euphemistic phrases take a medium position in the list, and distance from the prototype is greatest in the case of phrasal, idiomatic expressions.

In addition to testing the prototypicality of our verbs of dying we also tested their potential argument structure with special regard to their potential, expected patients, locus, place and time of occurrence, and their manner or condition evoked in stereotypical frames or scenes represented in mentally stored conceptual networks. Although we performed the test regarding the whole synonym set of 13 verbs, we would like to give the results of the top three lexical items of the prototypicality test due to lack of space. These results are shown in Table 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Verb</th>
<th>Patient</th>
<th>Locus/Place/Time</th>
<th>Manner (condition)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MEGHAL</td>
<td>people, animals, pet, acquaintance, relative,</td>
<td>at home, in accident, in hospital, in bed</td>
<td>in isolation, illness, unexpectedly</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>brother, sister, parent, domestic animal, old people</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELHALÁLOZIK</td>
<td>people, old people, relative, old relative</td>
<td>in hospital, in old people's home, in asylum, in bed, at home</td>
<td>peacefully, alone, unexpectedly, expectedly, unexpectedly, suffering, slowly, untimely, after long suffering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ELHUNY</td>
<td>people, old people, relative, grandparent, family member, famous person, ill person, animal</td>
<td>in hospital, at home, in bed, in old people's home, in accident</td>
<td>asleep, of old age, peacefully, in pains, suffering, without suffering, expectedly, with human dignity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3: Testing argument-types of three Hungarian verbs of dying
(with rate of occurrence in list 10 and higher)

As a second part of the above test we also tested readers’ intuitive judgements about the potential occurrence of the selected synset of verbs of dying in given types of texts or communications. Results for the top three lexical items were the following (rate of occurrence of items represented in the list: 10 or higher):

meghal:
informal conversation, newspaper, letter, police report, TV news, obituary

elhalálozik:
obituary, newspaper, minutes of the court, informal conversation, official statement, final hospital bulletin, statistical survey, literary text, novel

elhuny:
obituary, TV news, official news, newspaper article, funeral speech
4. Conclusions

It can be seen from the above data that concerning potential Patients the three lists of items show significant similarities, they dominantly contain [+ animate] [+ human] nouns referring to closely related human beings. Among the Patients associated with the two verbs: meghal and elhuny, which verbs play a critical role in our sample texts as their key words, nouns with the [+ animate] but [- human] selectional features are also present. Let us point to the significant rate of occurrence (higher than 10) of “famous person” in the list of Patients associated with elhuny, which associated item shows cohesive links with the topics of our newspaper articles. Significant similarities can be observed in the list of associated potential Loci, Places, Time of the three verbs. However, only the second and the third verb have “old people’s home” or “asylum”, that is, institutions of health represented in the list, the presence of which corresponds with their close associated links to ‘expected’ cases of death in mentally stored, frame-based lexical networks. It is not surprising, therefore, to find the items “expectedly”, “slowly”, and, perhaps even more significantly from the point of view of our examined articles, “peacefully” in the lists of the third column of Table 3. Meghal, on the other hand, refers to an “unexpectedly” occurring case of death. All the above meaning facets represented in the lists of associated lexical items filling argument positions related to the verbs studied can be inferred by readers of our sample articles, as these meaning facets are internally represented as integral constituents of the frames and scripts giving the core of knowledge structures that contribute to the coherence of the articles. Hence, the given verbs of dying have a critical role as text organizers in our newspaper articles studied. As a result of this critical role, they take highlighted positions: they occur in the headline or in primary positions in the lead paragraphs of the texts. At the same time, they are not freely interchangeable in such positions resulting from their text organizing status. In spite of the fact that they may belong to the same synset, they may evoke different frame constructs and also, they may evoke different types of scripts. Using them interchangeably might result in unnecessary frame-breaks during reading, comprehending the article, which would reduce the level of coherence and also of cohesion. All of this body of knowledge is mentally stored as part of text producers’ and readers’ encyclopedic, generic, and lexical knowledge related to the relevant contextual frameworks represented and evoked during reading the articles, in close correspondence with the evoked interpersonal and culturally based body of knowledge forming the basis of social cognitive and linguistically coded knowledge that constitutes the common ground that speakers and hearers, text producers and readers share in the complex processes of text production, representation, and comprehension.

As a consequence of the above, it is no wonder that the verb meghal, which, as was pointed out above, serves as a prototype in the synset and its meaning facets are the richest, has the potential to occur as a text organizer in a great variety of text types including informal verbal and written discourse and also semi-formal or formal written texts or media discourse, whereas elhuny and also elhalálozik are usually used and dominantly occur in (and are associated with) written or spoken texts representing formal registers as it can clearly been seen by studying the data of the second part of our second experiment.
Notes

11 The original versions of the articles can be read under Appendix 1, their English translations are given in Appendix 2. However, the original layout and appearance of the newspaper articles had to be modified slightly: no columns have been applied and the pictures attached to articles 3 and 4 (showing Princess Margaret with two other members of the Royal family) do not appear in the appendix due to technical reasons in reproduction. Letter types and sizes correspond to those in the original versions of the articles.

12 In the following we will be using the corresponding English equivalents of the Hungarian lexical items in the paper, given in italics for practical reasons.

13 For corresponding English equivalents of the Hungarian verbs of dying discussed here see Table 2 above.
References

Appendix 1
The original Hungarian versions of the five articles

1. Meghalt Margit hercegnő
Elhunyt Margit hercegnő, II. Erzsébet brit uralkodó húga. A 71 éves hercegnőt „békében, álmában érte” a halál szombat reggel. A Buckingham-palota által II. Erzsébet királynő nevében szombaton kiadott közlemény tudatta, hogy a hercegnő pénteken újabb szélütést szenvedett.

Margit hercegnő egészsége az elmúlt hónapokban rohamosan romlott, miután az elmúlt években kétszer is szélütést szenvedett. Rossz egészségi állapota miatt súlyos depresszió, étvagytalanság kerítette hatalmába. Tavaly nyár óta toloszékbe kényszerült. A hercegnőtől saját kérésére magántemetésen vesz majd búcsút családja.

Margit hercegnő halálával a Windsor-ház egyik legellentmondásosabb személyiségét vesztette el. Az udvari és a társadalmi hagyományok miatt a királyi sarjtól egész életében megtagadták azt, amire legjobban vágyott, hogy saját életét élhesse, ennek ellenére méltóság-gal teljesítette királyi családi kötelezettségeit. Viharokkal teli, boldogtalan életét végigkísérte, hogy nem mehetett feleségül nagy szerelméhez, a brit légiero egy elvált pilótájához, későbbi házassága pedig válaszol végződött.

[Vasárnapi Hírek]

2. Elhunyt Margit brit hercegnő
London – A Buckingham-palota közlése szerint Margit hercegnőt, II. Erzsébet 71 éves húgát békében, álmában érte a halál szombat reggel.

Margit hercegnő egészsége az elmúlt hónapokban rohamosan romlott. Tavaly nyár óta toloszékbe kényszerült. Két agyvérzése után pénteken újabb szélütést szenvedett, s a kórházban halt meg. (MTI)

[Metro]

3. Elhunyt Margit hercegnő, II. Erzsébet Húga x Keringési zavarok
A szépasszony halála
Meghalt Margit hercegnő. II. Erzsébet testvérét szombat hajnali fél hétkor „békében, álmában érte” a halál. A hercegnőt pénteken délután szállították kórházba, miután két éven belül immár harmadízben szélütés érte, este pedig keringési zavarok léptek fel nála. Halálos
ágya mellett egész éjszaka ott volt két gyermek, Lord Linley és Lady Sarah. Hajnalban a Buckingham-palotán félárbocra engedték a brit lobogót, a hercegnőtől magánjellegű temetésen vesznek búcsút Windsorszon.


4. Meghalt a hercegnő

LONDON – Félárbocra eresztték a londoni Buckingham-palotán a nemzeti zászlót arra a hírre, hogy meghalt Margit hercegnő, II. Erzsébet uralkodó húga. A hetvenéves hercegnő agyvérzés és keringési zavarok következtében tegnap reggel hunyt el a VII. Edward kórházban. A halálhírre II. Erzsébet királynői Windsorból visszatért Londonba, a hercegnő édesanyja, a százéves anyakirályinak azonban betegeskedik, és nem tudja elhagyni az észak-angliai Sandringham királyi birtokot.


5. Elhunyt Margit hercegnő

LONDON – Elhunyt Margit hercegnő, II. Erzsébet brit uralkodó húga. A Buckingham-palota közlése szerint a 71 éves hercegnőt „békében, álmaina érte” a halál tegnap reggel. A hercegnő pénteken újabb szélületet szenvedett, később keringési zavarok léptek fel nála, emiatt tegnapra virradóra a londoni VII. Edward kórházba szállították.

[Mai Nap]
Appendix 2
Translated versions of the Hungarian articles

1. Princess Margaret Dies

Princess Margaret, sister of the British monarch Elizabeth II has passed away. The 71-year-old princess died “peacefully, in her sleep” Saturday morning. The communication of Buckingham Palace made it public in the name of Queen Elizabeth II that the Princess had another stroke on Friday.

The health of Princess Margaret was rapidly failing having had strokes twice in the previous year. Due to her ill condition she was overcome by serious depression and lack of appetite. Since last summer she was bound to a wheelchair. As she requested, the family will pay last honors to her at a private funeral.

With the death of Princess Margaret the House of Windsor has lost one of its most controversial figures. Due to royal and social traditions she was denied of what she wished for above all in her life, the possibility to live her own life, but she still fulfilled the duties of the Royal Family with dignity. Her unhappy and stormy life was determined by the fact that she was not allowed to marry her true love, a divorced RAF pilot, and her later marriage ended in divorce.

[Vasárnapi Hírek]

2. British Princess Margaret Passed Away

London – According to the communications of Buckingham Palace Princess Margaret, 71-year-old sister of Queen Elizabeth II died peacefully, in her sleep Saturday morning.

The health of Princess Margaret was rapidly getting worse in the past few months. She was bound to a wheelchair since last summer. After her two previous strokes she suffered another on Friday and passed away in the hospital. (HTA)

[Metro]

3. Princess Margaret, Sister of Elizabeth II, Passed Away x Circulatory Disorders

The Death of the Beauty

Princess Margaret is dead. The sister of Elizabeth II passed away “peacefully, in her sleep” at half past six Saturday morning. The princess was taken to hospital Friday afternoon, having
Communication and Culture

had the third stroke in the past two years, and later in the evening some circulatory disorders arose. Her two children, Lord Linley and Lady Sarah spent the whole night at her deathbed. In the morning the British union flag was at half mast, last honors will be given at a private funeral in Windsor.

Princess Margaret was born on 31 August, 1930. In 1960 she married a photographer, Anthony Armstrong Johns, the later Lord Snowdon, whom she divorced in 1978. She has two children and three grandchildren. The beautiful young princess wished to marry RAF colonel Peter Towsend in the 1950s, but as the man had already been divorced, it only remained a dream. She always lived a high life, stayed a lot in the Caribbean, made acquaintances with artists, publicly drank and smoked a lot, and after her divorce she had relationships with several men. × Sz.Cs.

Photo: The mourning Royal Family (Reuters)

[Mai nap]

4. **The Princess Dies**

LONDON – The British union flag was half-masted to the news of the death of Princess Margaret, sister of Queen Elizabeth II. The seventy-one year-old princess passed away in Edward VII Hospital in consequence of a stroke and circulatory disorders yesterday morning. To the news of her death Queen Elizabeth II returned to London from Windsor Castle, but her mother, the hundred-and-one-year-old Queen Mother is unwell and, therefore, she is unable to leave the Royal estate of Sandringham in East-Anglia.

Princess Margaret, the younger daughter of George Prince of York and Princess Elizabeth did not like the restrictions of royal life, she was more attracted to the arts. In 1953 she fell in love with the 15 years older Captain Peter Towsend serving at the Royal Guards, but the Court expelled her love to foreign service in Belgium. The princess threw herself into social life, after her unhappy marriage and divorce she started drinking and became a heavy smoker. In the mid-50s malignant cells were found in her lungs part of which had to be removed. After the operation she was steadfast to work at a foundation campaigning against child abuse. She last appeared in public at the 101st birthday ceremony of the Queen Mother, Elizabeth last summer.

(Caption below picture: Margaret, the Queen Mother, and Elizabeth; photo Reuters)

[Vasárnapi Blikk]

5. **Princess Margaret Passed Away**

LONDON – Princess Margaret, sister of the British monarch Elizabeth II is dead. According to the communication of Buckingham Palace the 71-year-old Princess passed away “peacefully, in her sleep” yesterday morning. The Princess suffered another stroke on Friday followed later by circulatory disorders, therefore she was taken to Edward VII Hospital in London yesterday morning.

[Dunántúli Napló]
ON THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF ANIMAL TAXONOMIES ACROSS CULTURES
Sándor Martsa (University of Pécs, Hungary)

1. Introduction

When we read newspapers, journals, or participate in any kind of oral communication, we frequently encounter expressions, in which animal terms are used in different figurative senses, similar to those in (1) – (3) that were found in the latest issues of Newsweek magazine:

(1) Banks are helping ferret out Al Qaeda’s money networks with fancy new software. (December 17, 2001; p.26)

(2) They survive more than rise, and Hu has wisely spent most of the past decade keeping a low profile and parroting the wisdom of his boss. (December 31, 2001–January 7, 2002; p. 71)

(3) After all, some – like Schmidt’s carping about Carter – proved pretty close to the mark. (February 18, 2002; p.13)

The aim of this paper is to contribute to the better understanding of the motivations of the above figurative uses in a cross-cultural perspective. To this end, first, in section 2 the conceptual structure of folk biological taxonomies will be presented. Then, in section 3 it will be argued that among ethnobiological categories it is the so-called generic taxa that display the highest cognitive and cultural salience. Finally, in section 3.2 it will be demonstrated that the conceptualization of animal taxonomies, together with the fact that some animal terms readily extend to figurative domains, is most effectively interpretable within the framework of the GREAT CHAIN OF BEING metaphor. Examples will be taken mostly from English, but occasionally Hungarian examples will also be considered.

2. Ethnobiological classifications

Ethnobiological classifications are commonly believed to reflect consistently how speakers conceptualize living things, animals and plants across cultures. These classifications by definition are based on the commonsense knowledge and the everyday experience of many generations with particular animals and plants (Isaenko, 1972), consequently, they are usually incommensurable with scientifically based taxonomies. So, whereas such characteristics as ‘they are pleasant to stroke’ or ‘they move their tails from side to side when they feel good feelings towards someone approaching them’ (Wierzbicka, 1989, 167-9) seem to be fully
legitimate in the folk conceptualizations of cats and dogs, a zoologist certainly will not take them into account in scientific descriptions of the same animals.

This does not imply, however, that ethnobiological classifications are entirely arbitrary and unpredictable. In fact, as Berlin et al. (1973) and Berlin (1992), among others, pointed out, ethnobiological classifications are universally organized into a taxonomic hierarchy of mutually exclusive categories of ranks or levels.

The highest and the most comprehensive of these levels is the unique beginner or the kingdom level which is lexically labelled as animals or plants in English. The next level is that of the life form taxa, including for instance bird, fish, mammal from the animal kingdom and tree and flower from the plant kingdom. The largest number of taxa can be found at the level of generic taxa, subsuming in respect of the aforementioned life forms penguin or swallow, carp or trout, cat or dog, oak or elm, carnation or tulip. Although, in most folk biological classifications generic taxa represent the last and lowest rank in the hierarchy, some culturally highly salient generic taxa such as dog or cat include further subgeneric or specific taxa such as spaniel and retriever or Siamese and Persian. Likewise, due to the high degree of cultural saliency a few specific taxa in turn may have varietal taxa pertaining to them, e.g. cocker spaniel, golden retriever labelling subspecies of spaniel and retriever.

As ethnobiological categories are considered universal, the same or similar labels can be found for each of them in other languages as well. The corresponding Hungarian terms for the above categories are the following: the unique beginners are állat (‘animal’) and növény (‘plant’); the life forms can be madár (‘bird’), hál (‘fish’), emlős (‘mammal’), fa (‘tree’), virág (‘flower’), which respectively involve pingvin (‘penguin’), fecske (‘swallow’), ponty (‘carp’), pisztráng (‘trout’), tölgyfa (‘oak (tree)’), szilfa (‘elm (tree)’), szegfű (‘carnation’), tulipán (‘tulip’) as generic taxa; the specific taxa coming under kutya (‘dog’) and macska (‘cat’), respectively, are spaniel, vizsla (‘retriever’), szíámi (macska) (‘Siamese (cat)’), perzsa (macska) (‘Persian (cat)’); finally, the varietal taxon cocker spaniel exists in Hungarian too, whereas, in all probability due to its low saliency, no native (folk) label is found for the varietal taxon golden retriever.

It is also important to observe that the interpretation and the scope of the above ethnobiological categories have often been challenged. Wierzbicka (1996, 359ff), for example, argues that animal cannot be a label for a unique beginner in a folk taxonomy of animals in English, since it does not seem to imply insects, fish, or slugs, which in the scientific sense of the term do naturally belong to the animal kingdom. According to her, this taxonomic uncertainty concerning the status of animal, which is also confirmed by the semantic analysis of the lexeme ‘animal’ (Crystal, 1987/1995, 105), can be done away with if we consider it as a life form label, together with bird and fish. As regards mammal, on the other hand, it should be eliminated from folk classifications of animals, because it is a scientific term. She also suggests that the label for the unique beginner in the animal kingdom should be creature instead of animal.

Note that exactly the same taxonomic uncertainty characterizes állat, the Hungarian counterpart of animal, so it can be viewed as a life form taxon in Hungarian folk zoology too. By contrast, the Hungarian counterpart of creature ‘teremtmény’ does not seem to be an appropriate unique beginner label for its being a formal word with religious connotations. It may as well be the case that in Hungarian folk zoological taxonomies animal is both a label for a unique beginner and a life form taxon.
3. Evidence for the Conceptual and Cultural Salience of Generic Taxa

From the aforementioned ethnobiological categories generic taxa, also called folk genera, natural kinds, rigid designators (Cruse, 1986, 141) are considered the most basic and the most salient both conceptually and culturally. This is so, because, for instance, they are immediately apparent and they are easily elicitable from native speakers. Besides, children learn them earlier than the other taxa. So, whether something is a dog, i.e. a generic taxon, is normally not a matter of debate, but whether it is an Alsatian, German, or Belgian shepherd, i.e. one of these specific taxa, it is not so easy to decide (Foley, 1997/2000, 119); or, a child, and certainly an adult too, would first identify a barking animal as a dog, and only after this as a St. Bernard or a greyhound.

Furthermore, the conceptual and cultural priority of generic taxa is supported and secured by two more factors. One is the internal logic of the folk taxonomic hierarchy itself (see section 3.1 below); the other is that they often lend themselves to figurative applications (see section 3.2 below).

3.1. Definability of Folk Biological Categories

The central place of generic taxa or folk genera directly follows from the internal logic of ethnozoological taxonomies, more precisely, from the definability of particular taxonomic categories. These categories are usually defined relative to each other, but it is only the definitions of generic taxa that contain explicit references to both the superordinate life form and the subordinate specific taxa. So, in the definition of dog as a folk genus reference must be established to the life form taxon (4) and to the possible specific taxa (5), as illustrated in (4) and (5):

(4) A dog is a kind of animal.
(5) There are many breeds of dogs, such as Spaniel, Pekinese, Alsatian, etc

The definition of animal as a life form taxon, on the other hand, need not, in fact cannot, specify each folk genus subordinated to it. Finally, a specific taxon is usually defined as a kind of folk genus, therefore, when defining it is necessary to specify the superordinate folk genus under which it immediately comes. Cf. (6) and (7): (more on this see Wierzbicka, 1985, 161-179; 1996, 351-375)

(6) A retriever is a kind of dog
and not
(7) (?) A retriever is a kind of animal

3.2. The GREAT CHAIN OF BEING Metaphor

The cognitive and cultural salience of folk generic taxa for animals in a cross-linguistic perspective is even more convincingly shown in the vast number of anthropocentric or figura-
ative applications, in which these taxa occur in natural languages. This is not to say, however, that occasionally specific or life form taxa are not at all used figuratively. Consider in this respect the subgeneric taxa bitch or hog, in whose conceptualizations figurative, predominantly metaphorical, applications play an important role. (See examples below.) Similarly, the life form taxon animal (just like its Hungarian equivalent állat) may also be employed figuratively, denoting an evil, brutal male (more on this see Martsa, 1998).

The cognitive and cultural salience reflected in the anthropocentric figurative applications of folk generic taxa is best described within the framework of the so-called GREAT CHAIN OF BEING metaphor proposed by Lakoff & Turner (1989). This metaphor, “a tool of great power and scope”, which “… allow[s] us to comprehend general human character traits in terms of well-understood nonhuman attributes; and conversely, it allows us to comprehend less well-understood aspects of the nature of animals and objects in terms of better understood human characteristics” (Lakoff & Turner, 1989, 172). Lakoff & Turner also point out that the basic GREAT CHAIN OF BEING metaphor is not just a metaphor, but rather a conceptual construct made up of (a) the implicit cultural model of the Great Chain of Being; (b) a generic-level metaphor (GENERIC IS SPECIFIC); (c) a commonsense theory of the Nature of Things; and (d) the communicative principle of the Maxim of Quantity (“Be as informative as is required and not more so”). Although these components are discussed in detail in Martsa (2001), they have to be briefly revisited so as to demonstrate what it means for folk generic taxa for animals to be cognitively and culturally salient.

3.2.1. The Great Chain of Being
The chain is to be interpreted first as a top-down hierarchy, in which higher-level human attributes and behaviour are conceived of in terms of lower-level, nonhuman attributes and behaviour of animals, plants, complex objects and natural physical things. Therefore, with respect to the relations of humans to other levels in the hierarchy of the Great Chain it may plausibly be stated that human attributes and behaviour are often understood metaphorically via attributes and behaviour of animals (8), or those of plants (9) and inanimate things (10) (Lakoff & Turner, 1989, 144ff; Kövecses, 1997, 328).

(8) Sam is a pig.
(9) Her beauty is but a flower.
(10) Sally is a block of ice.

Underlying the comprehension of human attributes and behaviour through animal attributes and behaviour there exist the highly general conceptual metaphor HUMANS ARE ANIMALS and a number of submetaphors related to it (Kövecses, 1997; Martsa, 2001, 776).

(11) DIFFICULT-TO-HANDLE THINGS ARE DOGS/PIGS
E.g. It’s going to be a bitch to replace him. (CEGM); This tune is pig to play. (CIDE)

(12) COWARDLY PEOPLE ARE CHICKENS
It is important to observe that the Great Chain is also interpretable as a bottom-up hierarchy, which entails that along with the conceptual metaphor HUMANS ARE ANIMALS the reverse metaphor ANIMALS ARE HUMANS is also at work in the chain, yielding instances of anthropomorphization, more precisely, personification. From this point of view especially interesting are the polynomial specific taxa, which contain explicit reference to humans or human attributes. In monarch butterfly, crowned crane, crowned eagle, crowned pigeon, queen pigeon, king monkey, for example, it is in all probability appearance that made speakers think of royalty when naming these species. Furthermore, as regards ladybug, it also seems to have been motivated by appearance, while the names king crab, queen crab, king fish, queen fish, king snake, queen snake, king turtle, queen turtle indicate that speakers perceive gender as a feature capable of expressing difference in size: male species as a rule are bigger in size than female species. By contrast, king in king vulture, king penguin, king salmon is believed to relate not to royalty or gender, but only to size and in king cobra to the fact that this species is extremely venomous. Finally, the motivating effect of appearance and gender seems doubtless in bald eagle and in tomat, billy goat, nanny goat (cf. Nilsen, 1966, 263-4).

Concerning the two possible interpretations of the Great Chain, it is important to emphasize that anthropomorphization of animal attributes and behaviour is an input condition for any metaphorical applications of animal names. Put differently, an important condition for the metaphorical applications of generic taxa for animals is the anthropomorphization of the corresponding real-world animals (in this connection see Lakoff & Turner, 1989, 194).

3.2.2. The Nature of Things

According to Lakoff & Turner (1989, 189ff) this component of the Great Chain is a folk theory motivated to a great extent by the experience of humans with lower forms of being. In my opinion, in the case of animals, more particularly, in the case of generic taxa the best analytic tools to describe this knowledge are the so-called thematic parts suggested by A. Wierzbicka (1985, 161ff; 1996, 340-7). On her view, in people’s conceptualizations of animals the following thematic parts of animal life appear to be significant: ‘habitat’, ‘size’, ‘appearance’, ‘behaviour’, and ‘relation to people’. These thematic parts constitute a body of culture-dependent, automatically retrievable knowledge about animals, in which ‘relation to people’ is the most fundamental.

The relevance of thematic parts, especially of ‘relation to people’ among them, is con-
firmed by Edmund Leach (1964, 25-63), who found that, viewed from an anthropological stance, the folk classification of animals in British English is based on such criteria as edibility and taboo, which in turn are related to the matters of killing and verbal abuse. According to Leach, the central animal categories based on edibility are PETS (they are inedible and kept in or around the house), LIVESTOCK and GAME (their edibility is subject to rules; e.g. they are edible if castrated or if hunted at correct season; they are kept on farm or open field), and WILD ANIMALS (they are inedible; they include zoo animals, which is a valid subcategory, for these animals are seen by most people only in zoos). Species, which as a matter of fact are all folk genera and which appear to be especially loaded with taboo values ( obscenity, verbal abuse) are dog, cat, horse (PETS), pig (LIVESTOCK), rabbit, cony, fox (GAME). No taboo values are attributed to WILD ANIMALS such as tiger, lion, giraffe, which, as we have seen, does not mean that metaphorically understood values cannot be attributed to them either.

3.2.3. The Maxim of Quantity

The communicative principle of the Maxim of Quantity is believed to impose pragmatic restrictions on what gets mapped onto what, concretely which animal features get mapped on which human features. From the point of view of the present discussion it is crucial that these pragmatic restrictions eventually determine not only the metaphorical extensions of animal concepts, but also the lexicalization of these concepts. In the case of mapping animals onto humans it is only the essential, culturally and psychologically salient properties, such as behaviour, internal states, desires, emotions, limited cognitive abilities of animals that are mapped onto humans. Consequently, it is these properties that are lexicalized in the form of various linguistic constructions.

My own analyses of the metaphorical applications of not only folk generic animal terms (pig, dog), but also of animal verbs, i.e. verbs zero-derived from animal terms (to pig on, to wolf down), animal-based idioms (play chicken, chicken-hearted, to go the whole hog, snake in the grass), and proverbs (Don’t count your chickens before they are hatched) (cf. Martsa 1997, 1998, 2000, 2001), have revealed that in most of the cases what gets mapped can be specified in terms of one or more conceptual submetaphors derived from the basic conceptual metaphor HUMANS ARE ANIMALS. Thus, for example, in

(16) She is always pigging herself on chocolate. (CIDE)

the verb to pig on in itself evokes the conceptual metaphor GLUTTONOUS PEOPLE ARE PIGS, which signals that, due to the operation of the Maxim of Quantity, only the gluttonous nature of pigs gets mapped, not their fatness or dirtiness which otherwise are also salient pig-traits. In

(17) What a pig! He refused to help, even though he could see we were having trouble. (CIDE),

on the other hand, pig evokes the conceptual metaphor UNRELIABLE PEOPLE ARE PIGS. Note that the restrictive role of the Maxim of Quantity is detectable in the second sentence,
for it specifies which of the potentially available pig-traits is relevant for the interpretation of the first sentence.

Below are a few English and Hungarian examples with animal verbs and animal names in them. In the underlying conceptual metaphors those features that undergo mapping owing to the operation of the Maxim of Quantity are put in braces.

(18) O’Connor was the person who ferreted out the truth in this case. (CEGM)
PEOPLE [INTENSELY SEARCHING] FOR SOMETHING ARE FERRETS

(19) The kids beetled off home. (OALD)
PEOPLE [MOVING ALONG FAST] ARE BEETLES

(20) As soon as they get paid they squirrel the money away so they won’t be tempted to touch it. (CIDE)
PEOPLE [HIDING THINGS FOR LATER USE] ARE SQUIRRELS

(21) Mindig csak ugyanazt szajkózza. (‘He is always repeating (literally: jaying) the same.’)
PEOPLE [MECHANICALLY REPEATING THE SAME THING] ARE JAYS

(22) Hangyaszorgalommal dolgozik. (‘He is very keen on his work’. Literally: ‘He shows the assiduity of ant in work.’)
PEOPLE [WORKING HARD AND SYSTEMATICALLY] ARE ANTS

Similarly to animal verbs, the cognitive framework of the Great Chain of Being metaphor also makes it possible for animal-based proverbs to contribute to the conceptualization of folk generic taxa. For lack of space, let it suffice to observe that animal-based proverbs, just like other proverbs, are not only metaphoric descriptions or characterizations of people, but they also exhort people to do or not to do certain things (Lakoff & Turner, 1989, 160). This is in keeping with the generally accepted definition of proverbs, according to which a proverb offers advice or presents a moral in a short, pithy manner (Simpson, 1996, ix). This means that a proverb not only describes a situation, which, for example, in the case of

(23) If you run after two hares, you will catch neither

is the futility of one’s chasing two hares simultaneously, and, in compliance with the joint operation of the GENERIC IS SPECIFIC metaphor and the Maxim of Quantity, the futility of one’s pursuing two goals simultaneously, but it also exhorts us to do one thing: Focus on one thing at a time. More precisely: If you want to be effective, don’t pursue two goals simultaneously, focus on one at a time.

Generally speaking, animal-based proverbs seem to constitute a bestiary of a special kind (cf. Neisi, 1995), in which each proverb is a fable in itself. Given the didactic nature of fables, one understands why exhortations are so readily associated with animal proverbs, too.
4. Conclusions

We hope to have proved in the foregoing discussion that the study of the figurative applications of animal categories in general, and of folk generic taxa in particular, plays a crucial role in the proper understanding of the conceptualization of animal taxonomies. Drawing on the powerful cognitive tools, provided by the GREAT CHAIN OF BEING metaphor, it has been demonstrated that this conceptualization is basically a two-way mapping, in which humans and animals alternatively can be the source or the target domain.

The above discussion has also confirmed that ethnobiological categories for animals are not definable in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, but rather, in terms of psychologically and culturally salient features. These features can be revealed by the thorough analysis of linguistic evidence.
Notes

15 Note that to treat creature as a label for a unique beginner is not unproblematic, since, similarly to teremtmény it is also a derivative and, therefore, it seems to defy the requirement for unique beginners to be primary lexemes.
16 The extended GREAT CHAIN OF BEING metaphor, which will not be dealt with here, concerns the relation of humans to society, God, and the universe.
17 These examples are discussed in Searle (1993) and Lakoff & Turner (1989).
18 English examples, here and elsewhere, are taken from CEGM, CIDE, COBUILD, OALD (see References).
References

Roch, E. (1975). Universals and cultural


1. Introduction

In our contribution, we have developed an experimental numerical system called HERITAGE (Hungarian Lexical Root Dynamics and Structure Analyzing Numerical System) that is capable of analyzing and quantifying consistent structures of Hungarian lexical material. Due to the global methods utilized, it can also be used to explore other agglutinative language systems. In order to present our approach, first we need to offer a brief survey of the structure of the Hungarian lexical items and their relations.

2. On the Hungarian lexicon and subsequent cognitive insights

Nineteenth century Hungarian linguists Gergely Czuczor and János Fogarasi (Czuczor & Fogarasi 1862-1874) wrote a Hungarian dictionary based on the concept of root. In this paper, we will discuss material from this dictionary and adopt their lexical approach which can be characterized by the following guiding principle for the study of the Hungarian lexicon:

(1) Lexically related concepts have a related sound structure.

In order to make this principle more explicit first we will need to define some basic concepts of the Hungarian language and to describe the proposed basis for our linguistic categorization.

First of all, it is a well-known fact that the Hungarian language is an agglutinative language. This means that the basic categories N, V, A, etc. can be inflected with suffixes in order to express all the relevant grammatical information, such as grammatical functions, subcategorizational selection, information on person and number and so on. Consider for example the noun ház “house”. In example (2b) the locative relation “in” - in Hungarian coded by the suffix ban/ben - and the possessive marker for first person singular - (a)m - get attached to the root.

(2) a ház
    b ház-am-ban [house-1“pers.sg. poss.-in] “in my house”
The Hungarian language has an extremely productive set of suffixes which have a wide range of different functions and meanings that usually translate into English with great difficulties.

In this paper, we will adopt the following definition of a Hungarian root:

\( (3) \) A root is the smallest morphological entity of a word without inflexion that has a phonological and semantic identity of its own.

Normally, after isolating the root by taking off the agglutinated material (mostly suffixes), the root will show an active, well-identified meaning in its own right in contemporary Hungarian. The root KÖR meaning “circle”, for example, figures in many derived words: KÖR-ős “circular”, KÖR-őz “turn around in circles”, KÖR-ny-ék “environment, neighbourhood”, KÖR-ny-ez “surround”. Note that the adjectival suffix -ős, the nominal suffix -ny, and the verbal suffixes -őz and -ez can get attached to the root KÖR as shown in the examples above.

It appears that the isolated root sometimes has no active or independent meaning in contemporary Hungarian language any longer, but is nevertheless recognized by the native speakers of Hungarian as a root word capable of being identified by a specific bundle of semantic features. Note that in all of the following words: FOR-dúl “turn around”, FOR-gat “rotate”, FOR-og, FOR-r “boil, ferment”, FOR-rong-ás “upheaval, unrest”, FOR-gás “spin, turn”, FOR-gács “scobs, sliver, chips, turnings, whittling”, FOR-r-ó “very hot” the root is FOR, although this root cannot exist in itself in contemporary Hungarian. However, the verbal suffixes -dúl, -gat, -og, -r, -rong, the nominal suffixes -gás, -gács and the adjectival suffix -ó can be attached to FOR whose basic meaning is “turn”.

A similar case is illustrated by the following words: DAR-a “semolina (of wheat)”, DAR-ab “piece”, DAR-abol “cut into pieces” and DAR-ál “grind”. Again, the isolated DAR can be obtained by taking the nominal suffixes -a and -ab or the verbal suffixes -abol and -ál off, however the root DAR itself happens not to be used in isolation in contemporary Hungarian. Native speakers of Hungarian will assign it the meaning “CUT, BREAK”. DAR, similarly to FOR or KÖR, only exists in its suffixed forms. The root words such as DAR, KÖR, FOR are not specified for word categories, they can lend themselves to both verbal and nominal constructions.

With respect to Hungarian root structures we will make the following two claims. First, \( (i) \) the most dominant root structure in Hungarian is tryadic CVC and secondly, \( (ii) \) the basic meaning of the root is expressed by the consonants. The vowels do not affect the basic meanings of tryadic roots under analysis. Hence the fundamental morphophonological root structure of the Hungarian lexicon is C—C. We will call this structure the generating root. Note that this is a deep structure representation in the sense of modern linguistics [see Maracz 1989]. Surface structures are derived by spelling out the consonants and the vowels and by attaching the suffixes, if permitted, to the root. These linguistic operations modify the basic conceptual structure resulting in highly specific meanings.
In our pilot study, we have selected eight conceptual-lexical groups from the dictionary of (Czuczor & Fogarasi 1862–1874). The groups are (a) circle, round, turn, periodicity; (b) space; (c) touch a body in a way it is hurt or damaged; (d) touch, experience; (e) onomatopoeic verbs; (f) round forms in the living world; (g) light, fire; and (h) cut, peel. For reasons of space we will only discuss our findings with respect to the groups (a) and (f).

Czuczor and Fogarasi noted that in accordance with principle (1) it is possible to reconstruct so-called organic word groups across the lexicon of Hungarian. The members of the organic word groups are related to each other by the same generating root. This means that they have the same generating root in common and their meanings are related to the basic meaning that is expressed by the generating root. Consider for example the organic word group under (a) generated by the K—R tryadic root whose basic meaning is “a line that is curved into itself or a motion that is following such a line”.

With these organic word groups the capability of the Hungarian lexicon to link related conceptual structures with related sound structures, and its enormous permutational capacity, are by far not exploited. Under conditions to be specified below generating roots can be linked to yet other generating roots that are still further related conceptually.

In principle this system has an unrestricted generative capacity given the fact that in these “transformations” all the consonants of the Hungarian phonological pool may participate. In practice, however, the transformations have to comply with morphophonological and semantic conditions and obey formation rules restricted on such grounds. Generating roots may be linked if and only if (i) they have a related meaning and (ii) only one of the two basic consonants get replaced. In this way, it is guaranteed that the mappings are recoverable. This results in the following derivational pattern:

\[ (5) \text{Linking of roots: } C(x)_C(y) \rightarrow C(x)_C(z) \text{ or } C(z)_C(y), \]

in which all roots have a related meaning

Application of (5) to the K—R root provides the following actual derivations. All meanings are related to the basic meaning of K—R, “a line that is curved into itself or a motion that is following such a line”. Compare the results of the root linking procedure in (6) through
(17):

[6]  G—R:
  GUR: GUR-ul “roll” (intr), GUR-ít “roll (a round object smoothly)”
  GÖR: GÖR-be “curvilinear”, GÖR-nyed “bend (as of old age)”, GÖR-dít “roll (a heavy object)”
  GOR: GOR-nyad “droop”

(7)  GY—R:
  GYÜR: GYÜR-ú “ring”, GYÜR-ke “crust” (of bread), GYÜR-em “crumbled cloths, wrinkles”

(8)  H—R:
  HUR: HUR-ök “loop”

(9)  F—R:
  FÚR: FÚR-ó “drill”, FÚR-dal “keep drilling”, FÚR-at “bored hole”
  FÉR: FÉR-de “inclined”
  FER: FÉR-eg “worm”
  FÖR: FÖR-getty “tool that can be rotated back-and-forth in an inclined way”, FÖR-geteg “hurricane”
  FÜR: FÜR-ge “swift, moving quickly back-and-forth”, FÜR-dik “bathe, turn around in water”
  FAR: FAR-ág “carve”, FAR-adék “waste material from carving”, FAR-igcsál “carve easily”
  FÜR: FÜR-ész “saw”

(10)  V—R:
  VER: VER-ecsen “spinning-wheel of tailor”, VER-óczé “little door that turns easily”

(11)  P—R:
  PER: PER-eg “whirl”, PER-díl “spin round”
  PAR: PAR-ittya “catapult”, PAR-ípa “steed”
  PÖR: PÖR-get “twirl”

(12)  B—R:
  BAR: BAR-angol “ramble”
  BER: BER-reg “turning around by making a ber-like sound”

(13)
S—R:
SÜR: SÜR-ög “bustle”, SÜR-ög-FOR-ög “be bustling around”, 13
SÜR-get “urge”, SÜR-göldik “bustle”
SIR: SIR-ing “turn quickly”, SIR-ingel “turn once in a while”

The S—R generating root can be used as a starting point for further linking again. Note that in (14) the first consonant remains unaffected. Again the mappings apply to roots that represent different aspects of the notions “round”, “turning” and “turning around”:

(14)
S—D:
SOD: SOD-ör “current (of water) washes away, roll tobacco”, SOD-rás “current, rolling”

Again, according to the linking condition in (5) we continue mapping keeping the second consonant unchanged:

(15)
P—D:
PÖD: PÖD-ör “twist (of moustache or leaves)”, PÖD-rés “twirling, twisting”

(16)
F—D:
FOD: FOD-ör “curl (of hair or skirt)”, FOD-rás “curly, waving, rippling”

(17)
B—D:
BOD: BOD-ör “curly, curling”

The above derivations can be represented into the following overall scheme:

(18)

Note that the chain of transformations in (7) through (17) remain within the domain of a related conceptual structure, i.e. the different aspects of the meanings ROUND and TURN in motion. However, the scheme in (18) cannot really be captured in a linear representation because from each root a new derivational branching can shoot off.

The possibilities of mapping roots are even more extensive than linking because not only roots can be linked within one and the same conceptual domain but roots from other conceptual structures can be related as well. We will call this operation looping. Looping obeys basically the same conditions as linking in (5). The only difference is that although the mapped roots may belong to different conceptual structures they must have an aspect of their meaning in common, as defined by (5’).
(5’) Linking and looping of roots: \[ C(x) - C(y) \rightarrow C(x) - C(z) \text{ or } C(z) - C(y), \]
in which all roots have a related meaning despite the fact that they may represent different background conceptual structures.

In order to illustrate looping, let us first consider the group of words related to forms of circular or round shape in the living world (cf. conceptual-lexical group (f) above), such as fruits, vegetables, species of flora and fauna:

(19) \[ M\text{-}GY: \]
MÖGY: MÖGY-ön “hazelnut”
MEGGY: MEGGY-km “morello”
MAGY: MAGY-al “holly berry”

(20) \[ M\text{-}G: \]
MAG: MAG “seed, grain”, MAG-zat “offspring, embryo”, MAG-k “pig kept for breeding purposes”

(21) \[ M\text{-}K: \]
MÁK: MÁK “poppy-seed”
MAKK: MAKK “acorn”

These linkings can be represented as follows:
(22) \[ M\text{-}GY \rightarrow M\text{-}G \rightarrow M\text{-}K \]

On the basis of the linking and looping principle in (5’), it is to be predicted that the M—GY root can start further derivations in different directions resulting in the following sequences:

(23) \[ B\text{-}GY: \]
BOGY: BOGY-ó “berry”

(24) \[ B\text{-}R: \]
BOR: BOR-s “pepper”, BOR-ó “pea”, BOR-óka “juniper”
BAR: BAR-ack “peach”

These derivations can be represented as follows:
(25) \[ M\text{-}GY \rightarrow B\text{-}GY \rightarrow B\text{-}R \]

Recall that the generating roots are deep structure representations not specified for direction. Hence “inversion” of the two consonants in the mapping to surface structures may apply as well. Inversion of M—G gives the following derivation. Compare:

(26)
G—M:
GUM: GUM-ó “tuber”
GÖM: GÖM-b “globe”, GÖM-bóc “round sausage made of chitterlings, pork cheese”

After the application of inversion linking can start again:
(27)
G—L:
GAL: GAL-acsin “pellet”, GAL-agonya “thornapple”

These give us the following derivations:
(28)
M—G » G—M » G—L

Also, in a non-linear way, a new derivation can be started from the M—K generating root:
(29)
M—L:
MÁL: MÁL-na “raspberry”

This results in the following derivation:
(30)
M—K » M—L

The mappings in (22), (25), (28), (30) result in the derivational scheme of forms of circular and round shapes in the living world:

(31)
M—GY » M—G » M—K
↓ ↓ ↓
B—GY G—M M—L
↓ ↓
B—R G—L

Here it becomes perspicuous that it is not possible to represent this complex structure linearly.

At this stage, there are two possibilities for looping (or blending) the structure of round forms (31) with the structure of circular movements in (18).

The transformation B—R » K—R, for example, would corresponds to the conditions that we defined in (5’), since the species of round shape in the living world and round forms with their adjoining motions basically belong to two different conceptual structures, despite the
fact that they clearly have a crucial aspect of their meaning in common, i.e. roundedness.

Another instance of looping between the schemas (31) and (18) arises in the case when the root G_LY surfacing as GOLY-ó “bullet” is inserted between the G_L root in (18) and the G_R root in (31). This results in the following derivation:

\[
(32) \text{G}_L \rightarrow G_{LY} \rightarrow G_R
\]

The way we conceptualize linking and looping of lexical roots guided by principle (1) according to which “related concepts have a related sound structure”, and instantiated by the schemas in (5) and (5’), shows a remarkable parallel with structures familiar in the framework of cognitive linguistics as proposed, for example, by Lakoff (1987). The relational schemas that are obtained by the application of the derivations described above are primarily triggered by the conceptual structures and the meanings of the lexical roots. Hence the study of the Hungarian lexicon in the fashion advanced above should undoubtedly be assessed as a contribution to the study of the cognitive capacities of the human mind.

3. Efficiency of tagging (PoS) in agglutinative languages

The ideas on the Hungarian dictionary presented here have direct consequences related to diverse fields of interest. First of all, it has been clarified that agglutinative languages (Hungarian being a prominent example) do not fit into the PoS tagging system proposed by Brill (see the critical arguments in Megyesi 1999). The poor performance of tagging is to be derived from the pure syntactical nature of the method, which neglects the importance of the interrelated structures of the semantic dimension. Efforts in this direction have produced significant results (see, e.g. Bellegarda 2000) in order to implement a triggering/tagging system taking into account the semantic aspects too. As a natural outcome, the adaptation of those ideas, concepts and methods to the family of agglutinative languages will significantly extend and enhance the unificational efforts to arrive at a capable system of numerical speech recognition, automatic document processing and man-machine communication. All of these fields help in attaining a unified system of information flow across cultures and nations. Such an objective is becoming a central focus in the field of intercultural communication. In order to extend the pure empirical results presented in Megyesi (1999), the following tasks must be completed:

\[
(33)
\]

- explore and formalize the interrelation of the semantic and phonological structures of a given language,
- arrive at a reliable probabilistic model of the interrelation revealed in order to supply input for digitalized interpretation of textual information,
- produce the necessary numerical background and architecture to interact with the available well established numerical systems.
4. INTRODUCING HERITAGE

In order to proceed in these directions an experimental numerical system called HERITAGE (Hungarian Lexical Root Dynamics and Structure Analyzing Numerical System) has been developed along the following lines:

(34)
- completion of a dynamical representation and visualisation of the extent and possibly full range of related conceptual patterns,
- exploration and visualization of the ‘radial’ and ‘looping’ structures of the phonological representations of the identified semantic concepts,
- input for further statistical analyses of the derived interrelations,
- exploration of the possible extension in the direction of the visual and/or iconic interpretation of the semantic/conceptual categories,
- derivation of measurable, statistical results for further investigation and characterisation of the linguistic data.

It must be mentioned as an auxiliary remark that exploring the possibilities of the iconic representation of the semantic/conceptual categories significantly extends the horizon of the accessible fields of interests. It can contribute to the integration efforts in the direction of general studies of human cognition, such as the problem of metaphors and, in a wider sense, the study of the theory of blends and conceptual integration (see, e.g. Komlósi, in this volume).

5. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The findings can be summarized as follows:

(35)
- the numerical representation of the radial (locally linked) structure and the looping (global converging) characters of related word groups makes the analysis of semantic/conceptual structures possible far beyond the capabilities of the presently known and globally accepted methods confined to written, and or drawn representation exclusively,
- the numerical representation promises unparalleled efficiency in providing input data for the subsequent statistical and formalized studies of the identified conceptual structures,
- it helps (in some cases it even provides the unique opportunity) to recognize certain invariant structures of the system of interrelated semantic and/or conceptual entities.

In particular:

(36)
- the K-R root discussed above in (4) proves to be the most significant root, which is related to primary human experience of periodical, returning events. It is impor-
tant to note that words related to this root represent 31 per cent of the whole lexical corpus under investigation,
• roots with ‘R’ as the second consonant in them represent about 50 % of the corpus,
• the second, most important root (about 10 per cent of the corpus) is the S-R system discussed in (13), which is directly related to the K-R root,
• it is interesting to note that the K-R root represent mainly concepts defining facts (nouns), whereas the S-R derivatives are primarily related to activities (verbs),
• this latter observation directly leads us to the chronological and evolutionary aspects of these conceptual structures. However, reliable conclusions along these lines can only be drawn by relying upon a much larger corpus and by extending the study to other languages of the agglutinative family,
• the very last points are meant to indicate the main directions in which future analysis is proposed to be carried out.

The results of the activities in the numerical fashion described above can be summarized as follows.

(37)
• based on a preliminary lexical corpus of about 400 words, a numerical program has been produced implementing points (34/1-4) above,
• a small subset of possible statistical characterisation has been derived as far as point (34/5) is concerned.
Notes

19. The authors are indebted to László Komlósi for substantial comments on an earlier version of this paper.
20. Throughout the paper, the triadic elements of the root will be in capital and the suffixes attached to the root will be in lower-case letters.
21. We have translated the Hungarian words into English in order to give the reader an idea of the meanings of the suffixed words in Hungarian. In most of the cases, however, these meanings cannot easily and satisfactorily be rendered in English due to the subtle meanings that Hungarian suffixes add to the core meaning.
22. The spelling character GY is pronounced as dj, that is a palatalized d in Hungarian. Hence we have to do only with one sound.
23. Sörög-forog is a so-called reduplicated verb. Reduplication of verbs is a very active strategy of word-formation in Hungarian. We hypothesize that the reduplicated items obey the root-linking condition in (5).
24. Length of consonants in Hungarian is expressed by character doubling in the spelling. We will assume that double characters fill only one consonantal slot in the triadic root structure.
References


What Categories Reveal about the Mind. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.


Section III
Discourse Analysis and Argumentation Theory
In Quest of Cultural and Conceptual Universals for Situated Discursive Practice
László I. Komlósi (Pécs University (PTE), Hungary)

1. Forecast and foresight

In this paper I will attempt to give a comprehensive analysis of the complex relationship between linguistic behavior, social interaction and the reproduction of culture. By adopting the tenets of social constructivism and the discursive approach to culture, situated discursive practice is attributed a constitutive role in cultural production. Culture is defined through the observation of invariant patterns in language use, verbal behavior and narrative construction. A major distinction between “the cognitive linguistic system” (based on the conceptual organization of language) and “the cognitive cultural system” (based on narrative construction) is spelled out. The examples of cultural universals I will focus on in my analysis are as follows: (i) interactant identities secured by face keeping, with special emphasis on the “face triangle” in multilingual settings, (ii) cultural identities secured by cultural narratives to promote particular desirable cultural worlds enhanced in multicultural contexts, and (iii) the dichotomy of human inquiry (deductively formal vs. dialectically informal types) secured by the “prismatic complexity” of reasoning. The three examples of conceptual universals are (i) metaphorical and metonymical thinking, (ii) mental space blending, and (iii) fundamental organizing principles of concept-structuring systems (with the centrality of schematic structures and conceptual alterna-tivity). The nature of situated discursive practice is further analyzed with the help of the Pragma-Dialectic Framework of argumentative discourse and the Dialogic Action Game Theory of social interaction.

2. The backgrounds

This paper is addressing questions concerning the nature of verbal interaction in general, and of human discursive practice in particular. Linguistic behavior, social interaction and the making and maintaining of social reality by narrative cultural production have been studied by a great number of complementary disciplines, among others by linguistics, anthropology, sociolinguistics, developmental and social psychology, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, argumentation theory, cognitive linguistics, narrative psychology, literary scholarship, speech communication and media studies. It must be clear to any researcher that the undertaking to understand the relationship between language use, discursive behavior and human cultures involves a complex inquiry. For one thing, each discipline claims its own methodology, casting a claim on an independent pool of evidence and, not infrequently, on autonomy concerning the analysis of the issue under discussion.
At the same time, it should seem inevitable to all the disciplines evoked above to address the question of how we think and process linguistically relevant information and how formal our thinking is. We have witnessed in our disciplines long decades dominated by the “computer” metaphor for the working of the human mind. The idea of the computational mind with its computable outputs seems to have overwhelmed the respective paradigms in the study of the human mind for quite a long time. Mental representations at all levels of organization were posited as hard-wired entities to guarantee the grounding of meaning in the web of human concepts.

Today we are puzzled: we find no mental representations residing anywhere in the human brain. And still, we can and we do posit conceptual structures, cognitive schemes and mental spaces in good conscience only to explain the coherence of the human mind and the coordinated and meaningful social actions realized by rational and responsible human agents. For that matter, we seem to be more careful and probably more modest in our claims today than ever before about epistemic certainties underlying our reasoning and argumentative skills. We tend to take into consideration contextual properties affecting our ecological rationality to a greater extent than before in order to be able to maintain the notion of rational agents. We see argumentative discourse as rational behavior reflecting the interactive enterprise of constructing social meanings and performing meaningful acts. Meanings are seen as social constructs that can be negotiated in order to provide for rehearsable futures. Certainty is obtained through adaptive social skills of interactive behavior in which emotive processes go hand in hand with cognitive processes, thus providing for motivational gravity in meaningful acts.

I want to set the scene for my arguments by challenging the computational view and by reminding ourselves of the converging trends in the various approaches to the study of human verbal behavior and social interaction. In linguistics, the functionalist-cognitive paradigm has offered a real alternative to the structuralist-mentalistic tradition. The classical Message Model of communication has given way to the Inferential Model, together with the advent of Relevance Theory and Discourse Representation Theory. In the fields of reasoning and problem solving the deductive inferential means of inquiry have been complemented by dialectical and problematological means of reasoning. For argumentation theory a great shift can be observed from using the apparatus of formal logic to using the tools of informal logic in modeling human reasoning and argumentation. Scholars adhering to social constructivism have a strong belief in the interactive nature of meaning construction. Our reasoning and argumentative discursive activities are seen as social, adaptive behavior facilitated by speech accommodation skills only to help establish the conditions for felicitous communication.

In what follows, I want to reflect not only on the way we think (cf. Fauconnier and Turner, 2002), but also on the way we invariably act discursively in a wide range of social settings. Before inviting the reader to the odyssey, however, I will clarify what I mean by the terms “universals” and “culture” in the present context. In a technical sense, universals can be defined as invariant properties, structures or behavior patterns figuring as parts of either the grammatico-semantic structure of natural language or of human conduct.

The most salient examples for universals in linguistic structure are (i) some sound patterns characteristic of all human languages, (ii) the phenomenon of “embedding” in the syntax of all natural languages and (iii) universal human concepts (cf. Wierzbiczka 1992).
Linguistically relevant universals also figure as objects in structural and functional linguistics, in ethnopsychology and ethnosophistry. Some examples of such universal entities are “soul”, “mind”, “heart”, “fate”, “destiny”. Emotions such as “anger”, “fear”, “content”, “love” are also included as are moral concepts such as “humility”, “courage” or “recklessness”. Universal features appear in naming and in assigning kinship terms as well. In a somewhat less traditional sense, one can talk about universal features (invariant or re-occurring patterns) of linguistic behavior, social interaction and cultural production. All the three domains draw on universal features of concept structuring and conceptual integration, since concepts are conceived of as mental contents for mental states, which in turn are believed to cause human behavior. As opposed to computed linguistic structures as the end-result of cognitive processes, recent research in cognitive linguistics is focusing on general cognitive operations such as space building, cross-domain mapping, metaphorical and metonymical meaning extension, projection, schema induction, analogy making, recursion, conceptual categorization, mental modeling, intentional-state or mental-state attribution, framing, blending and conceptual integration (see Fauconnier 1985, 1997, Fauconnier and Turner 1998, 2002). It will be in this latter, non-traditional sense that I am going to analyze cultural and conceptual universals.

When we discuss language and culture, and subsequently linguistic behavior and cultural behavior, we must say something about the function of these behavior types. Behavior is closely related to rational, adaptive human action of cognizing agents. Social behavior is coordinated and purposeful action. The ultimate objective of rational agents is to obtain, process, synthesize, integrate and negotiate knowledge. How does cognizing take place?

I want to claim the trivial: with the help of language human beings are capable of (i) obtaining, processing and communicating information that is not experienced directly by the members of the speech community and (ii) of performing symbolic acts. Situated discursive practice rests, to a great extent, on knowledge management.

There are basically two opposing approaches to the relationship between language and cognition, formulated in terms of “grammar” and “experience”. Michael Halliday’s functional-cognitive theory is a language-based approach to cognition. He contends that the conception of knowledge as something that exists independently of language, and then gets coded or made manifest in language, is illusory. Halliday and Matthiessen (1999) emphasize that all knowledge is constituted in semiotic systems, with language as the most central. In their view all representations of knowledge are constructed from language. Language is seen by them as the foundation of human experience and (linguistic) meaning as the essential mode of higher-order human consciousness. They even go as far as claiming that there is no ordering of experience other than the ordering given to it by language. They define experience in linguistic terms: experience is the reality that we construe for ourselves by means of language. It is not difficult to recognize the Wittgensteinian “the limits of my language are the limits of my world” idea.

In the experientialist-cognitive approach language is treated as a code in which pre-existing conceptual structures are expressed. Our cognitive models, schemata, mental spaces, cognitive mappings and even our metaphors are seen as not primarily linguistic, but rather conceptual matters. It stresses the continuity and motivating character of the relationship between pre-linguistic and/or non-linguistic bodily experience and cognition. (cf. Sinha and Jensen de Lopez 2000 on the embodiment thesis of cognitive linguistics). In more
recent literature in cognitive linguistics, we can find an increasing interest in the grounding of language in social experience as reflected in social interaction and discourse. Langacker (2001) makes a strong claim that all linguistic units are abstracted from so-called usage events, i.e. actual instances of language use. Each such event consists of a comprehensive conceptualization paired with an elaborate vocalization. The conceptualization derived from a usage event includes the interlocutors’ apprehension of their interactive circumstances (the ground) and the current discourse space.

I will use the terms “culture” and “cultural” evoking two different meanings. One use of the term “culture” refers to social reality as social space of interacting agents performing symbolic acts of meaning. It is this social space that secures conditions and circumstances for coordinated and coherent social action. Any adaptation and accommodation to and compliance with a given “cultural setting” enhances and confirms the “rules” of maintaining and practicing the culture in question. Cultural sensitivity is acquired through language use and discursive social interaction. In my view, culture is not isolated from the language phenomenon. Culture is defined through the observation of invariant patterns in language use, discursive behavior and narrative construction.

The other use of the term “culture” is more restrictive. With the term “culture” I intend to refer to a particular way of paradigm of thinking and reasoning by acknowledging a space of argumentation and reasoning. A given space of argumentation and reasoning will determine and constitute the type of inquiry applied to a certain task in problem solving, where cognition and communication are taken to be manifestations of problem solving prima facie. In my analysis, the two major opposing “reasoning cultures” are (i) the deductive formal reasoning style in an axiomatic system (where premises are derived from axioms) and (ii) the argumentative informal reasoning style (where the premises are derived from endoxa, i.e. from items of social belief).

Before presenting the actual analysis, I need to give the reader a word of warning. I referred to the “computer metaphor” earlier. My concern and criticism was not directed at the pre-scientific character of the metaphor itself, but rather at the misconceived and misleading nature of the analogy suggested by it. Therefore, I will readily use the “space metaphor” in my further analysis, in the hope that I can give good reasons for suggesting the analogy emanating from the metaphor. In this respect, I will talk about “construction space” and “mental space” in the domains of linguistic and related conceptual structure, and about “argumentative space” and “disagreement space” in the realm of argumentation. Further, I will use the term “space of symbolic, meaning-producing acts” at the level of social interactions and the term “space of cultural narratives” at the level of social reality.

3. Linguistically relevant cognitive mechanisms and cognitive systems

I have been engaged in a particular linguistics project for almost a decade, a major objective of which is to seriously address the triviality of the following claim and to find independent cognitive linguistic evidence for its partial acceptance.

There is a reciprocal and intertwined relationship between language and culture in as much language reflects cultural phenomena and constitutes cognitive and affective coherence in the social reality
of culture (see the tenets of social constructivism and the discursive approach to culture), whereas cultural-societal phenomena secure the grounding of meaning in language and lend meaning-contents to linguistic expressions (see the tenets of linguistic relativity).

Subscribing to the plausibility of the above position, one is by no means bound to suggest isomorphism between linguistic structure and social structure, for example. However, in a weaker sense, evidence from linguistic construction, lexical semantics, conceptual structure and conceptual organization directs toward a solution according to which knowledge of the extra-linguistic world gets delicately integrated into detailed and fine-grained linguistic knowledge. As a result, it can be shown that understanding a simple sentence turns out to be a highly complicated mental event drawing on different knowledge sources.

What kinds of mental processes can account for the transition between the domain of the linguistic system and the domain of the extra-linguistic, cultural system when both of them are perceived genuinely in terms of verbal manifestations, i.e. verbal reports and narratives that are outputs of constant (and compulsive) verbalization of the mind?

I want to discuss briefly three recent proposals to this query.

3.1. Construction Grammar

Contemporary models of “form–meaning pairs” are called “construction grammars”. Construction grammarians assume responsibility for explaining all the constructions in a language, including those that seem peripheral. They also assume responsibility for explaining the network of relations in which these constructions stand. Let us consider some constructions to illustrate the point about the special status of these linguistics constructs.

Never will I leave you. Long may you prosper! Bless you! Am I tired! Do pigs fly? Be back in a minute. It satisfied my every wish. Not that I care. You idiot! Looks like a soup, eats like a meal. I live near work, but lazy me, of course I drive. It’s time you got married. He talked his way out of it. Why go to the store. I didn’t make it to Paris, let alone Berlin. The more you think about it, the less you understand it. (Examples taken from Cacciari et al. 1997)

For each of the examples above a form is paired with a skeletal meaning: the meaning of the expression is not provided exclusively by the meanings of the words, or even by a composition of other constructions. Rather, we know the form and we know that it prompts us to construct certain kinds of abstract meaning.

Constructions commonly include pragmatics as part of their meaning. Consider “And they say I don’t work hard”. This sentential construction carries a pragmatics: S is calling H’s attention to what S sees as absolute evidence (in way of a pragmatic persuasion), namely that the reported assertion is absurd.

The justifications for Construction Grammar are essentially identical to those for the original classical rhetorical program of analyzing figures. There is a considerable overlap between the classical study of figures and the modern study of constructions. The peripheral constructions such as e.g. “Him be a professor?” can well be compared to the Incredulity Construction known as one of Quintilian’s “artful figures”. However, Construction Grammar has a commitment to account for the totality of facts of the language.
3.2. Leonard Talmy’s Cognitive Semantics and Concept Structuring Systems

Talmy’s project of Cognitive Semantics is a monumental landmark in the history of the study of grammar and semantics, of linguistic structure and conceptual structure (see Talmy 2000). Talmy purports the view that semantics is intrinsically cognitive, grammars of natural languages reveal conceptual structures as expressions prompt for conceptual arrays. Thus, linguistics is the method for discovering the way we think.

Talmy takes the view that human language consists of two subsystems, the grammatical and the lexical. The lexical subsystem consists of the “open” classes of linguistic forms, while the grammatical subsystem consists of the “closed” classes that include grammatical categories, grammatical relations, word order patterns, grammatical complexes such as constructions, syntactic structures and complement structures. Linguistic expressions prompt listeners to construct cognitive representations. The grammatical subsystem is to provide cues for their structure, while the lexical subsystem for their content. Our language capacity depends on our ability to integrate disperse conceptual structures and conceptual contents to create unified cognitive representations. We should observe here that the emphasis in Talmy’s conceptual organization approach is on the processes of concept structuring rather than on a more classical view of semantic compositionality. The underlying idea of linguistic creativity shared by both Talmy’s mechanisms for concept structuring and the mechanisms for conceptual integration (see Coulson 2001, Oakley 1998 and Fauconnier and Turner 1998, 2002) is that our capacity for language also depends on our ability to use a relatively limited inventory of grammatical and lexical forms to prompt for virtually unlimited ranges of cognitive representations.

Talmy’s conceptual organization approach covers and integrates both the realm of linguistic structure production and the realm of cultural production. The cognitive linguistic system is responsible for the conceptual organization of language and the cognitive culture system for the narrative organization of culture. Talmy’s strong version of Cultural Cognitivism is based on the innateness hypothesis, according to which an innate faculty (i.e. an innately determined brain system) has evolved in humans whose principal function is acquiring, exercising and imparting culture. The system of cultural cognition processes culture as a highly differentiated, systematic and structured complex contents of which pertain both to conceptual-affective patterns and to behavior patterns.

3.3. Research project on collocational force, expression construction and language creativity

The ongoing research project at the University of Pécs, Hungary, on which I will report briefly, concerns the study of cognitive mechanisms at work for expression construction and the role of different types of linguistic expressions in the conceptual organization of narrative structures. The study of the mental lexicon reveals the striking fact that language production and language processing make use – simultaneously and at equal ease – of (i) expression construction along the lines of strict compositionality (transparent meanings), (ii) expression construction with the help of idiomaticity, metaphorization, metonymiza-
tion and different ways of cross-space mapping and conceptual blending (on-line constructed, integrated meanings), and (iii) expression construction on the basis of arranging pre-fabricated or semi-variable linguistic elements created by collocational force, such as figures or topoi of everyday use (conventionalized, entrenched meanings). The latter two types of expression construction do not operate with a few simple forms of algorithmic processing applied broadly and iteratively. Instead, they show a great deal of plasticity, flexibility and dynamism in conceptual organization. Such cognitive operations yield products that frequently become entrenched in conceptual structure and grammar (“constructions”) or they perform new work on previously entrenched products (“meaning integration”).

Our research shows that compositional structures on the one hand and blended structures on the other will contribute differently to the hierarchically-ordered levels of linguistic organization. Expressions with strict compositional structure will be produced in “construction spaces” where linguistic coherence is achieved by the coordination and fitting of grammatical categories. Conventional and/or institutional linguistic expressions used as utterances in context, such as illocutionary and perlocutionary acts, will be produced in the “space of symbolic, meaning-producing acts” at the level of social interactions. Subsets of such utterances are the ones that are used for the purposes of argumentative discourse. These speech products will be produced in highly contextualized “argumentative spaces” and will be blended with “disagreement spaces” in the realm of argumentative discourse. The “space of symbolic, meaning-producing acts” will contribute to the achievement of text- and discourse coherence. Linguistic expressions that are produced with on-line dynamism are to be found in “mental spaces” undergoing a wide variety of cognitive operations to obtain full meanings in situated contexts (cf. Fauconnier 1997). Products of social and cultural discourse will be produced in “spaces of cultural narratives” at the level of social reality. The latter two are in turn responsible for the achievement of narrative coherence among cultural agents.

Table 1 and Table 2 summarize the research findings concerning the construction of compositional and blended expressions.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Structure</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
<th>Processing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>compositional</td>
<td>computable, transparent</td>
<td>“algorithmic processing”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>idiom, metaphor,</td>
<td>on-line constructed, integrated</td>
<td>on-line dynamism in conceptual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metonymic,</td>
<td></td>
<td>organization with plasticity and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>blended,</td>
<td></td>
<td>flexibility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conceptually</td>
<td></td>
<td>“open processing”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>integrated</td>
<td></td>
<td>tendency for entrenchment in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pre-fabricated,</td>
<td>conventionalized, entrenched</td>
<td>conceptual organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>semi-variable,</td>
<td></td>
<td>“default processing”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>semi-productive</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Cognitive mechanisms for expression construction
The proposed systematization reflecting a specific hierarchy may be arbitrary and the cognitive processes may be much more complex and subtle than presented here. However, the systematization is supposed to capture linguistically relevant cognitive mechanisms that are responsible for cognitive coherence on all levels of human thinking, verbal interaction and behavior.

4. Cultural universals

4.1. Interactant identities secured by face work (face keeping): the “face triangle” in non-traditional multilingual settings

We can take Goffman’s notions of “face” and “face work” as the basis to create an ideal framework for the analysis of interactant identities relative to speech and cultural communities. However, a distinction has to be made, as also suggested by growing research literature, between “traditional monolingual and bilingual settings” on the one hand and “non-traditional multilingual settings” on the other. In these two settings there is a crucial difference both (i) in the character of “ownership” to the language chosen by the interactants and (ii) in the “relative status” of the language of communication. On the basis of O’Driscol (2001) I will call the first type of linguistic setting a “primary plurilingual setting” (i.e. historically existing, long-established plurilingual, multicultural communities) and the second type a “secondary plurilingual setting” (i.e. work-based international, plurilingual, intercultural communities, such as the Brussels, Brugge, Lake Geneva, UN or UNESCO communities).

I would like to call attention to the way I use the terms “intercultural” and “multicultural”. Intercultural communication refers to a secondary plurilingual setting where the members of the community have non-traditional, self-chosen multilingual communicative habits. Multicultural communication denotes a primary plurilingual setting where the members of the community acquire and develop multilingual communicative habits under natural social-environmental circumstances. The possible and actual uses of L1 and L2 are sorted out along the lines of the three “face primitives”: the ethnolinguistic face, the cosmopolitan face and the polite face, which in turn, contribute to the “face triangle” in secondary plurilingual settings.
“Primary plurilingual settings” and “secondary plurilingual settings” differ from each other in the following aspects:

a. the relative permanence of participants and norms  
b. the extent of overlap in language repertoires  
c. the ingroup-outgroup distinction  

Premise: Interactants’ language choice is a means to signal group membership and identity which at the same time predicates a particular configuration of personal faces for them.

In “doing” intercultural communication, interactant identities are not ascribed or established beforehand, but are created by negotiation as emergent identities. It is important to emphasize that in the second setting we observe temporary kinds of identities that are radically contingent on aspects of situation. The actions by which this kind of temporary identity is created and modified can neatly be captured by the notion of “hybrid face work” proposed in O’Driscoll (2001).

“Face-primitives”

1. Ethnolinguistic face involves ethnolinguistic group membership. Interactants have a safe L1 option and acknowledge ascribed identity, which yields an effect of reassurance to them.
2. Cosmopolitan face involves acquired membership and identity acted out on international high seas. It is practiced by high achievers with high ideals. Interactants have an ambitious L2 option, which lends an effect of impressiveness to them.
3. Polite face is acquired and practiced by our using other interactants’ L1, thus predicating polite face for ourselves. In doing so, we seek other’s social approval and friendliness.

4.2. Cultural identities secured by cultural narratives to promote particular desirable cultural worlds enhanced in multicultural contexts

I would like to bring up briefly an interesting example of the growing interest in how “text and talk”, especially directed narratives with cultural identity content can reproduce and transform cultures. Shi-xu and Manfred Kienpointner (2001) provide a remarkable analysis of the interconnections between argumentative discourse and cultural production. They analyze journalistic communication on Hong Kong’s recent historic transition and show how well-tailored argumentative strategies affect and influence the desired courses of future developments in line of Western interests. They are able to show that cultural realities - that are constantly appropriated and negotiated through the media of situated discursive practice - are formed, sustained and contested through discourse. They point out in their case study how the Western media make use of argumentative and rhetorical devices in culture production by enforcing a cultural discourse that attributes Hong Kong’s economic success to its intercultural discursive contestability, in other words, to its argumentative variability.
4.3. The dichotomy of styles of human inquiry (deductively inferential vs. dialectical reasoning) secured by the “prismatic complexity” of reasoning

So far I have looked at phenomena in which systematic analysis can point at the cultural and conceptual components of social interaction. Social interaction is rational, adaptive and context-sensitive. Our social behavior is – to a great extent – symbolic verbal behavior. It is in the context of social interaction that we come to appreciate the discursive skills constitutive of language use. Our reasoning and argumentative practices are reliable and coherent. Where does this coherence come from?

We must possess epistemic certainties as premises for our reasoning and argumentation. But how certain can we be of these premises? We can check them with other fellow human beings. After all it is a social game to confront our views with others. We challenge other people’s views, we try to persuade them of our truths, and sometimes we yield to their views and arguments. This is basically the scene for the social construction of meaning. We negotiate, confirm, reject and accept views so that we should feel comfortable holding certain views. We do not like epistemic or cognitive dissonance, just as we dislike emotional dissonance. However, sometimes we just have to live with different types of dissonance. For example, we all know the concept of “delayed satisfaction” by experience. The key to understanding the motivations for cherishing “delayed satisfaction” is to see that we invest in tolerating discomfort and dissonance of some sort in the hope of soon achieving harmony at a higher level.

This takes me back to my original question above: How formal is our thinking? What are the principles that help us select relevant information for constructing meaning? Is our reasoning and argumentation determined by a consistent set of internal norms and axioms? Or else, is our thinking likely to be influenced by context-specific factors, situations, competing alternative solutions, tensions, undecidenedness, therefore by varying degrees of acceptability? The answer has to be sought in our reasoning culture.

I will call to mind the answer to this dilemma given by Nicholas Rescher. His answer is often addressed to people in the methodology and the philosophy of science, however, in my mind the study of argumentation has benefited from it more than anything else.

In several of his works (see e.g. Rescher 1987, 1998) Nicholas Rescher claims that – depending on the task and the situation – we entertain different attitudes towards acceptability and consistency. For some inquiries we need to possess certainties, for others it is perfectly agreeable to have provisional credibility. Rescher argues that in natural sciences we reason in a deductively valid way from assured premises: we apply linearly inferential reasoning. In many walks of the social sciences and the humanities, however, we often apply dialectically cyclic reasoning: we repeatedly reconsider old issues from newly attained points of view. In dialectical reasoning we make assertions that are negated or corrected by subsequent counter assertions.

Rescher acknowledges that the human sciences are bound to tackle the prismatic complexity of human thought that is inherently complex and many-sided, that is a matter of inner tension of competing pushes and pulls in varying directions.
5. Conceptual universals

5.1. Metaphors, metaphorical/metonymical thinking and metaphorical extension

Traditionally, the study of metaphor as a type of figurative speech and its use has fallen into the realm of rhetoric and literary studies. There is a long-standing tradition to think of metaphors as linguistic constructions reflecting the way we express certain ideas by evoking some degree of similarity between the source and the target domains realized with the effect of a simile or an analogy. Thus, a persistent dichotomy has established itself about the distinctiveness of “proper, literal meanings” and “figurative, non-literal meanings” in the mental lexica associated with natural languages. In the traditional view, literal language is seen as a norm or standard of language and as an ideal for rational argument, whereas poetry and metaphor are taken to be radically different from everyday language, mostly because the latter are felt to express an emotive meaning, rather than a cognitive meaning. Thus, metaphors are claimed to be qualitatively different from literal language. Although in the twentieth century the philosophical, linguistic and literary disciplines began to invest renewed interest in the phenomenon of metaphor, the grammatical, semantic, pragmatic and conceptual aspects of metaphor interpretation still received distinct treatments.

Traditional approaches from the classical period through the twentieth century basically fall under the general rubric of objectivism and rely on the assumption that metaphor is a linguistic device used in order to enhance poetic language. The dichotomy of literal vs. non-literal meanings is based on the conviction that words should be postulated single, well-defined meanings in order to have compositional and normatively transparent meanings for natural languages.

The cognitive turn, and especially the advent of Cognitive Linguistics (CL), challenged the traditional views concerning linguistic meaning, and instead of objectivism it advocated experientialism. CL has produced remarkable achievements to overcome some of the problems and controversial issues inherent in the traditional treatment of the metaphorical phenomenon. It launched a whole agenda for the experientialist treatment of metaphor and shifted the focus of investigation from the way we express ideas with metaphors to the way we think with the help of metaphors and metonyms and the way we innovatively produce and process novel and highly integrated conceptual structures. The cognitive theory of metaphor assigns metaphor a central role in language and thought. Within this framework it is also postulated that metaphor does in fact account for a large portion of what we both know and think, not to mention what we feel and do in our daily lives. Thus, experientialism as opposed to objectivism, places a special emphasis on understanding structuring principles for mental constructs, and sees metaphor as a kind of idealized cognitive model (ICM) using image-schemas. According to the cognitive theory of metaphor, metaphor is a cognitive rather than a linguistic phenomenon, which is primarily a reflection of the way we conceptualize the world. Both conceptual metaphors and linguistic metaphors are merely reflections of more general cognitive processes. Metaphorical and other figurative thinking, therefore, can only be understood in more general cognitive frameworks.

The flexible but principled way of conceptualizing the world gives ample room for integrating both cognitive and emotive experiences in our mental constructs. Achievements
of CL counteract the unwelcome tendency to view emotions as elusive and chaotic entities which display no coherent structure. By observing the mechanisms of cognitive and emotive integration in conceptual organization, the cognitive framework successfully incorporates and correctly gives account of the phenomenon of experiential grounding in a sound theory of metaphor.

Within the realm of linguistic studies, the status of metaphor is still controversial. A major objective of grammatical description is to take stock of grammatical constructions and possible interpretations they prompt by virtue of their constructional and collocational force. Among the constructions a rich set is such that its elements can be interpreted figuratively, often metaphorically. According to semantics, metaphorical expressions are utterances in which one or more expressions temporarily undergo a change in meaning. Change-in-meaning regularities can be observed on the basis of assuming the existence of semantic rules.

According to pragmatics, metaphorical expressions are utterances in which the utterances are overtly saying something, but they mean something else by virtue of observing and following pragmatic principles of interpretation.

Ever since the beginnings of the cognitively oriented renewed interest in metaphors (cf. Lakoff and Johnson 1980, Paprott and Dirven 1985, Lakoff and Turner 1989, Leezenberg 1995, Cacciari, Gibbs, Katz and Turner 1997, Gibbs and Steen 1997, Kövecses 1990, 200, 2002, etc.) metaphorical expressions have been identified as linguistic constructions to be interpreted figuratively, exploiting the property of the constructions to prompt specific processes of meaning construction and conceptual integration. Such cognitive operations hinge on the interaction between image-schemas, on the projection, cross-mapping and integration of mental spaces and on the convergence of image-schemas with metaphor and metonymy.

The classification of metaphors is highly varied, there is no consensus among the scholars in this matter. Arguments have been advanced for the distinction situational or contextual metaphors versus schematized metaphors. According to a different principle we can talk about conventional metaphors versus novel, creative metaphors. We have also witnessed extensive research devoted to classifications distinguishing (i) structural or conceptual metaphors (in which one concept is metaphorically structured in terms of another, e.g. ARGUMENT IS WAR as in “She demolished my argument”), (ii) orientational metaphors (in which a metaphorical concept organizes a whole system of concepts with respect to one another, e.g. HAPPY IS UP as in “I’m feeling up”, SAD IS DOWN as in “I’m feeling down”), (iii) ontological metaphors (in which our experiences with physical objects and substances, our own bodies included, allow us to select parts of our experiences of events, activities, emotions, ideas, individuals, organization, etc. and view them and treat them as discrete entities and substances, e.g. THE MIND IS A MACHINE as in “I can’t think any more, “I’m running out of steam”, or LOVE IS A CONTAINER as in “He’s in love and fell into a depression” or LIFE IS A HUMAN (personification) as in “Life has cheated me”, or PARTS STAND FOR WHOLES (metonymy) as in “The ham sandwich is waiting for his check” and “Wall Street is in panic”.

Despite the difficulties in classification attempts, most of the researchers agree that metaphorical expressions structure the ordinary conceptual system of culture, which in turn is reflected in our everyday language. Metaphorical expressions also help us make sense of our
own experience: they have crucial experiential grounding, they provide cultural coherence and they are systematic in shaping the conceptual system by selectively highlighting some things and hiding others. As Lakoff and Johnson (1980:5) put it: the essence of metaphor is understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another. Metaphorical expressions, however, can extend beyond the ordinary literal uses of expressions into the realm of figurative, poetic uses of language. Thus, saying that a concept and the conceptual system is structured by metaphors, should count as meaning that due to the fact that metaphors are partially structured they can be extended in some ways but not in others.

As opposed to strict conceptualism (as advocated in Lakoff and Johnson 1980 or Lakoff 1987), Leezenberg (1995) and Gibbs (1997) argue for a more balanced treatment of semantic and pragmatic factors contributing to metaphor interpretation. They claim that understanding both metaphorical and literal language requires not only conceptual knowledge, but also a common ground of information shared between speaker and hearer. In general, interpretation depends on contextual factors such as the mutually shared ground established by preceding discourse licensing different kinds of inferences, such as entailments, presuppositions and implicatures. If we accept the view that a major part of linguistic meaning is sensitive to contextualization and situatedness, and is, therefore, to be treated as a flexible, negotiable, on-line constructible cognitive entity, we are bound to accept the claim that metaphorical interpretation involves a change of meaning of the constituting linguistic elements. (This view is elegantly defended in Leezenberg 1995, see also Koml i 1997.) It should be acknowledged that in Cognitive Linguistics metaphorical interpretation is treated as equally dependent on semantic and pragmatic notions. As a consequence, it is to be observed that the uses of literal and figurative language do not involve any qualitatively different processes of interpretation.

5.2. Conceptual Integration Networks: cross-mapings and mental space blending

Linguistic creativity is manifest in the mechanisms of conceptual integration (see Coulson 2001, Oakley 1998 and Fauconnier and Turner 1998, 2002): novel and emergent meaning constructs are constantly brought about in everyday speech production. As I claimed above, it is difficult to maintain the view any longer that literal and figurative language uses show an underlying quantitative difference. On the contrary: the way we think is pervasive and ubiquitous in literal, non-literal, figurative, poetic, argumentative uses of language alike.

Fauconnier and Turner argue (see Fauconnier and Turner 2002) that the same cognitive operation – conceptual blending – plays a decisive role in human thought and action. They claim that conceptual blending underlies and makes possible the totality of diverse human accomplishments, be it language, art, religion or science. Human beings use conceptual integration to create rich and diverse conceptual worlds. Conceptual integration makes use of partial cross-space mappings, selective projection to the blend and development of emergent structure in the blend. The lack of space prevents me from going into details concerning the mechanisms of mental space construction and blending and conceptual integration. Let it suffice for the objective of our quest for conceptual universals that the notion of conceptual integration is supposed to cover in general terms the features underlying the organizational principles for human thought and action.
It is instrumental to examine the relationship, especially the similarities and differences between metaphor and conceptual blending. Fauconnier and Turner (1998) introduce a unification of the analysis of metaphor with the analysis of a wider set of other linguistic and conceptual phenomena. They justify the joint treatment of these phenomena by observing that (i) metaphor is better treated as a conceptual rather than a linguistic phenomenon, and (ii) all these phenomena should be seen as involving systematic projection of language, imagery and inferential structure between conceptual domains. It is also to be noted here that there has been an important shift in the development of the conceptual integration theory as compared to earlier conceptual metaphor analysis. While the analysis of conceptual metaphors involves mappings between two conceptual structures (the source and the target domains), conceptual blending involves four or more mental spaces. These are referred to as the four-space or the multi-space models. These spaces generally include two input spaces, a generic space (containing conceptual structure that is shared by both input spaces alike) and a blended space (in which materials from the input spaces interact and combine). Further, in Grady, Oakly and Coulson (1999) we find a thorough analysis of the relationship of conceptual metaphor and conceptual blending. They point it out that metaphors are actually inputs to blending processes. Conceptual blending theory is concerned with well-established (sometimes entrenched) metaphorical associations between concepts while blending theory underlines the ability to combine elements from familiar conceptualizations into new and meaningful ones, thus arriving at emergent meanings. Metaphors can bee seen as stable structures for further blending processes that allow for flexibility in terms of meaning innovation. In this wider perspective on conceptual integration, domains of metaphors and spaces of blending interact in an active way: conventional metaphors feed the blending process by establishing links between meaning elements in relatively distinct domains and spaces.

5.3. Fundamental organizing principles of concept-structuring systems

I am convinced that seeing the different types of mental processes discussed in recent cognitive literature as unifying thinking processes or converging thinking mechanisms is well-founded and legitimate. The careful analyses of metaphorical and metonymical meaning extension, cross-mapping and blending of mental spaces in particular contexts and conceptual integration in general contexts are all about the ways we structure and organize our concepts. In 3.2. above I looked at the task Leonard Talmy set to himself, finding that a conceptual schematic structure is the very instrument of creating a unified cognitive representation by integrating conceptual structures (manifest in grammatical form) and conceptual content (manifest in the lexicon). The classical notion of semantic compositionality is static, which cannot account for conceptual alternativity and the variability of meaning solely on the basis of the relatively limited existing inventory of grammatical and lexical forms. The process of concept structuring must be conceived of as dynamic, allowing for expressions in natural language to prompt for conceptual alternatives and an array of novel conceptual constructs.
6. Situated discursive practice

6.1. The Pragma-Dialectic Framework of argumentative discourse

The Dutch school of argumentation, often referred to as the Amsterdam School of Pragma-Dialectics, places emphasis on the dialogic aspect of argumentation. Pragma-dialectics has a marked normative orientation as the arguers' obligation comes from the conception of argument as a cooperative effort to resolve differences of belief and opinion (cf. van Eemeren and Grootendorst 1987, 1992, van Eemeren, Grootendorst, Jackson and Jacobs 1993).

Recent developments in pragma-dialectics witness an interesting shift in orientation to pay more attention to the relationship of rhetoric and argumentation. A major rhetorical concern is the accommodation of audience in the process of argumentative discourse (cf. van Eemeren and Houtlosser 2000, Leff 2000). The interesting outcome is that there are serious attempts at seeing the normative art of dialectic and the empirical art of rhetoric in a unified system of argumentation.

6.2. The Dialogic Action Game Theory of social interaction

An increasing interaction and reciprocal influence between dialectic and rhetoric may modify our ways of thinking about rational argumentation, while certainly maintaining the crucial elements of the dialogic aspect of argumentation for the rational agents mastering their reasoning and argumentative skills. I have argued above that, under such developments, we do tend to take into consideration contextual properties affecting our argumentative spaces more than before. I have claimed above that we should see argumentative discourse as rational behavior reflecting the interactive enterprise of constructing social meanings and performing meaningful acts.

Finally, I would like to enhance my arguments by recalling a proposal in Weigand (2000) concerning a unified approach to text production, discourse, argumentation and social interaction under the name Dialogic Action Game Theory. Weigand sets out to find acceptable criteria for the final reference point for coherence: he proposes to look at text coherence only to prove that the notion of coherence at the level of text and discourse is vacuous. Any attempt for a final definition at that level is in vain. He claims that the move to the level of social interaction is inevitable and remains the only sensible solution. What we seek an answer for is the following question: "What makes a sequence of utterances a joint activity?" The move he proposes to take is the one from a closed conventional pattern of text and discourse production to open dynamic system of probabilistic actions. However, he warns against an artificial separation of texts and actions. The functioning unit according to his theory is Action Game that represents a cultural unit in which a specific type of social interaction takes place. Principles of dialogue certainly draw on rules and conventions, but they are just as well based on presumptions and suggestions. This approach is certainly much more sensitive to cultural aspects of verbal interaction than many traditional analyses of discourse. Action Game being a cultural unit of a specific social interaction type, the Theory of Action Game has good chances to account for the problem of differences in both socialization and world view and idiosyncratic social interactive behavior of interlocutors.
7. Conclusion

In the present paper I have turned my attention to the power of discourse in social interaction and in culture production. I have considered the realm of culture on a par with language in as much we assume that a cognitive linguistic system and a cognitive culture system together contribute to the construction of social reality. I have looked at the processes of concept organization which integrate both linguistic knowledge and extra-linguistic experience. We can observe cultural and conceptual universals playing a role in the cognitive organization of the mind. The cognitive integration of linguistic, conceptual and cultural phenomena is assumed to be reflected in the practice of argumentative discourse: the normative art of dialogical argument and the empirical art of rhetoric contribute to the coherence of social reality to be achieved by our ability for situated discursive practice.
References


STRATEGIC MANOEUVRING: WILLIAM THE SILENT’S APOLOGIE
A CASE IN POINT
Frans H. van Eemeren & Peter Houtlosser (University of Amsterdam)

1. The Apologie situated in its historical context

Inspired by Toulmin’s views on the ‘formal turn’ in post-Renaissance appreciation of reasonableness, we react in this paper against the strict separation between dialectical and rhetorical approaches to argumentation. For a sound analysis of argumentative discourse we believe that these two approaches must be systematically combined. We shall illustrate our integrated method of analysis by a partial reconstruction of William of Orange’s famous Apologie (1581), which justifies his actions as leader of the Dutch Revolt against King Philip II, the Spanish ruler of the Low Countries. Let us begin by offering some historical background information.

The years between 1555 and 1648 were decisive for the existence of the Netherlands as an independent state. In 1555, King Philip II inherited from his father, the Emperor Charles V, a political system in the Netherlands that can be characterized as a dominium politicum et regale. On the one hand, the sovereign governed according to laws and rules of his own design; on the other hand, he needed the people’s consent to maintain these laws and rules. Several of Philip’s political actions, however, were dismissive of the existing charters and privileges. Particularly his negligence of the political position of the Dutch nobility and his severe repression of the upcoming Reformation met with resistance, which developed step by step into a real revolt. The justification for this revolt became a fundamental source for the evolution of modern thinking about political power, the right of opposition, and national sovereignty. In Political thought of the Dutch Revolt, Van Gelderen points out that, although inspired by the same intellectual movements, the political ideology of the Dutch Revolt eventually made a significant further step beyond the doctrine of the French Monarchomachs, since it includes justifying the removal of the King and the foundation of a republic.

The leader of the Dutch Revolt was William of Orange, better known as William the Silent—because of his diplomatic gift of keeping his real purposes hidden. Born in 1533 as the eldest son of the ruler of the German principality of Nassau, William of Orange achieved prosperity and a prominent position at the court of Charles V by unexpectedly inheriting from his cousin René of Châlons the title ‘Prince of Orange’ and all its accompanying wealth. This led to William becoming one of the most powerful men in the Netherlands.

After first collaborating with Philip for some years, William started to act against the Spaniards’ policy of eradicating every form of heresy. Never a great admirer of religious dogmas, the traditional but tolerant Prince publicly defended freedom of belief and consciousness. At the end of the Sixties, the King accused him of undermining his power in the Netherlands. William fled to his principality in Germany, where he wrote the Justificatie ofte
Verantwoordinghe (1568), a justification of his behaviour. This was his first substantial contribution to the ‘war of pamphlets’, which, according to the American historian Harline, raged between 1555 and 1590.

Soon afterwards, William returned to the Netherlands, where he began to lead the Revolt. However diffuse the situation may have been, by the end of the Seventies the Revolt had spread from Holland and Zealand over the whole territory of the Netherlands. The King’s official representation, the State Council, tended to collaborate with the revolutionaries. In fact, even the King counteracted his own politically and militarily successful governor of the Netherlands, the Duke of Parma, by giving priority to capturing Portugal. The King came to the conclusion that the revolt could not be suppressed and initiated peace negotiations. But these negotiations failed and Philip saw no other solution than to have William the Silent killed. In 1580 a royal Proclamation and Edict was published which officially outlawed the Prince of Orange.

Apart from grossly misrepresenting the course of the revolt and William’s role in it, in this Ban Edict the worst imaginable vices were attributed to the Prince, accusing him of being ‘the public plague of Christendom’ and ‘the enemy of mankind’. A large sum of money and a peerage were promised to the person who would kill the Prince. William the Silent’s Apologie, written at the end of 1580 by his court chaplain Pierre Loisyseur de Villiers in close co-operation with the Prince and some others, was his response: the Apologie is a defence against virtually all accusations in the Ban and a strident justification of William’s behaviour. The Apologie was presented to the States-General. In 1581 it was published in five languages and sent to the ‘Kings and potentates of Christendome’. With one new edition being published after the other, the Apologie became a real 16th century bestseller.

According to Voltaire, ‘la réponse de Guillaume est un des plus beaux monuments de l’histoire’. The early nineteenth century leading protestant historian and politician Groen van Prinsterer observes that ‘il est certain que l’Apologie est écrite sans détours et sans euphémismes. […] L’exemple étoit donné par les antagonistes’ (Archives, p. 452-453). Villiers’ biographer, Boer, opines that the Ban ‘has received a masterly reply in the Apologie’ (1952: 118). In the introduction to a modern edition of the Plakkaat van Verlatinge, the political follow-up to the Apologie, it is called ‘a skilful defence of [William’s] own way of acting as well as an unprecedented fierce attack on the politics and the person of the Spanish king’ (Mout 1979: 12). According to another introduction to the Plakkaat, however, the Apologie is not of great significance: the real response to the Ban is the Plakkaat van Verlatinge, in which the States-General abandon King Philip II. Van Gelderen calls the Apologie ‘in the first place a moving personal defence by Orange, who felt deeply humiliated not only as a politician but also as a nobleman’ (1991: 68). ‘Orange’, he says judicially, ‘attacks the King by just as personal accusations and twisted reasonings’ (1991: 66-67). William of Orange’s biographer Swart considers the Apologie as a plea for his own cause ‘much less of a success’ than the justification published in 1568. He adds, however, that ‘presumably the author believed that he was telling nothing but the real truth’ (1994: 190).

We are interested in the Apologie from an argumentative perspective. What is our considered judgement of the argumentative discourse involved?
2. A pragma–dialectical method of analysis

When analyzing the Apologie, we view the text as an attempt to convince its readership and we try to reconstruct it in such a way that its argumentative potential can be optimally evaluated. In various publications we have explained that such a dialectical reconstruction amounts to analyzing the discourse methodically from the perspective of the projected ideal of a critical discussion and results in an analytic overview of all the moves that are relevant to the process of resolving a difference of opinion (van Eemeren & Grootendorst 1984, 1992, 2003).

Currently we are engaged in a project aimed at enriching our method of analysis with rhetorical insight into the strategic manoeuvring that takes place in argumentative discourse. How exactly are the opportunities offered by the dialectical situation in a discourse exploited by the speaker or writer? Each stage in the critical discussion constituting the resolution process has its own dialectical aim. In the confrontation stage the difference of opinion is defined; in the opening stage the positions of the parties and other starting points are established; in the argumentation stage the arguments and critical reactions are exchanged; and in the concluding stage the results of the discussion are determined. What kinds of advantage can be rhetorically achieved depends on the stage the discourse has reached.

The need to balance a resolution-oriented dialectical objective with the rhetorical objective of having one’s position accepted will be occasion for strategic manoeuvring. Strategic manoeuvring may take place by selectively choosing one’s move from the options available at a particular discussion stage, by adapting to audience demands, and by exploiting presentational devices. The options available for selection at a particular stage in the resolution process we view as the topical potential associated with that particular dialectical stage. Selecting certain issues gives them ‘presence’ in the discourse; suppressing certain issues denies their importance and pertinence. By adapting to audience demands, the moves that are made in each stage aim to comply with the audience’s good sense and preferences. The audience may be heterogeneous, so that certain moves can be effective in creating communion with one group, but not with another. By exploiting presentational devices, rhetorical figures are used to make the various moves effectively present to the mind. For instance, this may be achieved by means of præteritio—that is, drawing attention to something by saying that you will refrain from dealing with it—or by the use of a rhetorical question.

Although the three aspects of strategic maneuvering, which run parallel with important classical areas of interest – topics, audience-orientation, and stylistics –, can be distinguished analytically, in actual practice they will usually work together. We shall say that a fully-fledged ‘argumentative strategy’ is being followed only if the speaker’s or writer’s strategic manoeuvrings in the discourse converge with respect to choosing from the topical potential, adapting to the audience demand, and the exploitation of presentational devices. Argumentative strategies in our sense are methodical designs of moves for influencing the result of a particular dialectical stage, or the discussion as a whole, to one’s own advantage, which manifest themselves in a systematic, coordinated and simultaneous exploitation of the opportunities afforded by that stage.
3. Strategic manoeuvring in the opening stage of the Apologie

William’s Apologie provides an excellent example of strategic manoeuvring to reconcile rhetorical aims with dialectical obligations. On the one hand, William has to make a serious effort to deal with the accusations leveled against him in the Ban Edict, convincing the European rulers and nobles that he is not out for personal gain but is acting as a responsible and sincere political leader who supports a fully justified revolt. On the other hand, he may—at the same time—be expected to do everything he can to further the case of the revolt and to make an equally serious effort to turn the accusations of the King to his own advantage.

In an earlier paper (van Eemeren & Houtlosser 1998), we have shown that strategic manoeuvring is immanent in all the dialectical stages of the implicit discussion conducted in the Apologie. In this paper we shall concentrate specifically on William’s strategic manoeuvring in the opening stage. At this particular stage, one of the main dialectical aims is to establish the proper discussion roles for each of the parties: who is going to defend which standpoint, and which concessions made by the other party can be taken as the starting point? Viewed rhetorically, in this stage the parties position themselves in the way they think most advantageous, both with regard to their own concessions—making sure that the burden of proof they assume is manageable—and with regard to their credibility as a discussion partner—presenting themselves as a serious and authoritative party. The latter aspect of William’s manoeuvring in the opening stage of the Apologie will be highlighted in this paper: how exactly does William proceed to shape an advantageous position for himself compared with his main opponent in the discussion, the King of Spain?

First of all, the Apologie appears to contain a great many efforts at establishing the Prince’s ethos. Prominent among them—and, of course, highly common in this kind of text—are claims of modesty. As convention prescribes, they are expressed at the beginning of the pamphlet: ‘Knowing the ordinarie trade and course of my life, who love not more to blame an other man, than to praise my selfe, yet if it is so fall out that I do, either the one or the other, as it is very harde thing not to do so (albeit that it shal be with the greatest modestie that I can) and if there be any thing that may seeme not very seemely, it shal be long to you (my Lordes) to attribute the same, rather to the necessitie so to do (which mine enemies have layde upon me) than to my nature’ (p. 16). In line with this topos of modesty, William emphasizes that he leaves judgement of his case to the States-General: ‘leaving you to iudge (my Lordes) whether it be possible to purge my selfe from such slaunders, without ripping up in some matters, the ordinarie course of my life, & without exceeding my custome, in speaking of my selfe and other men’ (p. 17).

While stressing his loyalty and sincerity, however, the Prince also forshadows a certain judgement resulting from the States-General’s deliberations: ‘I am so assured of the iustice of my cause, and of my foundnes and faithfulnes towards you, and on the other side, of your equitie and roundnes, and of the knowledge that you have, howe & after what sorte all things have passed, that I demaunde no other thing of you, but onely that you would iudge, and take notice of this matter’ (p. 17). By claiming that the facts speak for themselves, William implies that mere knowledge of the way in which things have in fact proceeded demands a favourable judgement of his case. This factual basis for his case is then supplemented with an equally ‘objective’ judicial basis. William writes: ‘I suppose that it is neces-
sary, yea in deed most iust, that I aunswere to such slaunders, to the ende that some being mooved or perswaded by such words, may not yet receive this my defence, with a hearte more estraunged from me, than the lawe allowed amongst people, and iustice it selfe requireth’ (p. 18-19). And: ‘If [...] seeing that against all right and equitie, yea against his own othe, he [the King] hath by force constrained me, to attempt so necessarie a warre, [...] who is he (the premises being rightly considered) that can accuse me of any other fault, then this, that I framed my selfe to much to the time, before that I would take armes, and that I would not enioye that, whiche the lawe of warre, and of al nations yeeded unto me, unto me I say, who am borne a free Lorde, and who have this Honour to carie the name and title, of an absolute Prince, be not of anie great length or largenes?’ (p. 73).

Apart from establishing his own ethos and his role as the protagonist of a case which is based on facts and justice, William attempts to create an advantageous position for himself in the debate by discrediting his immediate opponent, Philip II. He attacks the King severely, not merely for his political and military actions during the revolt, but first and foremost for his ‘verbal actions’ in the Ban Edict. The King himself knows that he is lying, and so does everybody else: ‘I doubt not, but that as many among you have seene the whole, or else some part of my actes and behaviours, or else have understoode it from their fathers, and other good people, whiche have bin witnesses thereof: so having hearde me, ye wil as easelie iudge my words to be as true, as those of mine enemie are false and shamelesse’ (p. 52). Again, mere knowledge of the facts suffices to see that William has a case, unlike his opponents.

The Apologie suggests that William’s opponents are not susceptible to facts, but are led by their emotions, making it impossible for them to discuss matters in a reasonable way: ‘For, who is it that knoweth not, that without choise or discretion, they cast at my head, every thing that they finde in the waye, so great is their furie, and their passion so outragious and unmeasurable?’ (p. 89). This clouded vision causes William’s opponents to say things either which they know to be untrue, or which apply much more to them if they are to a certain extent true. This is, for instance, the case with regard to the accusation of treason and that of violating the Ghent Pacification, of which William points out: ‘We have not had, on our parte, any infidelitie or treason, or intelligence with the Spaniards, as our enimies on their parte have had. For have not they, against their faith & promise, with an armed power beginne a warre?’ (p. 110). ‘They object unto me’, William says, ‘that I have violated and broken the [Pacification]: Let us see, howe [the Spaniards] on their behalfe have mainteyned and kept it’ (p. 102).

William uses the same tactic of reversal in dealing with the accusation that he is a foreigner: ‘They object unto me also, that I am a straunger, as if the Prince of Parma, were a great countrey man, who was not borne in this countrey, nor hath a farthing worth of goods here, nor any title [...]’ (p. 48). In further discussing this point, an additional technique is used by the Prince: that of pointing out inconsistencies in the opponents’ starting points. ‘What do they meane by the terme straunger?’, he wonders, ‘Verely such a one, as is borne out of the countrey; then if that be so, hee him selfe [the King] shal be a straunger as well as I, for he was borne in Spaine’ (p. 48). And Germany, where the Prince was born, is ‘a countrey which is naturallie a freend and fellowe of this countrey’, whereas Spain ‘is natu-
rally the enemie of the lowe countrey’. Of course, the point is here also that being a long
time inhabitant of the Netherlands increases the Prince’s ethos as a rightful protagonist of
the cause of the revolt for the States-General.

Often the pointing out of inconsistencies is phrased as an ironical twist, aimed at ridic-
culing the opponent. When William discusses Philip’s efforts to bribe him into returning
forever to his native country, the Prince refers to the Ban Edict, where Philip motivates his
offer by pointing out that ‘it is a pleasant thinge for every one to live in his owne Countrey’.
Orange’s reply to this proclaimed common starting point is to ask: ‘Wherefore then, doth
this cursed race of Spaniards, go from countrey to countrey, to torment and to trouble all
the worlde?’ (p. 132).

Not only are the abilities of the opponents to argue in a sensible way ridiculed, but also
their oratorical style: ‘Now then (my Lordes) upon these fraile and weake foundations, they
come to build the sentence of their Proscription and here they lay out all their tragicall
eloquence: they thunder: they lighten: they storme and rage: [...] after that I have looked
rounde about me, I finde that they are, but windes of wordes, and noises, to make children
afrayde, rather than a man’ (p. 135). Irony is in fact the Prince’s favourite stylistic device,
even from the beginning of the Apologie, where William sets the stage by characterizing the
Ban as the ‘most excellent flowre of glorie, that I had bin able to have desired, to have bin
crowned with, before my death’ (p. 13-14).

The greatest failure of the Prince’s opponents, however, is—as he presents it—not their
untruthfulness, their emotionality, their obvious inconsistency, or their bad style, but
their incapacity to see that what they present as an accusation is in fact a compliment to the
Prince. This applies, for instance, to the accusation that the Prince has relations with the
common people: ‘I confesse then, that I am, and that I wil al my life long be popular, that is
to saie, that I wil pursue, mainteine and defende, your libertie and your priviledges. Thus
you see, howe there wise braines, are utterly voide of common wit and understanding, and
howe that even then when they blame me they praise me’ (p. 120).

The accusation of his involvement with the Request of the Nobles to the erstwhile gov-
erness of the Netherlands, the Duchess of Parma, is also turned around: ‘I confesse, that I
thought it not evill, that the request was presented [...] I count it a most great profit, both
for myne owne honor and reputation, and also for the service of the King and the countrey,
for if the wise Counsellors of the King, had bin so well advised as to yeelde thereunto, there
had not insued so many miseries, by whiche, there wanteth but a litle, but that the whole
countrey had bin consumed’ (p. 65-66).

In this way, even the most serious accusations are interpreted as attributing honour to
the Prince, instead of blame: ‘They have offered me (they say) great commodities, to the
ende that I might depart to the place where I was forme, where every one ought to desire
most to live, to the which I meant not to consent. What could they say (my Lordes) which
might make me more for mee than this? Consider I pray you their folie, or their shamele-
snesse. For this must needes be, either that they speake shameleslie, or else they are so voide
of goode understanding, that they praise me, when they thinke to blame me’ (p. 131-132).

In sum, we can conclude that in the opening stage of the discussion that is implicitly
conducted in the Apologie William’s efforts are aimed at establishing his own dialectical
ethos and – more in particular – at destroying the dialectical ethos of his opponents. The
Prince’s own ethos is built on references to his modesty, loyalty and sincerity as well as on references to the factual and judicial basis of his case. Conversely, Philip’s ethos is diminished by referring to his untruthfulness, emotionality, inconsistency and bad style, and by showing he mistakes praise for blame.

5. Conclusion

In this paper, we have presented an argumentative analysis of William of Orange’s strategic manoeuvring in the opening stage of the implicit discussion conducted in the Apologie aimed at enhancing his own ethos and destroying that of his opponents. Our rhetorical-dialectical observations confirm the conclusions that historians have defended earlier on different grounds. Groen van Prinsterer, for instance, has argued that one of William’s main objectives in presenting the Apologie was to move the States-General towards abjuring Philip II as the sovereign ruler of the Netherlands. To realize this objective, the Prince thought it necessary to damage as much as possible Philip’s personal and political reputation. ‘Il nous semble’, writes Groen, ‘que la véhémence des expressions n’était pas sans but et calcul politiques: le Prince, convaincu que la rupture désormais étoit irrévocable, désirait ne laisser à personne le moindre doute à cet égard’ (Groen 1839: 452-453). William of Orange’s biographer Swart (1994: 198) adds that the Prince had just concluded his negotiations with the Duke of Anjou in which he had agreed that the French Duke would come as soon as possible to the Netherlands to accept sovereignty. Until the official abjuration of Philip had taken place, this would, of course, not be possible.

Our argumentative analysis of Orange’s strategic manoeuvring in the opening stage of the Apologie has revealed an extra dimension in the Prince’s attempts to damage Philip II. Our analysis provides substantial evidence that, besides attacking the King’s personal behaviour and his political capabilities, in the Apologie William the Silent also aims at discrediting Philip II as a reasonable ‘discussion partner’: he undertakes a fierce attempt to disqualify Philip’s dialectical attitude and discursive abilities as manifested in the Ban. In this light, everything that Orange does is eventually directed at depriving Philip II of the quality of being a ‘reasonable discusant’. Whether Orange’s own manoeuvring in this endeavour is up to critical standard will be the subject of another paper.
It is often wrongly assumed that audience adaptation is the overriding, if not the only, characteristic of rhetoric. Rhetoric is then without any further ado equalized with giving in to audience demand. There is also a tradition in which the use of presentational devices is taken to be the main characteristic of rhetoric. Rhetoric is then primarily viewed as stylistics. In fact, topical selection could just as well be seen as the general umbrella characteristic of rhetoric. In the latter case, rhetoric would be aptly described as the art of finding the appropriate loci of persuasion. In our view, none of these one-sided conceptions of rhetoric does justice to the intricate relationship inherent in any form of adequate strategic maneuvering.

And perhaps even to declare him, as Barth and Krabbe’s formal dialectics has it, ‘irrational with respect to the present dialectical situation’.
References


EXPLORING COMMUNICATIONAL ETHOS
A COMPULSORY PHASE IN THE STUDY OF DISCOURSE AND INTERCULTURAL COMMUNICATION
Danièle Torck (Free University Amsterdam)

INTRODUCTION
In classical rhetoric ‘ethos’ refers to the image of a speaker given by his/her discourse and by the way it is delivered. In some areas of interactional linguistics (Kerbrat-Orecchioni, 1994), it refers to the dominant communicational behaviour of a certain group of speakers, and to the rules, principles and norms which regulate verbal interaction between the members of that group. Communicational ethos can be described along various dimensions: place of speech activities in the social or family group, role given to the interpersonal relationship and to faces (positive or negative facework), place given to the expression of feelings and emotions in discourse and interaction, conception of time (monochronic or polychronic time), etc. Descriptions of these dimensions have been given in different disciplines or areas, using various data and methodologies: anthropology (Bauman, Hall & Hall), ethnography of speaking (Gumperz & Hymes), cross-cultural pragmatics (Blum-Kulka, Wierzbicka), contrastive rhetoric (Kaplan) and cultural studies (Scollon & Scollon).

In this paper I aim to describe the notion of ‘communicational ethos’ as it is found in interactional linguistics. I will then briefly address the role of ethos in the perception and evaluation of someone else’s discourse, through the analysis of the representation of ethos or comments on ethos found in the press. In the framework of this intercultural conference, one dimension of the ethos will be presented in more detail: orientation towards consensus vs. orientation towards confrontation. In my concluding remarks I will refer to the pervasiveness of ethnocentrism in (approaches to) intercultural communication and emphasise the social consequences of what I will call the ‘force of inertia’ of one’s own ethos.3

1 COMMUNICATIONAL ETHOS
1.1 From classical rhetoric to interactional linguistics
Interactional linguistics present many similarities with classical and modern rhetoric. Cockcroft & Cockcroft (1992) stress both the ‘striking affinity [of interactional linguistics] with traditional preoccupations of rhetoricians’ and the social and interactional nature of rhetoric. Rhetoric is then seen not an art, ‘not is it a body of principles, it is a thing, a material artefact of human interaction’ (McGee, 1982, 45). I will mention two similarities.

The first, and the most fundamental, involves the notion of alterity, referring to the existence of the Other (speaker or auditorium) in all forms of verbal production and interac-
Communication and Culture

The relationship between the speaker and the addressee. In interactional linguistics, the relationship between speakers, addressees and addressers is central, and discourse forms are linked to this relationship, which can be described in terms of the so-called horizontal vs. vertical relationships, referring to discursive and social distance on the one hand, and the position of speakers (high or low, dominating-dominated) in the interaction on the other. The existence of the Other presupposes various representations of the self and of the Other, which are constructed and deconstructed during the interaction. Some interactional linguists and critical rhetoricians share the belief that every speaker creates a picture of the world, with him/herself as part of this world, a world that is a ‘distorted structure of facts and inferences selected not for their reliable representation of the objective world, but rather for their salience to the satisfaction of intersubjective desires’ (McGee, 1982, 43).

A second common point is the way communicational goals and stakes are defined: not in terms of transmission of information, but in terms of negotiations, negotiations that take place at all levels of the verbal communication (word meaning, word choice, speech acts, speaker’s position, (self-)representation). Verbal communication, let’s say dialogue, moves between two extreme conceptions: dialogue can be seen as an essentially co-operative process, whose goal is to reach a consensus, a fusion between speakers, each speaker trying to contribute to the realisation of that goal; or it can be seen as a verbal fight, whose goal is to dominate and to control the verbal exchanges, using various forms of seduction, persuasion or manipulation.

1.2 From speaker’s ethos to communicational ethos

Greek rhetoric limited the notion of ethos to its discursive manifestation (‘moeurs oratoires’). Roman rhetoric (Quintillian, Cicero) added a ‘pre-discursive’ ethos, a social dimension. At the level of the individual, ethos thus refers to the personality (personal image, charisma and face) and to the stance of the speaker (position). Of the three classical proofs, logos, pathos, ethos, only the last combines elements of the three. ‘L’ethos constitue une condensation spécifique des trois dimensions’, says Eggs (1999, 47). It combines phrónesis (logos= reasonableness), areté (ethos= sincerity) and eúnoia (pathos = solidarity).

Interest in the notion of ethos in interactional linguistics and discourse analysis has been recurrent and marked. ‘Toute prise de parole implique la construction d’une image de soi’ (Amossy, 1999, 9). If such a construction can be tuned and managed through communication techniques, as is the case with public speakers, it takes place, very often unconsciously, in our daily, personal interactions.

Communicational ethos is generally defined as the ‘set of values held by a community reflected in the language, social attitudes and behaviour of this community’. The assumption that communities show detectable patterns of speech, ‘cultural ways of speaking’ (Katriel 1985) has been a fundation stone of the Ethnography of Speaking (Hymes, Gumperz) since its establishment in the 1960’s. Differences in the way in which members of different cultures conceptualise communication itself and how such conceptual differences are to be related to actual patterns of verbal behaviour are considered by some linguists to be one of the major tasks of modern linguistics. In the debate between universality and
culture specificity, or between idealistic ethos and conversational behaviour (Searle, Grice, Leech) and culture-specific ethos and behaviour, the displaced person – especially if he/she is a language teacher and researcher – will most probably opt for the second position.

1.3 Cultural variations in verbal interaction

Cultural variation affects all aspects, at all levels, of verbal communication. Kerbrat-Orecchioni (in vol. 3 of *Les interactions verbales*) describes cultural variations at the level of paraverbal and non-verbal aspects of interaction (delivery, pitch, intonation, proxemics, kinesics); at the level of interaction (speech turns, overlaps/interruptions, silences); and at the level of speech acts and utterances (for instance thematic, logical and rhetorical structures).

Kerbrat-Orecchioni (1994, 63) argues that:

'It is reasonable to believe that the different verbal behaviours that exist within a community obey some profound coherence and logic, and that a systematic description of these behaviours will allow us to draw the communicational profile of this community, or in other words, its ethos (defined as the way this community presents itself and behaves in communication – with warmth or coldness, distant or close, modest or not, respectful or not of private territory, sensitive or rather indifferent to conflict – these communicational manners being related to other norms or values systems in use in this community)' (my translation, DT).

She then refers to previous similar propositions, such as the notions of collective ethos (Bateson), communicational or ethnic style (Scollon & Scollon), conversational style (Tannen), or cultural ways of speaking (Blum-Kulka, Katriel).

According to Kerbrat-Orecchioni, dimensions of ethos include:
- The place/position of speech activities in the community (verbosity vs. taciturnity, speech use as instrument of socialisation);
- The conception of interpersonal relationships: horizontal (norms of distance between speakers in interaction), vertical (high or low places), and orientation toward confrontation or consensus;
- The conception of linguistic politeness and importance given to faces (positive or negative facework) in communication (expression of feelings and emotions in interaction);
- The degree of ritualisation in communication.

Each of these dimensions is related to the others, and preferences at one level will result in preferences at other levels. For instance a culture that gives an extensive space to speech activities will often favour an orientation toward confrontation and allow a wider expression of feelings and emotions. The characteristics of a communicational ethos can only be defined through comparison of verbal cultures, as shown by Verschueren (1984, 504):

‘If Athabaskans could be stereotyped as taciturn in comparison with Anglo speakers of English, the latter could probably be stereotyped as linguistically uninventive and inexpressive in comparison with blacks. Whereas whites, generally speaking, structure their discourse around attempts to achieve some sort of internal cohesion in the
‘text’ produced (as was shown by Scollon & Scollon), Kochman’s description demonstrates how black ‘practice’ speech as an interactional art, with animation, vitality, and emotional intensity as its key attributes.”

I will now address the issue of one’s awareness of one’s ethos, or someone else’s ethos, through reflections on speakers and their communicational ethos found in the written press. In the multicultural societies we live in, comments on cultural features or differences are quite frequent; however, few of those will include references to interactional features that can be observed in interactions with speakers, or will go beyond stereotypical descriptions or comments.

2. Referring to communicational ethos in the press

A first example will stress, if such is necessary, the impact of a prominent person’s ethos on the public perception of this person. It is taken from an article from The New York Times published in The San Francisco Chronicle (February 14, 2002), whose topic is Rudolph Giuliani, the ex-mayor of New York. This article refers to a study, to appear in the summer of 2002 in The Journal of Research in Personality. This research has been done using ‘a novel personality assessment technique, a specially designed computer program that analyzes linguistic style’ (for instance, the use of pronouns and emotion-related words), in order to assess the personality change in Giuliani (from sarcastic, irritable, and defensive to ‘a heroic leader whose fortitude, calmness and compassion guided the city through its most difficult hours’). A study of 35 spontaneous speeches (in news conferences) over a period of 8 years (before and after Sept. 11) show differences in discourse forms, more involvement with his addressee, a different use of pronouns (especially we), more present-tense verbs, more words related to positive emotions, and more words reflecting social connection to people. Does that mean that he is a different man, asks the San Francisco Chronicle? The answer is negative: his discourse has changed, and so has the delivery of his discourse. The conclusion of the research is that the stereotype of his being (before Sept. 11) rather a hostile and aggressive leader may have come more from his tone or his communicational behaviour.

A second example will refer to an individual ethos as opposed to a community (national) ethos. In a letter to the Dutch quality daily NRC-Handelsblad (February 2002) about the new bride of Prince Willem-Alexander, and in reaction to a critical article on the wedding and on Dutch people’s reactions to that wedding, one reader advances: ‘Also in Maastricht the meeting with Máxima was a revelation, because of her special style and the warmth she radiates. And this is something that cannot be said of Dutch people in general’.

Though the description of Máxima is not explicitly one of her communicational ethos, and there is no relationship established between the young woman’s style and her original country’s dominant communicational ethos, it is opposed to what is claimed to be the dominant Dutch ethos.

My third example is about depictions of French politicians in the Dutch press. These are usually quite colourful and often illustrative of the historical and deep-rooted distrust of and disdain towards France. In an article in the centre-left Dutch newspaper De Volkskrant
Communication and Culture

Exploring communicational ethos

(September 2001) about the (then) prime minister Jospin, references were made to national clichés and to Nancy Mitford’s *The Sun King* (1966): ‘French people can be divided in two groups, the Gauls and the Franks. The Franks are serious and rather distant, the Gauls are frivolous and delightful, but they are also held responsible for the destruction of the nation’. Interestingly this opposition between these communicational ethoses (Franks and Gauls) can be illustrated by the two main candidates in the 2002 presidential election, Jospin and Chirac, and is not without political relevance, as many opinion polls have shown in the year preceding the election, and as has been demonstrated in recent discourse analysis. The analysis of discourse preferences in the 1995 presidential debate between Chirac and Jospin (Helmig 2002) (use of pronouns and associated verbs by the opponents) already shows the existence of two very different communicational ethoses, and basically two messages: (Jospin) Here are my proposals and the French voters have to decide vs. (Chirac) I know you and I understand you, so vote for me.\(^5\) Surveys and analyses of the 2002 presidential elections in France also confirmed this opposition between the two ethoses; furthermore, the ethoses of the two candidates seemed to play a major role in the evaluation of their personal qualities as a (future) president, but especially of their individual chances. SOFRES\(^6\) (January 2002) mentions the following results concerning the two main candidates. People were asked whether they associated certain descriptions with one or the other candidate. Chirac was found to be *chaleureux* (warm) (45%), *énergique* (28), *compétent* (20), *sincère* (11), *démagogique* (23) and *hypocrite* (20). Jospin scored high on competence, sincerity and credibility, low on warmth and social skills. The wish to see either Chirac or Jospin win got similar responses for both candidates (36%), but the evaluation of Chirac’s chances for another period of office reached 46%, while Jospin’s chances were only evaluated at 23%. A different survey among young people (also by SOFRES) confirms this differential in ethos and appreciation. They were asked who they would choose Chirac (first column) or Jospin (second):

- to tell a secret to
  - 45
  - 43
- to ask advice about future/career
  - 39
  - 52
- to go on holidays with
  - 50
  - 31
- to buy a second-hand car from
  - 37
  - 46

My last example, taken from an article in the Israeli newspaper *Ha’aretz* (January 10, 2002), is quite rare, as it explicitly describes some aspects of communicational ethos. It is about a joint unofficial initiative by two Israelis, a Jew Eyal Ehrlich, and an Israeli Arab, Abdulwa-hab Darawshe, to propose to King Abdullah of Jordan a ‘hudna’, which is a ‘tribal custom in which the leaders of the community ask forgiveness of one another and forge a truce’. The two men, who have been friends and business partners for more than 10 years, were received by the Jordanian Foreign Minister in Amman in a very pleasant atmosphere (‘The gates were opened, hands were shaken, and warm, demonstrative welcomes were given. Everything was quiet and friendly and very pleasant’). Just before meeting the Jordanian Minister, Darawshe warns Ehrlich to restrain himself and to be a diplomat:

Acting like a diplomat doesn’t come easy to Ehrlich. He and Darashwe represent two opposite approaches: The Israeli approach – direct, unmannerly, knowing no limits; and the Arab approach – indirect, oblique and conscious of limits. At meetings with
Arab leaders, Darawshe plays along and lets his hosts lead the discussion in a round-about way. Ehrlich has no patience for that and wants to get straight to the bottom line. With the Jordanian foreign minister, Ehrlich circumvents Darawshe again and says: ‘Pardon me, Mr. Minister, I am not a diplomat or a politician. I’m just a regular guy and I wanted to propose that you talk to the king and tell him that we’d like him to invite President Katsav to visit Jordan’.

The journalist notes that ‘Darawshe squirms in his chair, overcome with embarrassment’. The reaction of the Jordanian officials, as reported by the Israeli journalist, is described in terms of attentive listening, expression of understanding, interest and respect for Ehrlich and Darawshe’s personal initiative. The journalist lists the persons present at this meeting and adds ‘All are very elegantly dressed’, as a possible sign of the importance given to the meeting, or as a reference to an aspect of Arabic hospitality.

Considering the fact that the two Israelis are in contact with, and well aware of, both cultures, this example cannot be interpreted as an illustration of a speaker who is not aware of deep differences between what is considered acceptable in one culture and not in the Other’s culture, or as an illustration of a lack of awareness of the impact of their communicational ethos on others. It could well be analysed as a form of indifference, or as a form of linguistic and discursive imperialism, which may be the case when a specific ethos is linked to power, or to membership to a dominant class or country. Or, possibly, as I will conclude, simply the extraordinary force of inertia of one’s own communicational ethos.

These examples emphasise the importance of ethos in the evaluation of political speakers, in some cases, as I have shown with regard to the French situation, to the detriment of more objective qualities and facts. On the level of journalistic discourse, the study of how politicians are quoted by journalists can also uncover the pervasiveness of cultural stereotypes, and the almost universal lack of analysis of ethos.

3. On one dimension of ethos: Orientation to consensus vs. confrontation

In the introduction, following Kerbrat-Orecchioni, I opposed two views of verbal communication. These two views are based, among other things, on different ways of seeing the place of the individual and the role of (his) speech in society. One view could be labelled as an idealistic and optimistic view of communication, the other view as a more realistic and pessimistic one. The first would favour co-operation, the second, competition. At the level of communicational ethos, this opposition is a matter of orientation toward consensus vs. orientation toward confrontation. It should be noted that both orientations are present in any culture and one or the other will be favoured according to the individual, to the situation and to the stakes involved in the situation. But a speech community will be characterised by a positive evaluation of one or the other orientation.

It has been often claimed that preference for agreement is a universal feature in human communication, and that agreement had to be perceived as a co-operative process accord-
ing to general rules based on ‘universal values’ such as objectivity, objective truth, clarity, and relevance (among others). This alleged preference has to be related to the dominance of Anglo-Saxon linguistics and discourse analysis in the last 30 years. As Wierzbicka (1991) has clearly shown, there is already ambiguity in what we understand with ‘agreement’, and in what a speech community finds important.

The opposition consensus vs. confrontation refers to various assumptions: about the function of speech and dialogue, about the ability of to make a distinction between ideas and opinions on the one hand, and relationships on the other, about the cathartic function of verbal confrontations and the play function of talk (for instance the role of teasing in communication). Each dimension is characterised in terms of the presence or absence of ‘agonal’ markers in talk (Kerbrat-Orecchioni): direct formulation of speech acts, speech acts such as replies, refutations, denials, criticism, negative evaluation of opinions, face expressions and gesticulations, emphasis in intonation, higher pitch, faster delivery and the expression of strong feelings or emotions.

Ethnographic research and cross-cultural pragmatics have shown clear differences between national or ethnic groups, and described various degrees of tolerance to verbal confrontations, from rejection to social approbation of verbal confrontation and ritual verbal duels (Labov, Wierzbicka, Schiffrin, Katriel). In some cultures, arguing is seen as a form of sociability (cf. Schiffrin 1984). I have over many years observed Dutch students in debate with students of other cultural backgrounds, and in spite of the multiplication of contacts with other cultures, a confrontational ethos is for most Dutch people still perceived as an expression of aggression and intolerance.

From the perspective of a consensual ethos, confrontation and argument are seen as having as their primary goal the establishment of common ground and the resolution of conflicts. Discussion should take place on a rational level, emotions and feelings should be controlled (out of respect for the negative face of the Other). Respect for the Other’s opinions (also negative face) is achieved by indirectness in formulation. And social empathy should be expressed in talk.

In the eyes of the consensual speaker, the confrontational speaker does not use confrontation and argument to reach common ground, but to maintain disagreement. His/her exaggerated expression of feelings or emotions is associated with a loss of self-control, an egoistic, egocentric manifestation. What is seen as a lack of respect toward the Other is often associated with individualism and arrogance. Confrontational speakers are held responsible for social disturbance, and women speakers are sometimes labelled as ‘hysterical’.

From a confrontational ethos, however, the consensual speaker appears to lack courage, as he/she gives in too easily to pressures from the group or from dominant opinions. He/She does not show what he/she really thinks or feels. Accusations of hypocrisy or conformism can follow. Often it will be thought that the consensual person cannot distinguish between fighting for ideas and opinions and fighting on the level of the relationship, and globally, his/her incapacity to play with language and discourse will be stressed.

The confrontational speaker sees positive values in disagreement (‘That’s the best way to do it’, according to Schiffrin 1984’s informants). Or, as a French linguist wrote, ‘Quand tout le monde est d’accord, il n’y a plus rien à se dire; quand il y a désaccord, la discussion est possible’ (Moeschler, 1985,153). The débat d’idées (vs. l’affrontement de personnes) is valued.
Verbal confrontation, and even conflicts, can be seen as a sign of closeness: it bears witness to the strength and solidarity of bonds, says Schiffrin. For the sociologist Simmel, who sees conversation as the most extensive instrument of sociability, the topic of disagreement is ‘merely the indispensable medium through which the lively exchange of speech unfolds its attractions’ (quoted in Schiffrin, 1984, 52).

4. Concluding remarks

In the last 25 years research into cultural differences in communication has generated multiple observations and analyses of interactions and misunderstandings. The results of these have found their way into teaching material for students and professionals being sent to different areas of the world. In multicultural societies (which is the case of most Western countries) more and more attention is being given to differences in culture. In all these situations, the impact of this deepened knowledge and understanding of the Other has hitherto been generally disappointing. It has not led to a greater tolerance, but on the contrary to a strengthening of extreme positions, opinions, and rejection of the Other. Xenophobia and ‘cultural fundamentalism’ (Stolcke 1995) are characteristic of current political developments in many European democracies. Within the bounds of communication studies two possible explanations can be given.

The first explanation involves the tremendous force of ethnocentrism, which is often obvious in social and political situations, but also latent in many studies of discourse and cross/intercultural communication, and omnipresent in media discourse in the framing given to the coverage of events. Ethnocentrism, that is the emotional attitude that one’s own race, nation or culture is superior to all others (Webster), can also be defined as follows (Todorov, 1989, 19): ‘L’ethnocentrisme […] consiste] à ériger, de manière indue, les valeurs propres à la société à laquelle j’appartiens en valeurs universelles’. But when this ethnocentrism is related to the Western world, it often takes the form of a linguistic, discursive and cultural imperialism, already denounced in 1984 by Verschueren in a review of Edmund Glenn’s Man and mankind: Conflict and Communication between cultures, in which he criticises the author for having forgotten that in communication between Western democracies and other nations, in the political arena, ‘the purpose of the individual partners is rarely to really communicate [exchange information] but rather to dominate’ (1984, 495). This is still relevant, and could easily be generalised to other arenas than the political one."

The second explanation would be about the extraordinary force of inertia of one’s own communicational ethos. ‘For many, probably most humans, the ways one learns to speak during the period of early learning among the family and close intimate relatives places an indelible stamp on one’s discourse for the rest of life’, say Scollon & Scollon (1981, 151). These ways of speaking, or communicational ethos, are deeply anchored in one’s personal identity. As a member of a minority, the displaced speaker will often be reticent to adjust to the ways of the majority, to give in to some linguistic and discursive standardisation, even when adjusting would mean a better chance of getting what he/she wishes to attain.
Notes

3 Based on more than 25 years of living, teaching and doing research in a different communicational ethos.
4 Interestingly there is a great lack of knowledge, among journalists, of the long tradition of similar discourse analyses, and of their results.
5 In the first weeks of the 2002 presidential campaign, a third element was added: ‘I love you’.
6 One of the most important French market research and opinion polls organisation.
7 This sometimes appears at the level of the speech act verb or adverb that introduces the reported speech. The mention of for instance ‘X declared aggressively’ poses the issue of what is considered an ‘aggressive tone’. See part 3.
8 Recently, the Dutch Prime Minister, just after resigning with the whole government (April 2002), denied that he had taken his decision under the influence of emotions. It was not an emotional decision, he said, but a rational one, with emotional consequences.
9 Todorov adds later on that ‘L’ethnocentriste est pour ainsi dire la caricature de l’universaliste (...) cependant que l’universaliste est, trop souvent, un ethnocentriste qui s’ignore’ (1989, 27).
10 See also Scollon & Scollon (1995) and the domination of the Utilitarian Discourse System in professional communication.
References


The Transition from Misunderstanding to Understanding in Intercultural Communication

Jan D. ten Thije (University of Utrecht/University of Chemnitz)

1. Introduction

This paper challenges two tacit assumptions in the field of intercultural communication research. Firstly, misunderstandings can frequently be found in intercultural communication, although one cannot claim that intercultural communication is characterised by misunderstandings alone. The main analytical task should be to linguistically reconstruct intercultural understanding. Secondly, intercultural communication is not solely constituted by the fact that interactors from different cultural groups interact. Each analysis should detect to what extent instances of discourse are institutionally and/or interculturally determined. This paper discusses how some analyses of intercultural communication go beyond the analysis of misunderstanding. Consequently, a shift can be observed in the research focus towards the question as to what extent different linguistic means contribute to intercultural understanding.

The paper begins with an introduction to the historical background to the interest in intercultural communication and presents the main approaches to the study of culture in discourse. Subsequently, two analyses of beyond misunderstanding are discussed: Clyne’s (1994) revision of the Gricean conversational implicature and its maxims, and ten Thije’s (2002b) three-step strategy for intercultural understanding including generalising, perspectivising and contrasting cultural standards in discourse. The data consists of narratives by East and West Germans about the famous East German car the Trabant. The system change from socialist to market economy has influenced everyday life deeply in Germany and the Trabi stories document how new solutions were found for everyday needs, and old and new cultural identities are constructed.

2. Intercultural communication in times of social transition in Europe

Edward T. Hall’s The Silent Language (1959) counts as classic in the field of intercultural communication and is generally regarded as the book in which the notion of intercultural communication was introduced. A paperback edition of this book from the beginning of the sixties exemplifies the historical constellation in which Americans reflected upon their international relations in those days. The cover text asks the question Why are we ugly Americans? and gives the following answer:
Our tendency to regard the nationals of other countries as “underdeveloped Americans” and to insist that everyone else do things our way is extremely dangerous, stated Dr Hall. “We have to learn to take foreign culture seriously. The British are ahead of us on this, and the Russians are so far ahead it isn’t funny. We, in the United States, are in the stone age of human relations in the overseas field.” (Hall s.a.)

The text displays the American interest in increasing their intercultural competence as they were engaged in severe international competition. In fact, any allusion to anti-communism appeared to be a good advertisement in cold war time.

Nowadays, the notion of cross-cultural or intercultural communication is no longer connected to anti-communism, but indicates the development towards a global village (Asante & Gudykunst, 1989; Scollon & Scollon, 1995; Ehlich, 1996a; Bolten, 1997). Technological developments in times of globalisation facilitate an economic flourish that is based on direct access to worldwide communication. Müller-Jacquier and ten Thije (2000) discuss five – partly European-specific – characteristics of intercultural communicative developments.

Firstly, the internationalisation of business correlates to supranational changes in property, management and production structures. These innovations involve internal and external communication on every organisational level. Apart from examples of conflicting joint ventures, one finds productive synergy effects in multicultural teams, in which cultural diversity is no longer considered an obstacle but innovative potential. However, citizens (consumers) increasingly condemn the lack of participation on global decision making processes and fight for access to the international scene.

Secondly, workers’ mobility has increased enormously. On the one hand, expatriates need to be prepared for temporary stays abroad (Kühlmann, 1995). For instance, their culture shock has to be evaluated and taken care of. On the other hand, the migration of workers and their families to European industrial centres is a constant need in times of economic expansion, whereas mobility is impeded by economic depression (Ehlich, 1996b). Multilingualism and multiculturalism determine everyday life in most European cities. Natives are confronted on a daily basis with other languages and cultures when shopping, in school, in administration and at work.

The increasing importance of intercultural communication emerges, furthermore, in the growing willingness and necessity of European nation states to refrain from national and consent to supra-national legislation. After economic co-operation in the fifties, European unification nowadays determines all social institutions. Moreover, Europe’s Eastern expansion increases the number of cultures involved. Consequently, 19th century standards regarding nation state, national language and national culture are no longer ultimately determinative for social organisation. For example, one has to reflect on the question as to how the European regulations on opening hours determine the various concepts of Sonntag, Sunday, Domenica or le weekend in respective cultures (Müller, 1998).

In reaction to such convergence processes with respect to migration and mobility, one also detects the emergence of a regional and national consciousness as well as the need to express local cultural and linguistic identities. These phenomena manifest themselves in different forms of regional and national folklore, in initiatives to safeguard and maintain national and minority languages and cultures, but also in aggression to foreigners and foreignness.
Xenophobia and racism require constant social and legislative action. The development of ethnic stereotypes and prejudices (that may result from international exchange programmes), as well as the construction of multiple identities, determines the relevance of intercultural communication.

Finally, the interest for intercultural communication depends on worldwide political developments. Decolonisation and the system change in Eastern Europe have enabled a new quality in the contacts between the classical poles of North/South and East/West. Traditional political and cultural borders have changed and new forms of migration and mobility (cf. the German Spätaussiedler and Green-Card-Asian) have determined all sectors of trade and industry. However, new (ethnic) borders are also fought for as the Balkan war and the war against terrorism have shown. In sum, international and national institutions - like the UN, the army, police, politics, unions, and schools - acknowledge that they can no longer function properly without taking account of multiculturalism in society.

In sum, these developments show that social transition creates qualitative new cultural constellations, which means that the everyday lives of masses of people are deeply interculturally determined. Moreover, various intercultures emerge from cultural contact (ten Thije, 2002a). The management of multiculturalism asks for complex communicative competencies that go beyond ordinary foreign language skills and knowledge about other cultures (Knapp-Potthoff, 1997). The relevance of the soft skill referred to as intercultural competence has brought about various research traditions in several disciplines that emphasise different aspects of intercultural communication.

3. Approaches to the study of culture in discourse

Clyne (1994) distinguishes three approaches to studying the role of culture in discourse. The first research tradition concerns the Contrastive Approach. These studies compare native discourse across cultures (cf. Fisiak, 1983; Wierzbicka, 1991). Their main purpose is to develop universal categories to describe the correspondence and differences between cultures and their languages. On the one hand, the studies aim at fundamental typological linguistic theories; on the other hand, findings are applied in various methods for language teaching. The fundamental issue that has engaged this tradition for a long time concerns the problem of a tertium comparationis, namely the question – in which dimensions can the discourse of two languages be considered equivalent?

The second approach concerns the Interlanguage Approach, which examines the discourse of non-natives in a second language. In the sixties and seventies, analyses focussed on phonological, morpho-syntactical and semantic interference (cf. Lado, 1957; Selinker, 1972). More recently, the trans- and interference of pragmatic and discourse phenomena have been analysed (cf. Blum-Kulka et al., 1989).

This paper focuses on the third tradition in particular, the Interactive Inter-cultural Approach. These studies concentrate on the discourse of people of different cultural and linguistic backgrounds interacting either in a lingua franca or in the language of one of the interactors (Clyne, 1994, 3). Müller-Jacquier & ten Thije (2000) state that the term intercultural communication should be reserved for this specified field of interest. In fact, intercultural com-
munication should refer to face-to-face communication in intercultural situations. The research in this field of interest initially focused on the reconstruction of misunderstanding and communication breakdown (cf. Gumperz, 1982; Asante & Gudykunst, 1989; Gudykunst & Kim, 1992). Recently, the focus of attention has shifted to beyond misunderstanding (Clyne, 1994; Sarangi, 1994; Koole & ten Thije, 1994, 2001; ten Thije, 2002). The latter analyses not only focus on the determination of cultural and linguistic differences, but also on the detection of the interactive impact of linguistic contrasts. They pursue the question as to how people with different cultural and linguistic backgrounds react to unexpected (re)actions in intercultural discourse. In fact, the research reconstructs how common ground in intercultural discourse or intercultural understanding is brought about and what new discourse structures result from intercultural communication.

4. Misunderstanding in intercultural communication

In order to clarify the initial focus on misunderstandings, four assumptions of the mentalistic concept of culture (Goudenough, 1964) that underlie many of the socio-psychological studies (cf. Asante & Gudykunst, 1989) are commented upon (see Streeck, 1985; Koole & ten Thije, 1994; Auer, 1999; 209). The mentalistic concept of culture leads to a static view of culture as the content of people’s heads.

The first assumption concerns the statement that intercultural communication takes place the very moment people from different cultures/ethnic groups meet. In contrast to this, one should reflect on the question as to whether the gathering of people from different cultural backgrounds automatically results in intercultural communication. For instance, Sarangi (1994) shows that discourse in intercultural situations could be intercultural, but does not always necessarily have to be so. In fact, each analysis should detect to what extent discourse in intercultural situations is institutionally and/or interculturally determined (cf. Schmitt & Keim, 1995). Rehbein (forthcoming) distinguishes one-sided from two-sided intercultural communication, depending on whether interactors reflect upon and change their cultural apparatus.

The second assumption indicates that culture is a collection of propositions about do and don’t that can be listed out of context. The vast literature on intercultural business communication illustrates this assumption (cf. Hill, 1995; Richmond, 1995). On the other hand, culture should not only be substantiated in the mind or the heart of the interactors, but also in their interaction. Consequently, analyses of intercultural communication should detect how culture is being actualised in a cultural contact situation.

The third assumption states that when people from different cultures meet, they expect that the other will act as a member of the speaker’s own culture. At the same time, they assume that they are unable to adapt to the other’s culture, and, therefore, misunderstanding is inevitable. However, people’s assumptions regarding cultural sameness are as important as ethnic or cultural prejudices respecting cultures’ foreignness. In fact, people expect foreigners to act foreign and, as Auer (1999, 210) argues, core cultural values regarding face work can be switched off in intercultural communication, since these cultural patterns are thought to be irrelevant for intercultural communication. For instance, Germans often perceive Japanese, contrary to the cultural stereotype, to be impolite.
The last assumption respecting the mentalistic concept states that knowledge transfer about other cultures guarantees successful intercultural communication. This assumption can be traced back in many intercultural training programs, for example, in cultural assimilation programs (e.g. Müller & Thomas, 1991). However, discourse analysis has shown convincingly that even intra-cultural understanding is not automatic and interactors can misunderstand each other on purpose. Therefore, analyses of intercultural discourse should consider the social and institutional constellations and analyse how the so-called ‘power’ relations between the participants hinder intercultural understanding or cause deliberate misunderstandings.

As well as the mentalistic, a number of other concepts have been elaborated in intercultural communication research, e.g. the behaviouristic (e.g. Boas, 1911), semiotic (e.g. Geertz, 1973) and pragmatic concepts of culture (Rehbein, fc.; for an overview see Sarangi, 1995). Koole & ten Thije (1994) summarise the common characteristics of these concepts as follows: (1) culture is man-made and can be learned, (2) culture is related to human groups instead of to individuals, and (3) culture can be attributed a locus with respect to human activity (either as the activity itself, or as the knowledge presupposed to it, or as the artefacts resulting from this activity). The concepts vary according to the categories they use to denote a collective or human group. Next to the traditional category of nation state one finds notions such as discourse community (Knapp Potthoff, 1997), ethnic group (Gumperz 1982; Hinnenkamp, 1989), Kommunikationsbund (Clyne, 1994) or discursive interculture (Koole & ten Thije 1994; ten Thije 2002a). All these notions focus the member-specific interactive practices of inclusion and exclusion that characterise forms of intercultural discourse under specific social constellations.

As an example of a study that summarises many items of potential intercultural misunderstandings, one could mention Müller-Jacquier (2000). The author presents the framework Linguistic awareness of culture in order to analyse intercultural communicative events. Linguistic awareness of culture implies that people are able to reconstruct original intended actions from the uses of concrete linguistic utterances (Müller-Jacquier, 2000). This framework refers to languages and cultures in different nation states. The items summarise relevant analytical categories that result from research in many disciplines, especially ethnomethodology and communication theory. According to Müller-Jacquier (ibid.) misunderstanding may occur in the following items:

- Social Meaning / Lexicon
- Speech Acts / Speech Act Sequences
- Organisation of Conversation: Conventions of Discourse
- Choice of Topic
- Directness / Indirectness
- Register
- Paraverbal Factors
- Non-verbal Means of Expression
- Culture-specific Values / Attitudes

Beginning with the categories from cognitive and social psychology about the cultural specificity of social meaning and lexicon, the framework denotes contrastive pragmatic
analyses of speech acts and discourse structure conventions from the first research tradition mentioned above. Subsequently, the framework contains the item of directness versus indirectness from politeness theory (Brown & Levinson, 1987), ending up with insights from the communication research conducted by Hofstede (1991) on different dimensions for comparing cultures, such as power distance and insecurity avoidance.

Although the framework contains an interesting survey on important items of intercultural misunderstanding, it has the weakness of an eclectic model, since categories overlap and do not fit together, as they originate from different theoretical backgrounds. Moreover, the impact that contrasts between communicative conventions in different languages have on the structure of face-to-face interaction in intercultural situations cannot be determined on the basis of this model. In analysing face-to-face interaction in intercultural situations one has to consider that the interactors do not always act as pure representatives of their cultures, but react to the reactions of other actors who speak another language. In fact, analyses within the Contrastive Approach are an important precondition for interactive intercultural research, but do not provide insights into the intercultural discourse structures of face-to-face communication itself.

5. Analyses beyond misunderstanding

Linguistic research on intercultural discourse that focuses on beyond misunderstanding reflects on the question as to what extent different linguistic means contribute to intercultural understanding. Within the framework of this paper, two examples will be discussed (for an overview see Bührig & ten Thije, forthcoming). The first example concerns the controversy as to whether Grice’s Cooperative Principle (1975) needs to be applied differently across cultures or whether it is culture-bound and ‘mono-centric’. In a second example, the linguistic reconstruction of a specific cultural contact phenomenon, namely perspectivising intercultural discourse, will be discussed (ten Thije, forthcoming).

5.1 Grice revisited

The Gricean cooperative implicature counts as an important attempt within the framework of sentence oriented linguistics to take account of the fact that speech acts imply complex and flexible worlds and language knowledge and that their understanding is in fact interactively accomplished. The universality of the conversation implicature and its maxims has been discussed extensively (Keenan, 1976). On the basis of a large interactive intercultural study of spontaneous workplace communication of immigrants from diverse backgrounds using English as a lingua franca in Australia, Clyne (1994, 192f) discusses the Gricean theory and reformulates the Gricean maxims in order to assign them a more universal suitability. As Clyne attempts to analyse the role of culture in discourse beyond misunderstanding his reformulations are quoted in full:
The Gricean maxim of Quantity:

Make yourself as informative as is required.
Do not make your contribution more informative than is required. (ibid.)

reads as follows in Clyne’s revision:

Make your contribution as informative for the purpose of the discourse, within the bounds of the discourse parameters of the given culture parameters (e.g. form/content, oral/literate, rhythm, directionality, concreteness/abstractness). (ibid.)

The maxim of Quality:

Do not say what you believe to be false.
Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence. (ibid.)

sounds in Clyne’s revision:

Do not say what you believe to be in opposition to your cultural norms of truth, harmony, charity and/or respect. (ibid.)

The Maxim of Manner Avoid obscurity of expression sounds in Clyne’s revision:

Do not make it any more difficult to understand than may be dedicated by question of face and authority. (ibid.)

and the sub maxim, Avoid ambiguity, is reformulated to:

Make clear your communicative intent unless this is against the interests of politeness or of maintaining a dignity-driven cultural core value, such as harmony, charity or respect. (ibid.)

The sub maxim Be brief is revised to:

Make your contribution the appropriate length required by the nature and purpose of the exchange and the discourse parameters of your culture. (ibid.)

The sub maxim Be orderly is revised to:

Structure your discourse according to the requirements of your culture. (ibid.)

Clyne (1994, 194) hopes that these revised maxims will be adaptable for use within any culture. In fact, this revision does not account for intercultural discourse, as Clyne (ibid.) emphasises. Consequently, his revision should be considered to be results within the Contrastive Approach (see above).
With respect to the application of the maxims to the analysis of intercultural discourse, Clyne (ibid.) asks the question as to whether the speaker’s or hearer’s culture should be the determiner of the communication pattern in intercultural discourse. He claims that the dominant culture in the intercultural situation will eventually be accepted as the norm and concludes: “Successful inter-cultural communication is achieved by making the communicative intent very clear and, where possible, being aware of the interlocutor’s cultural expectations.” (ibid., 195). Therefore, for the sake of intercultural discourse he formulates an additional Maxim of Manner that reads as follows:

In your contribution, take into account anything you know or can predict about the interlocutor’s communication expectations. (ibid.)

Although this maxim could be interpreted from the speaker’s as well as from the hearer’s position, the overall model stays speaker-oriented and, in fact, Clyne’s revision collides with the restraints of the single utterance analysis. When the analysis has to detect the responses to reaction in intercultural discourse, one has to analyse stretches of discourse and one needs analytical categories that go beyond the unit of a sentence or an utterance. Furthermore, the revision implies that intercultural understanding can be described on the basis of a homogenous language concept and, consequently, intercultural competence is an addition to the monolingual competence. It is just for these assumptions that Clyne’s study marks the boundary between the analyses of misunderstanding and going beyond this.

5.2 Perspectivising intercultural discourse

Bührig & ten Thije (forthcoming) contains an overview of analyses beyond misunderstanding that show how linguistic means, especially reformulation, repair and perspectivising, facilitate intercultural understanding as they enable the interlocutors to reflect on ongoing intercultural discourse and to deal with potential conflicts or to benefit from the synergy of the language and cultural contact.

As an example from this survey, an analysis of ten Thije (2002b) will be presented that can be related to Clyne’s addition to the Gricean maxims. Clyne proposes that interactors should display their consideration respecting the communicative expectations of the cultural other in their contributions. It is this process of taking into account the communicative expectations in intercultural discourse that is analysed by ten Thije (2002b). In this respect ten Thije (ibid.) proposes a so-called three-step strategy with the following structure: generalising, perspectivising and contrasting cultures (ibid.). In short, these steps can be determined as follows: by generalising, an interactor considers his utterance as a cultural standard solution; by perspectivising, he locates his utterance in the actual speech situation taking into account cultural standards of the other. By contrasting cultures, the speaker enables the hearer to compare the speaker’s cultural standards with his own and attain an adequate interpretation of the discourse.

The example below originates from a research project on biographical stories about the famous East German car the TRABI. The Trabant was, and for some people still is, the sym-
bol of the GDR; it was proclaimed the car of the year 1989 and, after German reunification, it evolved into a cult object which it remains even now. The different names given to this car express various cultural identities, as becomes clear from the names: Wunderwerk, Objekt der Begierde, fahrbarer Untersatz, Stinkkiste, Pappe, Rundgelutschter, Mülltrabi, and Camouflage-Auto. The biographical stories give a very detailed insight into the development of German society, and the East in particular, in the last decades. The system change from socialist to market economy has influenced everyday life deeply and the Trabi stories document how new solutions were found for everyday needs.

On the basis of the Trabi stories one can compare the constitution of common ground in intra-cultural and inter-cultural discourse and, consequently, the reproduction of group boundaries (Barth, 1969). In order to reconstruct these discursive processes, the constellations of the narrative interview were varied according to the following scheme: an East German storyteller told an East German interviewer about his Trabi experiences. A West German told a West German, and a West German was interviewed by an East German. Finally, both East and West German informants told an outsider, a Dutchman, about their experiences. In short, the research is based on a corpus of about fifty interviews, divided into five groups: East-East, East-West, West-West, East-Dutch and West-Dutch. In each group, young people, adults and old people were interviewed. Consequently, it was possible to document how stories are told within one’s own cultural group, presupposing common communicative expectations, and how stories are told in intercultural discourse to an outsider with whom it was presupposed there was not so much common knowledge and to whom one had to explain and clarify (cultural) fore knowledge. The following themes were discussed: ‘my first Trabi-experience’, ‘my first Trabi-trip’, ‘the use of the Trabant in everyday life’, ‘the Trabant in the time of reunification’ and ‘my last Trabi-trip’. The analysis of the corpus gave the opportunity to examine the processes of the three-step strategy of generalising, perspectivising and contrasting in detail.

In the discourse fragment below, a West German adolescent tells a Dutch adult how she experienced a Trabant for the first time in her youth. East German relatives showed her a photograph with a green Trabant, which was said to be very special and a thing to be very proud of, but for her, as a West German, this was totally suspect and strange and she could not understand why they liked the colour that she found simply awful.

It strikes us that her story contains four reformulations on the central assertion about the green colour. On the basis of these four reformulations, the three-step strategy to understand intercultural discourse can be illustrated. This strategy has also been reconstructed in other stories.

Discourse fragment (WNJFM1-N1): A green Trabant (ten Thije 2002b.)

20X Wunderwerk, Objekt der Begierde, fahrbarer Untersatz, Stinkkiste, Pappe, Rundgelutschter, Mülltrabi, and Camouflage-Auto.

204

27-05-2003, 12:25
The Transition from Misunderstanding to Understanding

2D Wie/ wie soll man das sagen halt wahrnehmen oder das
2D how/ how should one say became aware or that
2D mm.

2D v dann auch/ naja weiß ich nich, das war halt so'n/ Der
2D then also/ yeah I don't know, that was just such a/ It

2D war halt irgendwie grün, und die fanden das halt ganz
2D was just somehow green, and they just considere it

24N very special, that Grandfather simply had a green

2D Trabi hatte, das muß was [1 Besonderes] gewesen sein,
2D that must have been something special,

Laughing

2D von der Farbe her einfach, weil das wohl nich [2 normal
2D simply because of the colour, because that was probably

2D war, 2] Also hier/ Ich weiß das (noch) Haha
2D not normal. Thus here/ I do (still) remember it

27N Laughs

2D [das is (sozusagen/) alles so Sachen, die mir so
2D that is (so to say/) all such things, that were

3 Laughter and raising her voice

2D völlig suspekt/ 3] un mir als/ als West-
2D completely suspicious for me/ and for me as/ just as a West

29N

2D völlig fremd war'n, well . die so stolz
2D that were completely strange because . they were

10N

2D damit, daß der diese [4 komische grüne Farbe, 4] die
2D so proud, that it had this funny green colour, that

31N

4 laughing

2D ich einfach [5 furchtbar häßlich fand 5] HH hh hh haha
2D I simply found terribly ugly

3 Laughing

2D Ha hahahaha

2D Laughs

12N

5 laughing

2D [6 So'n bißchen/ 6] also dieses komische Grün hatten,
2D A little/ well had this funny green,

11N

6 Still laughing

2D und die fanden das ganz klasse und
2D and they liked that very much and
The fragment displays the main characteristics of biographical story telling. According to criteria put forward by Rehbein (1982) the discourse is a story since it contains a series of assertions with a steering evaluation process ending up in a final judgement (point). The complete analysis cannot be discussed in detail in this paper but the focus will be on the four reformulations of the core assertion about the green colour that shows the three-step strategy for intercultural understanding.

The storyteller begins the story by introducing the persons, the car and the birthday party. Then she mentions the central event by saying:

> Der war grün und die fanden das besonders, daß der Großvater ‘n grünen Trabi hatte.

It was green, and they considered it very special that Grandfather had a green Trabi.

Subsequently, she generalises this event within the culture of her East German relatives. Thereby, she realises the first step of the three-step strategy by saying:

> Das muß was Besonderes gewesen sein von der Farbe her, weil das nicht normal war.

That must have been something special because of the colour, because that was not normal.

In the second step she considers the whole event from her own position as she judges it to be strange. In addition, she indicates her own position with means of the formulation mir als Westdeutscher. She says:

> Alles Sachen, die mir suspekt und mir als Westdeutscher fremd waren.

All things that were completely suspicious for me and strange for me as West German.

In the third step, she contrasts the judgement from her own and from the foreign culture. This foreign judgement contains the central point of the story which, according to Rehbein (1982), could be considered as the scandalon of the story. By formulating the scandalon the hearer understands why the story is actually being told (Bührig, 1996, 137). The storyteller says:

> Weil die stolz waren, daß der diese komische grüne Farbe hatte, die ich furchtbar häßlich fand.

Because they were proud that it had this funny green colour that I found terribly ugly.
So far, the interviewer has not reacted verbally. Now he joins in by laughing and realises
the hearer part of story telling. He thereby shows that he likes the story. Subsequently, the
teller finishes the story by summarising the result and by returning to the initial question.
She says:

Die fanden das klasse und ich konnte das nicht nachvollziehen. Das ist mein erstes
bewußtes Erlebnis.
They liked it very much and I could not understand it at all. That is the first experi-
ence I can recall

In sum, this reconstruction shows how the storyteller generalises, subsequently perspectivises
the event and finally contrasts both judgements on the event. By so doing, she enables the
hearer to understand the story properly. The function of this three-step strategy in this
example could be summarised as follows: the point of the story contains a very negative
judgement on Trabants. As a consequence, the storyteller runs the risk that this negative
judgement will be transferred to her East German relatives and in the end to the entire
GDR. That means that she could be regarded as someone who transmits negative East Ger-
man images. On the contrary, she does not transmit this image as overall image, but only as
a judgement from a certain historical position, that is from the position of a West German
adolescent before German unification.

The second step in the strategy of perspectivising is decisive in this respect. From other
analyses on perspectivising it is known that formulations as "Also hier / ich weiß das noch" (Thus
here/ I do (still) remember it) and "sozusagen" (so to say), and laughing contribute to perspectivis-
ing (Bredel, 1999). In the execution of the three-step strategy the storyteller ensures the
hearer gains an adequate interpretation by generalising, perspectivising and contrasting
the included cultural standards. As a result, the thread of negative self-presentation by the
storyteller is minimised. In fact, she presents herself as a good storyteller as well as an inter-
culturally competent person.

In conclusion, this fragment contains an example of perspectivising: the negative judg-
ment about the colour is not an absolute one, but its validity is decreased by specifying the
speaker’s cultural position, that means as a West German. From other stories, it is known
that the East German excitement about the colour had to do with the fact that this green
colour was not available in the GDR and that the car was painted with, as they called it, west
paint.

6. Conclusion

The field of interest of intercultural communication research should be limited to face-
to-face communication in intercultural situations. Clearly, studies within the Contrastive
and Interlanguage Approach on the role of culture in discourse contribute to the analysis
of intercultural communication. However, in order to develop a clear description of the
coherent research subject these studies should not be called intercultural research. It would
be more suitable to name them research on discourse in culture contact or, as Clyne (1994) proposes,
studies on the role of culture in discourse.
Within the limitation of the field of interest of face-to-face interaction in intercultural situations the following topics can be and need to be studied, if the linguistic consequences of the social transition in Europe are to be taken seriously:

- interactional constitution of cultural/ethnic identity
- the structure of non-professional interpreting
- international lingua franca communication
- interaction between ‘intercultural couples’
- structures of code switching and code mixing
- receptive multilingualism
- perspectivising intercultural communication
- the emergence of intercultures
- intercultural communication in virtual space (intercultural netiquette)

In conclusion, this paper has documented a shift of focus within the Interactive Intercultural Approach going beyond misunderstanding. The revision of the Gricean maxims by Clyne (1994) marks the transition which leads from the analysis of misunderstandings towards the analysis of intercultural understanding. The analysis of the three-step strategy of ten Thije (2002b) exemplifies how various linguistic means can be functionalised for intercultural understanding.

This change has important theoretical consequences for the focus and purposes of future linguistic research. According to theories on code switching and multilingualism, one should no longer assume that the monolingual speaker in a homogeneous speech community is the unmarked case, but replace this additive conception with the idea of an integrated bi- or multilingual competency (Lüdi & Py, 1984; Milroy & Muysken, 1995). Consequently, one should take the bilingual interlocutor in intercultural discourse as the starting point and consider various stages in the development of bilingual competence. For instance, one could transfer the theory of a dual focus model from code switching research (Franceschini, 1998) to an analysis of intercultural understanding and, consequently, contribute to a functional language theory concerning bi- and multilingual competencies.
I want to thank Ulrich Bauer and Ann Langridge for their comments on a previous version of this paper.
References


Ostmitteleuropa (pp. 413-429). Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.


The Role of Political Communication in Shaping Culture in CEECs

István Tarrósy (University of Pécs, Hungary)

“Since a politician never believes what he says, he is surprised when others believe him.”
Charles de Gaulle

1. Introduction

The aim of the present paper is to give a general overview of the role political communication can play in making and remaking culture in the post-Soviet countries. First, the relationship between political culture, political socialisation and political communication will be investigated. Then, some characteristic features of political culture in the transition countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) will be mentioned, with a focus on what political communication has done since the fall of the Berlin Wall with regard to contributing to the change of the political systems from one-party communism to multiparty democracy. Finally, conclusions will be drawn as to what political communication can do in order to achieve the democracy of the active citizenry in the region.

In any analysis of the role of political communication, the study of communication methods should have a central place. At this stage of my research on the topic of political communication, however, no specific examples of communication methods will be presented. Instead, the basic relationship of political communication and social transition, the transformation and future prospects of cultures of the Central and Eastern European regions will be put in the focus of the discussion. It is foreseen, however, that in my Ph.D. dissertation case studies of some Central and Eastern Europe countries (CEECs) will be added to the line of investigation from the point of view of argumentative discourse taking into consideration aspects of argumentative logic, consistency of political communication, rhetorical style and figures, and the rhetorical manoeuvring of the political players, i.e. political personalities.

“Communication is ... a social affair, usually taking place within the context of a fairly well-defined social situation” (Akmajan et al., 1990, 308). In the case of political communication, the investigation focuses on well-defined interactions between political parties, individual politicians and citizens. Communication is considered to be a game of players at the two ends of the channel of communication, therefore, it is important to specify and characterise the ends that are being dealt with. For our analysis at this stage, both ends are looked at with requirements of the democratic developments of these societies in view.
2. Political culture, political socialisation and political communication

Any state is characterised by its political culture as it is an important constituent of both the political life and the political establishment of that society. There are two approaches to explain what political culture is about: it can either (1) mean the collective cultural and behavioural patterns, attitudes of a political community or (2) cover the group of attitudes, values and norms of the individual towards the political system, the political community. As Bill Coxall and Lynton Robbins put it, “a political culture is the pattern of understandings, feelings and attitudes which dispose people towards behaving in a particular way politically. It is the collective expression of the political outlooks and values of the individuals who make up society” (Coxall & Robbins, 1998, 93).

As a further insight into the “two-way effect” of political culture, (Almond & Powell, 1992) provides additional evidence for the essence of the formation of political culture. This can be summarised as the distribution of political behaviours, merits, impressions, sets of relevant information, together with political abilities, skills and willingness. Exploring more of the dual nature of political culture, it can be revealed that on the one hand, the political culture of a nation is composed of individual attitudes, norms and expressions. It is, in short, determined by its citizens. On the other hand, the political culture of a given country influences its citizens and political players in their political behaviour, actions and reactions. According to Almond and Verba’s theory (Almond & Verba, 1963), the most important condition for the creation, practice and preservation of democracy is the existence of a democratic or “civic culture”,

Political culture is intertwined with the overall socialisation of people. In addition to general socialisation processes, people are politically socialised and sensitivized according to various agencies of their micro and macro environments, ranging from family to school to political parties. These agencies use different ways and methods of communication to reach the individual and forward their messages to them, either with the intention of making a better informed citizenry, or to get them to act according to their will. They communicate their views, opinions, standpoints, in one word, all sorts of political information that can shape and transform the political consciousness of the community. Thus, these agencies shape and transform the political culture of society at large.

The process of the political socialisation of the individual begins in childhood and finishes with the death of the individual. “Socialisation in general determines how children get accustomed to the world surrounding them, to the society they will live in, therefore, it is of utmost importance. In terms of political socialisation, it is “the process of social learning whereby individuals acquire knowledge, skills and dispositions that enable them to participate as more or less effective members of groups and the society” (Negrine, 1996, 131).

In this process of political learning it is not irrelevant what sort of agencies to what extent in what ways are involved. In addition, it is decisive what methods the agencies use to communicate their information about the world the individual is part of. There are primary agencies of socialisation, such as the family, the school, the workplace, as well as secondary ones, including peer groups, associations, political parties, the mass media, etc. Negrine argues that “the role of the mass media [is] actually more significant than the secondary designation warranted. By [the late 1960s], radio was well established and television had
become widely available so that a child could be easily exposed to non-familial influences from a very early age. Today this would be even more true with videos, satellite channels, and round-the-clock television transmissions filling up the 24 hours of the day” (Negrine, 1996, 132–133).

Political communication is an integral part of our daily life and exerts crucial influence on the political socialisation of the individual, consequently, on the development of modern political culture. Taking into consideration that “communicative success depends on the ability to make truthful links to situations and achieve consensus on informational significance” (Komlósi, 1997, 16), efficient political communication is dependant upon a number of identifiable conditions provided that the channel of communication between the political player and the citizen is set properly. Among these prerequisites the following ought to be mentioned (for further support see Appendix):

– the level of the development of telecommunication systems of the country;
– the nature of mass media (free, controlled or suppressed, objective and fair, informative, pluralistic, etc.);
– the level of professionalism of political actors in forwarding all sorts of political information to the individual, therefore, the methodology and techniques used by politicians (for instance, in political debates in the national assembly or at press conferences).

In short, effective political communication greatly depends both on the environment and the individual, and their actual interdependence.

3. Some features of political culture in transition countries

Drawing upon the work of Hungarian political scientist Tamás Fricz, some features of political culture in transition countries will be presented in this section (see Fricz 2001). Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) are different from their socially developed Western counterparts in some crucial areas and in some crucial senses. Whereas there is a continuity in the historical development of the Western nations, even if they had experienced wars and other subversive processes within society, CEECs under the Soviet rule were forced to give up or transform their political and cultural traditions (as the case might have been) in favour of a distorted, brave new culture. Again, after the political changes of 1989, new political institutions have been established with varying degrees of stability across CEECs, however, there is still no tradition for the rotation of governments. I do not mean to suggest that, for example, the British, basically two-party system where from time to time Labour and Conservative rule change is better than the ever-changing coalition governments of CEECs. I only observe that there is still no stabilised structure for the consolidated rotation of the different governments. As Fricz argues, until the present day, there has been a constant battle for authority and the creation of the associated culture. No coherent tradition has been established so far; a struggle of cultural approaches and a free competition of political cultures have been observed ever since the change of the Soviet-type political systems of the region. Compared with developed democracies of the West where the emphasis is laid on common resources and cooperative action, the major political forces of CEE democracies deny any common root or feature in the political culture they believe they represent.
seems that each party has fears that other forces will go against their approach, will suppress them, and the other will remain the sole player in shaping political culture.

CEECs have a heritage from the past, which haunts them. Although it is a great political achievement that political structures are stable, and CEECs are determined to make democracy work, being ready for meeting the Copenhagen Criteria for the sake of their European Union membership, there are problems both on the level of the political elite, as well as the individual. These problems are direct consequences of the Communist rule after which fundamental changes occurred in state institutions, and in the fields of economy and social integration. The degree to which a country is socially integrated and mobilised can determine the development of an active citizenry. After the collapse of Communism, the structures changed radically allowing bold social integration and a better mobilisation of the individual. Such trends naturally gave way to the rise of the level of citizen activity and involvement.

The development and shaping of political culture is impossible without the participation of the active citizens. To be able to reach the citizens, first, the political forces and actors need to solve the problem of mutual trust. Distrust and suspicion are among the main features of present-day political culture in the region. In fact, there is no established, settled, mature political culture today, therefore, there is a lot to be done from the point of view of democratic development. This is especially true at the level of the political elite. The citizens themselves have gone a long way in gradually developing a type of political culture which possesses characteristics of Western democratic countries where being active in society, living up to and using the fundamental rights to express individual opinion, to vote or protest are unanimous elements of daily life.

No democratic state can be characterised properly without its democratic political culture. Democratic political culture is in turn characterised by the pluralistic and politically independent media. These media can visualise in an ideally objective way the standpoints of the political forces that shape and transmit political culture, thus, make the citizens aware of processes within society, and help them play an active role in formalising and shaping the society they live in. It is vital, therefore, for any democratic regime to foster its media system.

4. Political communication and political language

Political communication is a double-edged sword. It helps the leading elite gain and maintain political power, whereas it also facilitates other groups of society to criticise. Presupposing a democratic political culture, which possesses democratic political communication as one of its indicators, political communication can be used to activate the citizens to become an integral part of decision-making about their living-conditions, representation and future. The critical tone of the people’s voice against the ruling political forces is necessary for a democratic regime. The process of achieving that, in which political communication becomes an obvious tool for both the actors of politics and the society at large, becomes the biggest tasks for societies of Central and Eastern Europe.

“Certainly, politicians use words and sentences in an emotive manner; it is part of their
aim to create a feeling of solidarity, to arouse emotions such as fear, hate or joy” (Wilson, 1990, 19). To be able to understand this political language, the individual needs to recognise the “linguistic dimension” that is created by the political player. Also, as a prerequisite, the political players are requested to construct the utterances that carry political information with the intention to persuade the citizens in a certain way that can be followed by the audience that is planned to be persuaded. Therefore, properly constructed arguments are fundamental in successfully communicating political messages.

Different socialising agencies, such as family or school, as well as the media help the individuals master a certain political language. Possessing and being able to interpret this type of language can contribute to the better orientation of the citizens within the political system. The French social scientist, Annick Percheron (Percheron, 1974) pointed out that a given culture can live and survive in a given world of meanings established by the individual through interacting with others. This is why political language is significant in carrying political meanings to the individuals from the political elite.

Different political cultures use diverse political language. Different types of politicians apply distinctive political language with divergent aims. In today’s globalized world, however, the common phenomenon of the race for power is ever so vivid. In transition countries of CEE, for instance, politicians want to gain or maintain their power, thus, the election struggle has been transformed into a simple competition for persuading more individuals to vote for their given parties, but not in the sense that the party wants to provide the individual with a series of possibilities and future prospects, rather it simply goes for grabbing power without real ideology. Parties only fight for the compassion and sympathy of the citizens and definitely do not intend to “save the world”.

The language used by the political elite is sometimes direct, in other cases, indirect, with implicit, hidden “extra” meanings. Following Grice’s theory of conversational logic, it can be stated that there is much more to what is meant than what is said. People in general may not mean what the words they use mean. Nonliteral speech involves the “common cases of … irony, sarcasm, and figurative uses of language such as metaphor” (Akmajian et al., 1993, 313). Also, as Crystal confirms, “the majority of [speech] acts in everyday conversation are indirect” (Crystal, 1987, 121), that is, more is meant to communicate by implications and implicatures than what the actual words and sentences convey. Individuals can establish their own concepts of the political system they live in only from the input they get from the socialising agencies, their families, the party, etc., through the various verbal and non-verbal communicative sources, such as politicians. In theory, their task is not easy as “more than just a common [political] language is required to enable the hearer [i.e. the voter] to identify the speaker’s [i.e. the politician’s] communicative intentions on the basis of the speaker’s [the politician’s] utterances. A shared system of beliefs and inferences must be operating” (Akmajian et al., 1993, 315).

As far as today’s political competitions can be followed in the media, either electronic or printed, which have the ultimate goal to sell their products to the biggest possible number of people, it is a challenge to use as much direct and reduced language as possible when persuading people. As Fricz argues, what is needed, therefore, is simple speech and vocabulary understandable widely, clear and simple for the majority of the population, which in turn means that political parties need to train their representatives according to such require-
ments, as well as they have to come up with “consumable products” as regards communicating their ideas, programmes and portfolios.

It is inevitable for anyone wanting to get orientated in a given political system to grasp and master political language. We know, politics is a game, but it is also understood that “communication [itself] is a game played co-operatively, according to socially conventional rules and procedures” (Eemeren, 1996, 201). According to Barbara O’Keefe’s theory of the logics of message design, “language is a means of expressing propositions, but the propositions one expresses are specified by the social effect one wants to achieve” (O’Keefe, 1988, 86). Politicians, therefore, need to be prepared and trained to be able to express the messages of their parties according to the socially accepted norms of their societies. Obviously, these norms differ from society to society, making countries and political cultures distinguishable from one another.

Messages are designed in various ways, following different motivations. They can be simply “expressive”, meaning that they are used in the process of linguistic expression of feelings and thoughts with the intention of informing the audience about the immediate feelings and thoughts the speaker has on a certain subject. They can also be conventional or rhetorical, but there is no doubt about the fact that “political language functions to influence political thought ... since politicians present an argument which they want the electorate to believe” (Wilson, 1990, 9).

5. Conclusions

The radical change of the political systems in Central and Eastern European countries during the last decade of the twentieth century has had an influential impact on almost all walks of life within these societies. A great number of difficult tasks were attached to the shift from communism to private capitalism, from a one-party political rule to multi-party democracy. Economic restructuring, consolidation of market reforms, strengthening “the social and political foundations of a democratic system, ...and the development of a vibrant civil society” (Gower, 1999, 4) were undoubtedly among the first tasks to be achieved in order to accomplish a real change in the system.

Civil society and civic culture go hand in hand. Transition is not possible without a fundamental change in the mindset and way of thinking of the individuals. The advancement and encouragement of a more participatory political culture over the dependant, “subservient-type” political stance of the era of communism is still an unattained, but inevitable goal for the political elite. I am convinced that this goal is an ideal one. In a more sceptical voice, Colin Sparks raises the question whether “there has been any significant change as a result of the fall of communism” (Sparks, 1998, 187). He states that “the mass of the population remains dominated by a narrow, and substantially unchanged, elite group that monopolises social and political power”; and argues that the reason for this is that “the political, social and media life of the former communist countries remains heavily peopled with representatives of the former regimes. Social continuity in the elite groups is one of the strongest and most striking features of the transition” (Sparks, 1998, 187).

The formation of a new culture, both in the social and economic senses, however, began
in 1989 in the majority of the countries of the former Soviet bloc. Total transformation could not take place in such a short period of time, but it has been launched and will be concluded in the future. To varying degrees, some countries will reach this level of transformation earlier than others, therefore, they will be able to join the community of their western partners, i.e. the European Union (EU) earlier. Membership to the EU is in fact an indicator of the level of “metamorphosis”.

The role of the media is crucial in the transmission of political information towards the citizens. Since 1989, CEECs have been experiencing a boom in the field of mass media products including the critical voice of the public, an important sign of a strengthening pluralism which “increasingly contains the element of a free press that criticises the regime” (Tarrósy, 2002, 10). As this is further confirmed by Sparks, “the media themselves did change. They ceased simply to be the property of a single, unified ruling group. They no longer spoke with the one single voice determined by the Central Committee. Now they responded to the pulls of different competing groups of rulers.” (Sparks, 1998, 188–189). Competitiveness in various aspects of life has become an unmissable constituent of the developing democracies of the countries of the region.

Political communication, on the one hand, is a multifunctional tool for politicians to persuade, activate and even dictate. On the other hand, it is a tool in the hand of the citizens to criticise, become activated and heard, as well as take part in decision-making. In a democratic society, it is the two-fold tool of co-operation between politicians and society at large. For CEECs, i.e. countries under transition this is a lesson to be learned, together with respective methods and techniques to be mastered, always bearing in mind the ultimate right to the freedom of expression as such.
### Communication and Culture

#### The Role of Political Communication in Shaping Culture in CEECs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Population (July 2001 est.)</th>
<th>Telephone: Main lines in use</th>
<th>Telephone: Mobile cellars in use</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>31,304.17 (2000)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>17,573.3 (1998)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>40,202.3 (1998)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(April 1999)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Slovakia</strong></td>
<td>5,414,837</td>
<td>1,934,558 (1997)</td>
<td>736,662 (1997)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(1 million)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Slovenia</strong></td>
<td>1,930,132</td>
<td>722,000 (2000)</td>
<td>17,160.0 (2000)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Broadcast Stations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Radios</td>
<td>4.51 million</td>
<td>3,159,134 (December 2000)</td>
<td>(plus 1,434 repeaters)</td>
<td>35 (plus 161 low-power repeaters)</td>
<td>179 (plus 256 repeaters)</td>
<td>48 (plus 392 repeaters)</td>
<td>38 (plus 864 repeaters)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Internet Service Providers (ISPs)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Internet Users

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>900,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>650,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>2.8 million</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>800,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>700,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>450,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>460,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix

Table
Some significant features of the development of the telecommunication systems of 7 CEECs
Source: CIA World Factbook 2001

With regard to the general assessment of the telephone systems of the respective CEECs by the CIA, a modernisation process can be recognised with all its benefits to the development of communication in the region. The evaluation itself ranges from the category of “extensive but antiquitated” in the case of Bulgaria to the “poor domestic service, but improving” category of Romania to the Hungarian example where “the telephone system has been modernised and is capable of satisfying all requests for telecommunication service”.

Communication and Culture

Notes


13 This political culture means that citizens are informed and committed in certain political issues; they actively participate in debates, political movements and activities, and think over issues of political nature in rational and thorough ways in varying degrees from individual to individual. (See Andorka, 2001; and Körösényi, 1998)

14 Political socialisation can form and transform political culture. In the midst of special events, for instance, the establishment of a new nation or state, political socialisation creates political culture in areas and social layers where previously other political culture had existed. Resocialisation is crucial during the life of the individual. For example, Germany has experienced this type of resocialisation twice; first after World War II and for the second time after the fall of the Berlin Wall and during the German unification. Political resocialisation affects mainly the senior citizens of the given country. In the case of Germany, therefore, after the 'Wende', the attitudes and forms of behaviour of GDR senior citizens changed dramatically according to the new type of political culture. (See Almond & Powell, 1992)

15 It is obvious that the development of telecommunication results in broader circles of society that people become more informed, and at the same time, more involved in matters affecting their daily lives. Politicians gradually use telecommunication systems as much as possible to influence the individual and shape the course of public opinion. Analysing and comparing telecommunication systems and the level of the development of the media in various countries contribute to the better understanding of the given methods and approaches politicians tend to utilise in their communication with the society at large. For this purpose, see the data for comparison among some CEECs in the Appendix. (Also, for further examples cf. Tárósy, 2001)
References


Tarrósy, I. (2001). Politikai kommunikáció és kultúra Tanzániában és az Egyesült Királyságban. [Political communication and culture in Tanzania and the United Kingdom]. In M. Kunszt & Á. Laczkóné Tuka (Eds.): *Politikatudományi válaszok a XXI. század kihívásaira. VII. Politológus vándorgyűlés* [Responses from the Domain of Political Science to the Challenges of the 21st Century. 7th Hungarian Political Scientists’
Communication and Culture


ARGUMENTATIVE AND JUXTAPOSITIVE STRATEGIES IN POLITICAL DISCOURSE
J.Lachlan Mackenzie (Free University Amsterdam)

1. Introduction

This article will consider the text ‘Families the best guardians’ (see Appendix), which appeared in the Internet version of the English-language newspaper Budapest Sun of 20 December 2001. The stated author is Péter Harrach, the Hungarian Minister of Social and Family Affairs and Deputy-President of the Hungarian Christian Democratic Alliance. The original text was accompanied by a picture, without a caption, which later research revealed to be a picture of Terry Black, of whom more below, holding the baby he adopted. As I will show (section 2), the text qualifies as ‘political discourse’ in the sense of Van Dijk (1997) and of the entire volume in which that article appeared (Blommaert and Bulcaen 1997). The central focus of this article (section 3) will be on the strategies adopted by the author to impart his political message; I will examine the extent to which Rhetorical Structure Theory (RST; Mann 1999) can help to elucidate those strategies.

The text consists of 41 paragraphs; in the Appendix I have provided each with a number, and the sentences within them too, so that §14.2, for example, is to be read as the second sentence of paragraph 14. Other additions of mine, such as double lines and letters added to the numbers, I will return to in section 3 below. The paragraphs are generally very short (averaging 1.83 sentences per paragraph, the longest paragraph having 4 sentences); this is fairly standard in much journalistic writing: the paragraphing bears only a very loose relation to the structuring of the text, and will be disregarded henceforth. The sentences are often quite sophisticated in structure, with regular use of co-ordination and subordination, both finite and non-finite: the average sentence contains 21.57 words, a length that falls within the usual range for argumentative journalistic writing. In appearance and style, the article does not strike the reader – especially the reader unfamiliar with Harrach – as being any different in essence from the others in the same issue of the Budapest Sun, not least since it is classified by the website as a “News Story”.

The question arises to whom the text is addressed. Presumably not to an audience of potential voters within Hungary, since they would be unlikely to take cognisance of Harrach’s views in English. An alternative readership is the European-wide Christian-Democratic movement, the purpose then being possibly to express solidarity with other like-thinking political parties in other countries. But this also seemed unlikely, since many of the references in the text and various details of adoption law in Hungary are not familiar to the outsider. My provisional conclusion is that the intended audience is the émigré Hungarian world-wide, who retains an awareness of and interest in Hungarian politics and social life, but who has lost some or all of his/her parents’ or ancestors’ Hungarian
communication and culture

2. Political discourse

Van Dijk (1997, 25) characterises political discourse as “reflexive”, i.e. referring to the author himself and his political opinions and intentions; this property distinguishes political discourse from, for example, “educational, scholarly, or legal discourse”. The text, however, has a predominantly argumentative or persuasive style, especially in the initial paragraphs. This somewhat disguises the political ambitions of the text, with the truly “reflexive” passages coming towards the end. Nevertheless, the intentions which become explicit in the final passage are present from the very beginning, but are partially concealed by being presented either in presupposed form (as in §3 The reason Hungary is amending its child protection law ..., with moreover the subject Hungary rather than the Government) or by means of an impersonal construction and the passive voice (as in §4: it is important that the adoption process be accelerated).

Yet these matters, despite being apparently downplayed, are in fact the central topic of the text. Van Dijk (1997, 26) proposes that the textual topic be formulated as a semantic macroproposition, which I would express as follows:

(1) It is necessary that the Government reform the law about adopting children.

Here, to use terms from Role and Reference Grammar (Van Valin and LaPolla 1997) the Actor is appropriately a political institution (specifically the Government) and the Undergoer the ‘public’, specifically the children to be adopted and the would-be adopters. The predicate is appropriately a political action (reform) and is, as one would expect, future-oriented and positive. Much of the rest of the text concerns the present and immediate past, and is negatively coloured, while the closing paragraphs of the text trumpet a positive vision of the future. Finally, the macroproposition contains a deontic modality (it is necessary that), from which the entire persuasive content of the text flows.

Van Dijk points out that non-elite individuals can also play a part in political discourse, where they have a “special rhetorical effect” (1997, 26). This role is clearly played in our text by Terry Black, pseudonym of Károly Rácz, variously identified in Internet sources I have consulted as a transvestite, “Hungary’s most famous gay”, and an actor and TV host. He was in 2001 found fit to adopt a child; there are indications that the child was ‘bought’ for HUF 3.7m. The mother, said to be a porn actress, is alleged to want the child back; Terry is equally adamant about keeping the child. According to a survey, 78% of the Hungarian population felt at the end of 2001 that Black should retain the baby.

Van Dijk finds that conservatives – and Harrach is surely to be classified as such – typically appeal to the “good old times” (1997, 27), but it is noticeable that the Minister does not do this, perhaps because the old times in Hungary were not so good. The situation he wishes to remedy has prevailed, he says significantly in §5.1, for “several decades”. Instead,
the author concerns himself with the ‘bad new times’, as it were, in which the globalisation of western values has impinged upon Hungarian culture. The implicit appeal here to fortress Hungary, surrounded by threatening forces, is clear – in this context it is interesting to find the implicit suggestion that Hungary is not part of Europe in the phrase Hungary and Europe in §19.1. The danger is of so-called “ultra-liberal” values penetrating the land, like the Trojan horse, from such sources as the Netherlands, mentioned by name in §19.2 as permitting euthanasia, gay marriage and adoption of children by gays.

A typical property of political discourse, which we find at every turn in the text under examination, is polarisation. The text breathes polarisation from the very beginning, where acceptable is opposed to unacceptable and subjective to objective. More specifically, Van Dijk (1997, 28) finds political discourse to be characterised by “positive evaluations of us and negative evaluations of them, i.e. our political and ideological competitors, opponents, or even enemies”. Belonging to the positive category (us) in this text we find the Government, the Christian-Democratic party, Christians and Bible-believing people, and crucially the heterosexual married nuclear family, consisting of “a mother and a father” with their children, biological or adopted. The positive classification of these people is apparent from such terms as healthy, suitable, decent, well-balanced, intimate, sober and happy.

The negative characterisation of them is also reflected lexically in such terms as mostly-biased (§21.2) and activists (§20.1) as well as, at the morphological level, the prefix in ultra-liberal. Punctuationally, we may note the scare quotes around parents in §5.2: even when conceding that the present system is not a total failure, the author is not prepared to grant the adopters the unequivocal status of parents. Who, then, are they? Harrach’s opponents come from various walks of life: the bureaucratic personnel in the national child protection system, especially in the capital Budapest; single parents, be they divorcees or widows/widowers; porn actors; certain media figures; non-Christians, apparently a distinguishable category from non-believers in the Bible (§31.4); and one more category, homosexuals, to whom we will return.

There is a strong suggestion in the text that his own position, that of we, is objective, or at least commonsensical, whereas that of his opponents is subjective – as reflected in the above-mentioned adjectival phrase mostly-biased; similarly, his own values are presented by implication as eternal, those of his opponents being trendy. His opponents (they) are regularly classified as alternative, implying that choice is a good thing in society, but that the people in question have made a bad choice, which is ultimately down to their consciences (§22). With this approach goes an appearance of tolerance, particularly with regard to sexual activities and orientations. In §18.1, Harrach refrains from condemning Black for his personal life as that is his private business. This attitude also applies in §22.3 to people who live the much-mentioned alternative lifestyles in their sexual behavior, which is granted the status of strictly a private matter. But it will affect their life opportunities, if Harrach gets his way. Also relevant in this regard is the use of the term lifestyle to refer, indirectly, to unmarried cohabitation and homosexuality in one breath (it is noticeable that these are co-ordinated with married life in §27.1). As Lakoff (1996, 226) has pointed out with regard to the very word lifestyle, there is here a strong suggestion that homosexuality is a choice, which flies in the face of mounting scientific evidence that it is genetically determined rather than an option of free will. Similar remarks apply, I would contend, to the expression sexual identity crisis (§16.2), where the suggestion is...
that sufficient psychiatric help would lead to a cure.

Harrach’s ‘objective, positive and eternal values’ are, he claims, held by the majority, as we see in §35 (although the above-mentioned 78% in the opinion poll might suggest differently). A typical characteristic of political discourse is indeed the depiction of a majority threatened by a minority. Whereas most experts agree (§29) with Harrach, some opponents are interviewed as experts [my emphasis, JLM] (§20.1); but they represent certain smaller groups (§25.1). Van Dijk (1997, 31) comments that “political discourse is similar to ethnocentric majority discourse about minorities”.

The way in which our bad acts are portrayed will differ from the depiction of their bad acts. The problems that the government has had with adoption in the past are downplayed (the situation is not so tragic as one might imagine §5.3), and are blamed upon county personnel rather than government-enacted bureaucracy. What is more, the director was on a well-deserved (§15.1) vacation when the decision to permit the adoption was taken, suggesting the scenario of “when the cat’s away, the mice will play”. But the tendency will be to enlarge upon the bad acts of one’s opponents: the Terry Black case is already sufficiently familiar to the audience, but Harrach cannot resist mentioning a scurrilous fact which the media have not conveyed with sufficient clarity to the public (see §17.2).

And finally, as for the word we itself, it is to be found in the opening and closing passages of the text. In the opening, its use is effectively impersonal, I believe: We must mention (§5.2) and we should not forget (§9.2), expressions which could be switched into the passive voice. In the closing passage, however, we in §36.1 and §37.3 refer to the Government, and in §39.2 and certainly in §41 we is now fully assimilated to the Hungarian people of the present and a utopian future.

The conclusion to be drawn is that ‘Families the best guardians’ is thoroughly political discourse. Nevertheless, the text generally has the appearance of argumentative prose. Harrach generally does not harangue his readership, but predominantly adopts the style of cool, almost academic debate, as in §25, where he talks of two opposing schools of thought, which define two different pictures. In order to examine this more deeply, let us consider the structure of the text in greater detail, employing the techniques of RST.

3. Structural analysis of the text

The text divides, I would submit, into three sections; the divisions are signalled in the Appendix by double lines (/ /):

A. 1.1 – 14.1
B. 14.2 – 32
C. 33 – 41

A presents the central topical proposition of the text and provides general background. B offers the ideological back-up to the proposals for reform outlined in A, seeking to persuade the reader of their necessity. C translates the central proposition of the text into present and future government action, and depicts the future results of that action.
This general macrostructure can be detected rather straightforwardly, I would claim, although it may be obscured somewhat by the paragraphing in §14. More “subtle and indirect” according to Van Dijk (1997, 31) are issues of local coherence, i.e. the textual structuring within the sections of the text. He laments the lack of systematic empirical data on local coherence in political discourse. A notable exception, however, is his volume-mate Jucker (1997), which shows that whereas a persuasive intention can be assumed in a British party-political television broadcast, the persuasive claims cannot be retrieved from the transcription of the broadcast itself. The persuasion is implicit: it is the juxtaposition of textual elements that invites the receiver of the text (i.e. the viewer of the broadcast or the reader of an article such as Harrach’s) to make new connections: the receiver persuades himself/herself, as it were. This notion of juxtaposition will return below.

In a persuasive text, we would expect, in terms of the work of Sanders, Spooren and Noordman (1992), a predominance of causal over additive relations between text spans: the author is building a case and, just as in a law court, establishing causal relations is essential to the persuasiveness of that case. Before examining this proposition, let us first very briefly go into the notion of a text span, an unavoidable but elusive component of any textual analysis. It is clear that neither the sentence nor the clause can be simply identified with the text span. Sentence §3.1, for example, contains two text spans; indeed it could (certain stylistists would say: should) have been written as two sentences. Sentence 1.3 contains, under one analysis, five clauses (including one that has lost its finite verb under co-ordination reduction and another that is verbless); yet I should wish to regard it as one text span, since it contributes one (admittedly complex) message to the entire text. Very roughly and provisionally, a text span would be a clause that is not (a) an embedded clause, (b) a restrictive relative clause, or (c) a conditional clause in a tight protasis-apodosis relation. Our text, as most do, offers further complications. Generally, a copular construction of the form X is Y would be taken as one text span. Nevertheless, writers have the option of presenting a discourse unit as presupposed and yet intend it to be understood as a text span. This is what I take to happen in §3.2, where Hungary is amending its child protection law is, as we saw earlier, presented as presupposed but is the core proposition of the entire section, possibly of the entire text. Another case before we move on: in §5.1 the which-clause is presented as restrictive (lacking a comma) but must be understood as a separate span which is in an implicitly causal relation to the preceding span.

In the Appendix, the division of text section A into spans is indicated where necessary by the letters following the paragraph numbers. Figure 1 presents an analysis of section A in a representationally informal version of Rhetorical Structure Theory (RST) in the fashion of Mann (1999); lack of space prevents me from presenting an analysis of the entire text. The diagram shows satellite-nucleus relations between spans: a single-headed arrow points from a satellite to a nucleus; a double-headed arrow indicates a relationship of mutual dependence. I will refer to the ultimate nucleus of each grouping of text spans as a ‘core’.

The beginning of the section under analysis strongly suggests that the author is adopting an argumentative approach of the type one might encounter in an academic essay. The writer starts (§1.1) with an uncontroversial statement and then (§1.2) prepares the reader for two reasons for the state of affairs denoted by that statement. This rational procedure
Figure 1: RST analysis of Section A

Figure 1
is supported by §1.3, which offers the first reason. The structure of the text powerfully implies that §2.1 will offer the second, but the formulation deviates from what is expected. In an academic text, one might have anticipated something like The unacceptable reason is that bureaucratic regulations and practices get in the way. Instead, the writer’s political commitment and indignation, we may assume, lead to the formulation (a rather ironic one under the circumstances) there is absolutely no reason .... This intrusion of subjectivity is heightened by the following sentence, which is introduced by the emotive disjunct sadly, and suggests a correspondence between objective we and subjective they, but otherwise is hard to interpret. The RST analysis in Figure 1 brings out the overall structure of these two paragraphs, but cannot account for the slippage between cool argumentation and personal indignation. Mann (1999, 1) writes, indeed, that “RST is intended to describe texts, rather than the processes of creating or reading and understanding them”. As we shall see, however, the labelling of relations (and to some extent the determination of the structure) cannot be divorced from processes of reading and understanding.

Some of this begins to become clear in §3.1, where two text spans are presented in juxtaposition, as mentioned before. Whereas the second span clearly is a satellite to the first, we may assume a causal relation, but the lack of connective makes this uncertain. §3.1 prepares the reader for §3.2, in which the central proposition of the text is presented in presupposed form, The reason Hungary is amending its child protection law is primarily so that ..., as opposed to the potential assertion Hungary is amending its child protection law primarily in order to .... It may be that the author is keen to return to the cooler, more rational style that has been abandoned since §2. Here the RST analysis I propose goes against what the grammatical structure of §3.2 would suggest. The result, however, is greater parallelism with §4, where, if we grant that it is important that introduces the communicatively foregrounded pair of clauses, an assertion is followed by an indication of the purpose of the measure that it asserts. The two paragraphs are further elaborated (or is it restated?) by §5, which shows a very regular ‘left-branching’ structure.

Paragraphs 6 and 7 group together, picking up on §2.1, the subjectively coloured “unacceptable reason”. The core here is §6b, which is to be central to the discussion of the Terry Black case from §14.2 onwards. §6a actually undermines the reasoning applied at the outset of the text, and thus is a concession with regard to what follows. The RST structure here clarifies the structural relations among the various text spans, but cannot bring out our interpretation: note the use of for example, which should rationally introduce a random instance, but which is used to zero in upon the specific county, Budapest, that is to be blamed for its laxness. The author’s indignation is here tempered by the style features of cool argumentation: There are huge differences ... for example and the use of statistical data.

§8.1 is roughly equivalent to §4.1 and is the core of a sequence that moves the argument on, preparing for the entire remainder of the section under analysis with its core §9.2, culminating in the essential word suitable, which recurs 3 times later in the text. In §10, we see a sharp contrast between grammatical structure and text structure, which is brought out by the RST diagram. The grammar, and specifically the conjunction while suggests a contrast between §10a and §10b; since no such contrast exists in logic, we must link §10a back to §9.2, to which it remains juxtaposed.

The structure of the remainder of the passage under analysis, from §11 onwards, breaks
away from the more complex argumentative style, presenting statements in simple juxtaposition, without any connectives. Here again, it is eminently possible to reveal the structural nucleus-satellite relations between text spans through RST trees, but the labelling of these relations is more problematic: the less rational the discourse, the harder it is to apply RST. The writer appears to realise that there is a discrepancy between his series of credos and the reality of human relations when he introduces his summary with let’s face it, a discourse marker indicating an appeal to an all-embracing subjective consensus that abrogates all previous reasoning. (Something similar will happen again in §27.2, with the expression let’s be honest.)

4. Conclusion

To what extent, then, is this a persuasive text? In one sense, it is not, since it is not likely to convince a sceptical reader, not least because dissident views are regularly dismissed. A member of the THEY clan is not liable to switch to the WE clan on the basis of this text. Given the recurrent references to Christianity, it may not be inappropriate to compare the text to a sermon: Harrach is, as it were, preaching to the converted. In another sense, the text does seem to be persuasive, at least in those passages where the style and the textual structure revealed by RST are more reminiscent of logical academic discourse. Here statements are appropriately relativised by concessions, as in §5.2 and in §13, and we find adverbs typical of the academic’s careful formulations in primarily (§3.2), partially (§6a) or predominantly (§6b), as well as the modal verb might in §6b. But this style alternates with passages in which articles of faith are juxtaposed in a way that is tougher for RST to handle. §12 is a relevant instance in which the reader is invited to see some logical link between the two sentences The interest of the child is number-one and he or she should have a mother and a father. Here, as in Jucker’s (1997) examples of political discourse, finding the coherence is left to the reader. In the quasi-rational framework set up by the initial paragraphs of the text, the reader is indirectly invited to see a rational link between these two statements, and the suggestion, made explicit in §14.1, is that the link is causal: because the interest of the child is number-one, he or she should have a mother and a father. The readership, in making that link themselves, become accomplices to the writer’s purpose.
Notes

16 I am grateful to Gerard Steen for advice on the RST analysis and to many participants in the Dutch-Hungarian Conference on Crosscultural Linguistics and Intercultural Communication (Pécs, Hungary, 20–23 February 2002) for their valuable comments on the spoken version of this paper.


18 I am aware that the subject matter dealt with in the text under analysis is politically and/or emotionally sensitive for many people in contemporary Hungary. I am also aware that certain aspects of my analysis may be interpreted as being personally critical of the text and its author, both emanating from Hungary. My intention is not to intensify painful emotions, although the close analysis of a text may well have the indirect consequence of exposing nerve endings. And my intention is certainly not to suggest that political discourse in Hungary is qualitatively different from that in other democracies; my choice of a Hungarian text, made available to the world through the Internet, should rather be seen as a tribute to Hungarian democracy.
References


Appendix
Families the best guardians
by Péter Harrach

§1.1 Today in Hungary it is very difficult to adopt a child. §1.2 There is an acceptable and a less acceptable reason for this. §1.3 The acceptable reason is that a child put up for adoption is not merely another consumer product which can be purchased and then returned or dispensed with if unwanted.

§2.1 But on the other hand, there is absolutely no reason for bureaucratic regulations and practices to get in the way when it comes to adoption. §2.2 Sadly, systems based on objective rules are also accompanied by subjective ones.

§3.1a It is in the basic interest of a child to be raised in a family, §3.1b the interests of the child stand before everything else. §3.2a The reason Hungary is amending its child protection law is primarily §3.2b so that children given up for adoption should find their place in a family.

§4a Also, it is important that the adoption process be accelerated and §4b that guardians or adoptive parents be appointed as soon as possible, §4c so that children spend as little time as possible in State institutions.

§5.1a It is now necessary to overhaul the overloaded child-care system §5.1b which has not been developed for several decades. §5.2 We must mention, however, that even so, 9,000 of the 20,000 children under the State’s welfare system have been placed with “parents”. §5.3a Thus, the situation is not as tragic as one might imagine, §5.3b although there is definitely room for improvement.

§6a Bureaucratic procedures are partially to blame for the number of children remaining in welfare homes, §6b but it is predominantly the mentality of the personnel employed in the State’s child protection system that might cause problems.

§7.1 There are huge differences among these employees in the nation’s 19 counties. §7.2 For example, in Budapest the number of those given up for adoption who are actually placed with new parents is only half the national average.

§8.1 The amendment to the child protection law submitted to Parliament is to simplify and shorten the adoption procedure. §8.2a I regret to say that the so-called “secret” or anonymous adoption process (§8.2b whereby adopting parents and natural parents do not know each other’s identity and neither does the child know its “real” mother and father) §8.2a takes several years.

§9.1a In the case of so-called “public” adoption (§9.1b where natural and adopting parents know of each other) §9.1a the amendment will allow the Adoption Guidance Office (Gyámhivatal) to decide a child is ready for adoption after six months, instead of the current one-year period, §9.1c should their parents not keep in contact with them while they are in State care. §9.2 But we should not forget that one of the priorities must always be to determine whether the prospective parents are suitable.
§10a While many suitable married couples are ready to adopt, §10b the priority is not to satisfy the needs or requests of single, unmarried people wanting to be parents.

§11a Suitability for adopting a child should be better examined, §11b testing the candidate’s personality lifestyle and environment.

§12.1 The interest of the child is number-one. §12.2 He or she should have a mother and a father.

§13.1 Naturally and regretfully I understand many children are compelled to grow up in broken homes. §13.2 This, I believe, is a certain situation most probably created unintentionally by the parents.

§14.1a But let’s face it, §14.1b if there is a chance of placing a child with a married couple then it is more in the interest of the child for this to occur. // §14.2 Here is where I must mention that, in what has now been tagged “The Terry Black Case”, the interests of the child are far more important than the interests of the single parent.

§15.1 I believe that in his case it was an attempted “coup” under the cover of adoption. §15.2 The director of the Gyámhivatal in Budapest’s District XIV was on his well-deserved holiday leave when a panel of child experts decided to allow Terry Black to adopt.

§16.1 When learning of what had happened, the director immediately informed the Budapest Child Guidance Authority and the Budapest Chief Prosecutor’s Office vetoed the move and aborted the adoption procedure.

§16.2 One of the main reasons was that the majority of child experts said Black’s sexual identity crisis made him an inappropriate parent.

§17.1 However this was not the only problem. §17.2 Very few people know - as it was not clearly conveyed to the general public by the media - that this person in question is a lead actor in porn films.

§18.1 In saying this I do not wish to judge or condemn him for his personal life as that is his private business. §18.2 However, I disagree that he be allowed to adopt a child simply because, as Minister of Social and Family Affairs, I must concentrate on the fact that I’m primarily representing the interests of the child in question.

§19.1 Many new ultra-liberal trends have rooted themselves in Hungary and Europe. §19.2 For example, in the Netherlands euthanasia and marriage of and adoption by homosexuals is permitted in law.

§20.1 These trends all have their leading activists, who are sometimes interviewed as experts in the media for their views. §20.2 However, debate generated in this case has exceeded what I would call a healthy limit.

§21.1 The Terry Black issue, blown up out of all proportion, has become a repulsive circus in which most decent people would most probably not want to be involved. §21.2 This is also possibly the reason for the choice of mostly-biased commentators interviewed in the media.

§22.1 Here is the key message. §22.2 It must be acknowledged that not everyone is suitable for the same purposes. §22.3 For example, people who live the much-mentioned alternative lifestyles in their sexual behavior - strictly a private matter - must be left to deal with this based on their own consciences.

§23 But, nevertheless, those who accept being alternative must also accept that they are suitable for certain purposes, but at the same time unsuitable for others.

§24 The development and cultural standards of a society can be determined by its attitudes
to (agreement or disagreement) such trendy alternative lifestyles.

§25.1 In today’s Hungarian society, certain smaller groups want to validate or promote their alternative lifestyles. §25.2 Society has two opposing schools of thought which define two different pictures of the future.

§26 The root of this big difference can be found in the definition of the words personal freedom.

§27.1 According to ultra-liberals, being married, having a live-in lover, or having a homosexual relationship is of equal social value. §27.2 But the goal of an adoption, let’s be honest, is that a child find a healthy and happy family.

§28 In my vocabulary, a family consists of a smaller community within larger society based on a marriage where there is a father (man) and a mother (woman) who raise their child(ren).

§29 Most experts generally agree that it is best for a child to have married parents - in the form of a father and a mother - and that they not be raised by others in a welfare home or institution.

§30 It is also crucial that the two parents should, for the sake of the child, guarantee a sense of security via a well-balanced, intimate family relationship.

§31.1 This, and nothing else, is the definition of a family best for a child. §31.2 This should be comprehensible to every sober person. §31.3 For those who follow the Bible and true Christians it is natural to think of a family being headed by married parents. §31.4 In non-Bible-believing or non-Christian communities it is still considered more favorable for a child to grow up with unmarried parents who live together long-term in a husband-and-wife-style relationship.

§32.1 There are cases where a divorced or widowed parent is compelled to live and raise their child(ren) as a single parent. §32.2 For what reasons and whom to blame for this occurrence is another story in itself.

§33.1 In Hungary, the basic requirement is that all children should be allowed to grow up as healthy, emotionally well-balanced people, in a complete family and to this end the Government encourages young people to marry and raise as many children as possible. §33.2 The Government believes that Hungarian society should be one based on healthy family values, as mentioned above.

§34.1 Currently, Hungary is spending more than twice the portion of the budget that it was spending in 1997 on family support. §34.2 With the reintroduction of incentives like tax breaks and other benefits, the resulting development, strengthening and improvement of family life can already be seen.

§35.1 The security for parents to raise children is now available. §35.2 At the same time, it is vital that the family role-model, represented by the majority of society, be of strong importance, with the backing of schools, the media, churches and civil organizations.

§36 In the child protection law draft proposal now before Parliament, the key amendment is that we first settle the fate of children currently in the State welfare system via having them adopted.

§37.1 If this does not happen, then they should be placed with foster parents and if this does not prove successful then the ultimate solution is to set up small family homes. §37.2 Only as a last resort would we consider placing the child in a State welfare institution. §37.3 Selecting foster parents and establishing a foster parent network is of utmost importance in accomplishing this.
§38 New organizations have been included, especially strong and established foster-parent networks like that of the Maltese Mission.

§39.1 Regarding families and the future of the nation, there is a strong chance of a more positive future. §39.2 Already we can see decreasing number of suicides and the rising birthrate.

§40.1 Any political party painting a grave picture of the future of this nation is making a big mistake. §40.2 Opposition parties have to criticize the Government, but they must also recognize results.

§41 How great it would be if we could also imagine ourselves celebrating the fact we are a nation with lots of healthy families raising lots of happy children.